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ABSTRACT 
 
STUMBLING TOWARD THE UP ESCALATOR: 
HOW TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND FINANCE 
HAVE COMPLICATED LATIN AMERICA’S QUEST FOR SUSTAINABLE, 
DIVERSIFIED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
SEPTEMBER 2018 
MARY ELIZA REBECCA RAY 
B.A., GUILFORD COLLEGE 
M.A., THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 
Ph.D. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: James K. Boyce 
 
This dissertation explores economic, environmental, and social aspects of Latin 
America and the Caribbean’s (LAC’s) halting steps away from commodity dependence 
(the “down escalator” envisioned by Hans Singer). It focuses on the most recent 
commodity boom (2003-2013), during which the region shifted back toward primary 
commodity production under a new policy framework aimed at limiting the 
environmental and social costs of this production while more broadly sharing its benefits 
through infrastructure, social spending, and closer oversight of foreign investors.  This 
dissertation’s three essays focus on three international flows: trade, development finance, 
and investment.  
The first essay weighs the environmental impact of LAC’s recent “China boom” 
in commodity exports. It finds that LAC primary commodity production is more 
  
 
viii 
environmentally intensive – in net greenhouse gas emissions and water use and 
contamination – than manufacturing. Applying these findings to the “China boom,” it 
finds that LAC-China exports are associated with significantly more carbon emissions 
and water use and contamination than other exports. 
The second essay evaluates environmental and social protections covering 
development lending for infrastructure in the Andean nations of Columbia, Ecuador, 
Peru, and Bolivia, which have experienced an infrastructure boom concurrent with the 
end of the commodity boom. This essay measures the environmental impact (using 
geospatial imaging of tree cover change) associated with the 84 infrastructure projects 
financed by international development institutions between 2000 and 2015 in these four 
countries. It finds that projects undertaken under policy regimes including guarantees of 
prior consultation with affected indigenous communities were associated with 
significantly less tree cover loss, showing the importance of social protections for 
environmental outcomes in the Andean region.  
The third essay examines recent environmental and social reforms in Ecuador’s 
oil sector. It uses a mixed-methods approach to evaluate the extent to which new 
partnerships with Chinese state-owned oil investors gave Ecuador the needed policy 
space to implement this regulatory framework. It finds that while Chinese oil firms 
operating in Ecuador have avoided the environmental and social misconduct that typified 
some past oil FDI, the state has struggled to carry out its own social and environmental 
protections, endangering its new “high-road” approach to extraction. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I.1 Introduction 
Over the last 50 years, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has made several 
attempts to diversify its production base away from relying on exports of raw materials, 
with mixed results. Over the last business cycle, these perennial efforts were further 
complicated by 21st-century trends in current and capital account flows. As a result, 
rather than diversification, the region has experienced a period of re-primarization. This 
time was different from previous commodity booms, however, at least regarding the 
regulatory frameworks in place. Across Latin America and the Caribbean – and 
especially in South America – governments during the commodity boom enacted 
sweeping protections for workers, indigenous groups, and the environment, as well as 
instituting greater redistribution of rents through social and infrastructure spending. This 
dissertation attempts to examine this recent re-orientation toward “high-road” primary 
production in light of longstanding structural problems with reliance on primary 
commodity production and exports.  
The present work is divided among three essays to cover three forms of 
international flows – trade, finance, and investment – at the regional, sub-regional, and 
national levels.  Essay 1 explores the rise of China as a major trading partner for LAC, 
how China’s demand for raw materials has contributed to LAC’s re-primarization, and 
the environmental impacts of this “China boom.” Essay 2 explores the infrastructure 
boom financed by international development finance institutions (DFIs) in the Andean 
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nations of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia in light of new social and environmental 
standards, to measure whether the environmental profiles of these projects has improved 
concurrently with the enactment of these new protections. Finally, essay 3 focuses on 
Ecuador, a small country highly dependent on oil exports and foreign investment in its oil 
sector, to evaluate governmental attempts at re-defining the terms of investor-state 
relationships with new investors: Chinese oil SOEs. 
I.2 The Resource Curse Globally and in Latin America and the Caribbean 
Hans Singer famously stated that developing nations’ attempts at reaching 
“sustained development and industrialization” are akin to “trying to run up a downward-
moving escalator” (1949; 7). Structural transformation requires such a dramatic 
dedication of capital that it is all but impossible for countries to do so using domestic 
resources, which are already occupied addressing their immediate needs. (In other words, 
their efforts are currently being used to avoid going down the downward-moving 
escalator on which they find themselves).   
Prebisch (1950; 5) elaborates further on this point by positing that Latin 
America’s development challenge was to avoid “restrict[ing] the individual consumption 
of the bulk of the population, which, on the whole, is too low, [while] accumulat[ing] the 
capital required for industrialization and for the technical improvement of agriculture.” In 
his view, the region faced two perennial obstacles in meeting this goal: countering short-
term fluctuations in export prices (due to global business cycles) and finding long-term 
financing for investment.  Thus, commodity-producing countries – and especially those 
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in Latin America – needed to mobilize international resources for industrial 
development.  
Ironically, though, attracting that international capital can be particularly difficult 
for commodity-producing countries, because of the unfavorable impacts of commodity 
exports on the stability of terms of trade and exchange rates. In perhaps their most 
famous legacy, Prebisch and Singer are both credited with developing the “Prebisch-
Singer hypothesis” that raw materials will display a secular price decline relative to 
manufactured goods in the long term, leaving commodity-exporting countries with 
inevitably declining terms of trade. Tests of this hypothesis have largely validated it over 
varying commodity baskets and time periods (see for example Arezki et al., 2013; 
Cuddington, 1992; Grilli and Yang, 1988; and Harvey et al., 2010). Furthermore, 
Blattman et al (2007) finds a significant association between commodity exports and 
terms of trade volatility, which in turn is linked to exchange rate volatility, diminished 
FDI inflows, and lower long-term GDP growth (Aiyar et al., 2013; Eichengreen, 2008). 
Prebisch expressed concern over “acute social antagonism” arising from the labor 
market fluctuations and, when monetary policy alone is used to address them, inflation, 
that are intrinsic in the boom-and-bust cycle of commodity exports (1950, 41).  Indeed, 
one of the major areas in which scholars have studied the so-called “resource curse” is its 
relationship to labor markets, discussed in more detail in the LAC case below. Even 
during booms, export-oriented agricultural and extractive production tend to use capital-
intensive methods and support few employees.  For example, Lódola, Brigo, and Morra 
(2010) calculate the employment intensity of 31 common agricultural products in 
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Argentina for the year 2007 and find that soy –which grew precipitously in price and 
production in the latest commodity cycle and drove Argentina’s export agriculture boom 
– is among the crops that supports the fewest employees for a given value of output. Soy 
is tied with rice at 7 jobs per million pesos; only barley supported fewer (with 6 jobs per 
million pesos). For its part, the extractive sector is famously capital-intensive, as is 
further discussed below in the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) case.  Thus, the 
benefits of commodity booms do not automatically spread throughout local communities 
by way of labor markets. Furthermore, commodity booms can lead to currency over-
valuation (the so-called “Dutch disease”), hurting the competitiveness of other, import-
competing industries, which can itself have significant employment impacts (Buiter and 
Purvis, 1980; Ismail, 2010; Palma, 2014).  
For all of these reasons (and many more that go beyond the scope of the present 
research), LAC has spent decades in halting steps toward diversifying away from reliance 
on exports of raw materials, with mixed results. The most recent commodity boom, from 
2003 to 2013, represented a step backward toward re-primarization but under a new 
context of higher social and environmental protections to address the “acute social 
antagonism” flagged by Prebisch. This regional turn – and the reforms applied to it – are 
discussed in more detail below.  
I.3 LAC: Commodities, Re-Primarization, and the Resource Curse 
Latin America has famously struggled to diversify away from reliance on raw 
materials for decades. As Figure I.1 shows, real manufacturing growth has lagged behind 
overall real GDP growth in LAC since the mid-1990s.  The two began to diverge further 
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in the mid-2000s during the years of the most recent commodity boom, 2003-2013. In 
fact, of all goods-producing sectors (shown in black in Figure I.1), only agriculture has 
kept pace with total value added. Latin Americanists refer to this phenomenon as “re-
primarization” (see for example Baumann, 2010; Burchardt and Dietz, 2014). As Figure 
I.1 also shows, the most recent downturn of 2015 brought slowdowns to all sectors, but 
extraction was particularly hard-hit and declined further in 2016. It is no exaggeration to 
say that the end of the commodity boom set extractive production back decades, as the 
last time it was at its 2016 level was roughly 20 years previously. Thus, though the bulk 
of this dissertation deals with the commodity price boom from 2003 to 2013, it is 
important to bear in mind that economic activity in these sectors is subject to rising and 
falling with prices and profitability.  
Figure I.1: Real GDP growth by sector, 1990-2016.  
 
Note: Commerce and logistics includes trade, hospitality, storage, and transportation. 
Source: Author’s calculation from ECLAC (n.d.) data. 
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The lagging of manufactured goods compared to non-manufactured goods is also 
visible in LAC exports. As Sinnot, Nash, and de la Torre (2010) note, LAC is 
disproportionately represented among world commodity exports – especially petroleum 
exports – relative to its share in world GDP. Table I.1 shows the LAC goods exports as a 
share of regional GDP, disaggregated by technology level, following the technology 
classification matrix of Lall (2000).1 Raw materials and their refined derivatives occupied 
a place of prominence in the LAC export basket – close to or above 10 percent of 
regional GDP – from 2003 to 2013, shown in darker shades of grey. In contrast, 
manufactured goods hit their peak of importance in 2004 and began to decline thereafter.  
  
                                               
1 Here, “resource-based” exports are primary commodities that have undergone minimal transformation, 
such as refined metals, gasoline, and soybean oil. 
  
 
7 
Table I.1: LAC exports as a share of GDP, by technology level, 1990-2016 
 Non-manufactured Manufactured, by tech. level GRAND 
TOTAL  Primary Resource-based Total Low Medium High Total 
1990 3.9% 1.4% 5.3% 0.7% 1.4% 0.2% 2.3% 7.6% 
1991 3.3% 1.9% 5.2% 0.9% 1.5% 0.3% 2.6% 7.8% 
1992 3.6% 2.2% 5.8% 1.3% 2.2% 0.8% 4.2% 10.0% 
1993 3.3% 2.1% 5.4% 1.4% 2.3% 0.8% 4.4% 9.8% 
1994 3.4% 2.1% 5.5% 1.3% 2.3% 0.9% 4.6% 10.1% 
1995 3.7% 2.5% 6.3% 1.4% 2.7% 1.0% 5.1% 11.4% 
1996 4.0% 2.4% 6.4% 1.5% 2.8% 1.2% 5.5% 11.9% 
1997 3.9% 2.3% 6.3% 1.6% 3.0% 1.4% 6.0% 12.2% 
1998 3.2% 2.2% 5.5% 1.6% 3.2% 1.7% 6.5% 11.9% 
1999 3.8% 2.6% 6.4% 1.8% 3.7% 2.3% 7.9% 14.3% 
2000 4.4% 2.8% 7.1% 1.9% 4.0% 2.7% 8.6% 15.7% 
2001 4.1% 2.8% 6.9% 1.9% 4.1% 2.7% 8.7% 15.6% 
2002 4.9% 2.9% 7.9% 2.3% 4.7% 2.8% 9.9% 17.7% 
2003 5.7% 3.4% 9.1% 2.4% 4.8% 2.8% 10.0% 19.1% 
2004 6.1% 4.4% 10.4% 2.4% 5.1% 2.8% 10.2% 20.6% 
2005 6.3% 4.6% 10.9% 2.3% 4.8% 2.5% 9.6% 20.6% 
2006 7.2% 4.1% 11.4% 2.1% 4.8% 2.6% 9.4% 20.8% 
2007 5.3% 4.1% 9.4% 1.8% 4.4% 2.2% 8.5% 17.8% 
2008 6.9% 4.5% 11.3% 1.7% 4.2% 2.2% 8.2% 19.5% 
2009 5.6% 3.9% 9.5% 1.4% 3.3% 2.1% 6.9% 16.4% 
2010 5.7% 4.2% 9.8% 1.3% 3.6% 2.0% 6.9% 16.7% 
2011 6.4% 4.1% 10.5% 1.2% 3.7% 1.8% 6.7% 17.2% 
2012 6.5% 4.3% 10.8% 1.3% 4.0% 1.8% 7.1% 17.8% 
2013 6.4% 4.0% 10.4% 1.3% 4.2% 1.8% 7.2% 17.6% 
2014 5.1% 3.5% 8.6% 1.4% 4.3% 1.8% 7.5% 16.1% 
2015 4.6% 3.4% 7.9% 1.5% 4.9% 2.0% 8.4% 16.3% 
2016 4.4% 3.4% 7.8% 1.4% 5.0% 2.0% 8.4% 16.2% 
Source: Author’s calculations based on UN COMTRADE (n.d.) and IMF (2017) data.  
Note: The commodity boom years of 2003-2013 are shown in darker shades of grey. Technology levels are 
defined using Lall (2000). “Resource-based” exports are primary commodities that have gone minimal 
transformation, including goods such as refined metals, gasoline, and soybean oil.  
Within the primary and resource-based commodity categories, the most important 
exports for LAC were petroleum, copper, iron, and soybeans (in their refined and 
unrefined forms), as Table I.2 shows. Each of these products increased their share of total 
exports sharply during the commodity boom compared to the previous 11 years. Other 
major LAC export commodities – including animal feed, other fruits and nuts, 
sweeteners, and coffee – remained constant or fell as a share of total exports.  
  
  
 
8 
Table I.2: Top LAC export commodities during the boom: share of exports, 1992-
2002  
1992-2002 2003-2013 
Crude petroleum oil 10.3% 14.8% 
Refined petroleum products 4.0% 4.3% 
Copper 2.2% 3.1% 
Unrefined iron 1.2% 2.5% 
Unrefined copper 0.8% 2.3% 
Soybeans and other oilseeds 1.2% 2.1% 
Animal feed 2.1% 1.9% 
Fruit and nuts (excluding oilseeds) 2.2% 1.6% 
Sugars, honey, and molasses 1.4% 1.4% 
Coffee and coffee substitutes 2.3% 1.2% 
Source: Author’s calculations from UN COMTRADE (n.d.) data. 
Figure I.2 shows average world prices for these four categories of regionally-
dominant commodity exports: petroleum, copper, iron, and soybeans. Each of these four 
categories saw explosive growth in prices – in both nominal and real terms – between the 
years of 2003 and 2013, before declining again after 2013. For this reason, this collection 
of essays defines the commodity boom – as LAC experienced it – as occurring from 2003 
to 2013.  
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Figure I.2: Average world prices, major LAC export commodities 
A. Nominal prices 
 
B. Real prices 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using World Bank (n.d.) data. 
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commodity boom compared to the prior decade. While all other segments grew in their 
contribution, agriculture and extraction each shrank in their contribution to just 0.1 
percent annually each.  
Table I.3: Contributions to average annual GDP growth in 5-year periods, LAC, 
1990-2015 
 1993-2003 2003-2013 
Agriculture, hunting, fishing, forestry 0.2% 0.1% 
Extraction 0.3% 0.1% 
Manufacturing 0.3% 0.4% 
Construction, utilities 0.1% 0.4% 
Transport, storage, commerce, hospitality 0.5% 0.9% 
Public administration 0.5% 0.7% 
Finance, insurance, real estate 0.3% 0.5% 
Total Value Added 2.1% 3.1% 
Source: Author’s calculations from ECLAC (n.d.) and IMF (2017) data. 
Furthermore, the commodity boom did not help LAC’s terms of trade, shown in 
Figure I.3. The export and import price indices both rose by about the same amount 
during the boom and in 2013 LAC’s terms of trade index was 2.3 percent below its 2003 
level. This lack of terms of trade benefit can be traced to one simple factor: a lack of 
diversification. When commodity prices rose, LAC countries, in general, had to import 
products that relied heavily on those commodities as inputs, including refined and 
manufactured goods using large shares of iron (such as steel products), copper (such as 
electronics), or petroleum (such as plastics). This is especially true for small commodity 
exporters such as Ecuador, whose exports are not only mostly limited to raw materials, 
but to a small number of raw materials.  
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Figure I.3: LAC import, export, and terms of trade indices, 1990-2014 
 
Note: Regional price indices are calculated as the weighted average of country indices, with weights 
defined as each country’s share of regional exports or imports in a given year. Where UN COMTRADE 
data are missing for a given country’s exports/imports in a given year, they are imputed from rest-of-world 
imports to/exports from that country and year.  Source: Author’s calculation using Penn World Table 9.0 
(Feenstra, Inkaar, and Timmer, 2015) and UN COMTRADE (n.d.) data.  
I.4 Social and Environmental Impacts of LAC’s Resource Curse  
Any examination of the social and environmental aspects of the resource curse in 
LAC suffers from a paucity of existing literature measuring this subject, partly due to a 
widespread absence of official data collection among regional governments. All three 
essays in this dissertation aim to help address this gap, by more closely examining – and 
where possible, measuring – the environmental and social aspects of LAC’s halting steps 
away from raw material dependence. In place of region-wide, quantitative work on the 
social and environmental costs and benefits of natural resource production in LAC, a 
deep literature of location-specific and sector-specific case studies has emerged from the 
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Ecological research, for example, shows that Brazilian Amazonian deforestation 
is significantly linked to beef and soy price trends. During commodity booms, the 
expansion of beef and soy production frontiers has driven deforestation in the Brazilian 
Amazon, showing that the responsiveness of agroindustry to world commodity demand 
trends has outstripped conservation attempts by the Brazilian government, resulting in a 
“boom and bust” cycle tying deforestation trends to world commodity price trends 
(Barbier 2004; Fearnside, Figueriedo, and Bonjour, 2013; Verburg et al., 2014). Dammert 
Bello (2015) shows similar findings for the expansion of the palm oil productive frontier 
in the Peruvian Amazon, with related impacts including both deforestation and 
community displacement. 
Research from the fields of political ecology and geography shows that 
environmental and social problems arising from commodity production are inextricably 
intertwined. Bunker (1985) shows that extractive production in the Amazon not only 
suffers from the “enclave economy” characteristics of low employment intensity 
described above but also amplifies these problems by competing with local communities 
for the natural resources (including land, water, and sinks) necessary for traditional 
livelihoods such as fishing, hunting, gathering, and smallholder agriculture. Thus, these 
new sectors endanger traditional livelihoods without creating a substitute employment 
boom.   
Employment estimates bear out these claims, especially for extractive activities of 
mining and drilling. Table I.4 uses household survey data to estimate direct employment 
per million USD of economic activity, by sector and country. These figures undoubtedly 
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overstate employment in agriculture, because they include peasant agriculture, which is 
famously labor-intensive. Plantation-style agriculture for exports has a very different 
labor profile, but one that is impossible to differentiate with existing survey data. 
Nonetheless, Table I.4 clearly shows that extraction requires very little labor input. This 
lackluster employment impact, combined with competition for the resources necessary 
for traditional livelihoods, creates conditions in which conflict can proliferate. 
Table I.4: Direct employment per millions USD of economic activity, by sector 
 Sector All Economic 
Activity 
Data 
Year Agriculture Extraction Manufacturing 
LAC Overall 159.5 4.8 50.1 45.7 2014 
Countries:      
Argentina 7.1 3.4 27.8 31.6 2014 
Bolivia 472.4 24.9 167.2 151.7 2013 
Brazil 134.4 0.0 52.1 42.4 2014 
Chile 89.0 7.3 30.4 29.2 2013 
Colombia 158.6 6.9 60.8 57.7 2014 
Costa Rica 84.2 13.2 39.3 42.4 2014 
Dominican Rep. 173.4 6.3 41.8 61.3 2014 
Ecuador 194.9 5.2 58.9 72.1 2014 
El Salvador 190.5 36.2 81.7 103.1 2014 
Guatemala 348.5 0.0 81.8 113.0 2014 
Honduras 487.5 52.1 128.5 172.3 2013 
Mexico 187.0 3.0 38.4 40.8 2014 
Panama 186.7 3.3 45.2 35.7 2014 
Paraguay 118.0 0.0 104.0 99.0 2014 
Peru 309.6 11.1 55.1 80.9 2014 
Source: Author’s calculations using World Bank WDI and UN ECLAC CEPALSTAT data. 
Leff (2001) notes that this dual nature of environmental and economic concerns 
makes the US-based framework of environmental justice an apt one for analyzing 
conflicts that arise in this context. Bebbington and Bury (2013) show how these concerns 
unite – further complicated by a context of long-standing ethnic and economic inequality 
– in conflicts surrounding extractive sectors in Latin America, particularly in the sectors 
of mining, gas and oil in the Andean region.  Sinnot, Nash, and de la Torre (2010) 
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explore the differing conflict triggers for various commodity sectors: mining (water 
contamination, noise, and particulate air pollution), oil (water and land contamination), 
agriculture (chemical runoff and land tenure disputes), and fisheries (over-exploitation).  
One way to estimate the social and environmental costs of commodity production 
in LAC is through the records of the Environmental Justice Atlas, or EJAtlas (Temper, 
del Bene, and Martinez-Alier, 2015). The EJAtlas complies information about 
environmental conflicts worldwide for the last several decades. This resource warrants a 
note of caution: it would be impossible for it to successfully capture and catalog every 
conflict with equal detail, though it is a remarkably rich source, with over 700 such 
conflicts reported for LAC. Furthermore, reporting is not perfectly comparable across 
geographic areas, as conflicts may be submitted to the database by civil society 
organizations, who do not all operate in similar political contexts – or with similar 
internet access – across nations or regions. Finally, it includes occasional duplicate 
reports of the same conflict or related conflicts. However, it still has value as a tool for 
overall estimates if used with caution. For example, even though it cannot capture 
differences across regions, it can still have value for illustrating the relative distribution 
of conflicts among sectors within particular geographic areas. Table I.5 shows the results 
of this comparison. It includes only those conflicts based on allegations of specific 
misconduct, and it attempts to exclude all instances of duplicate reporting. It shows 
conflicts listed by the sector accused of misconduct. 
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Table I.5: Distribution of environmental conflicts by triggering sector 
 Caribbean Mexico, Cent. Amer. South Amer. Total 
Agriculture, food processing 12% 15% 15% 15% 
Extraction and refining 42% 36% 56% 52% 
Manufacturing 8% 2% 2% 3% 
Tourism 8% 3% 1% 2% 
Commerce 0% 1% 0% 0% 
Infrastructure 23% 36% 21% 24% 
Public land management 8% 7% 3% 4% 
Multiple sectors 0% 0% 1% 1% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Note: “Public land management” includes public administration of land tenure and conservation projects.  
Source: Author’s calculations using EJAtlas (Temper, del Bene, and Martinez-Alier, 2015) data. 
As Table I.5 shows, the sector most closely associated with environmental 
conflict across LAC is extraction and refining, followed by infrastructure projects. In 
Mexico and Central America, notably, these two sectors tie for the dubious honor of 
triggering the greatest number of environmental conflicts. Taken together, primary 
sectors account for over half of all conflicts in every sub-region in LAC. It is clear that 
these sectors are disproportionately represented in social conflict; even at their height 
during the commodity boom, primary activities reached a peak of just 12.3 percent of 
GDP, in 2008 (ECLAC, n.d.). In contrast, manufacturing accounts for less than 10 
percent of environmental conflicts in each sub-region and only three percent for LAC as a 
whole, though it is a larger share of LAC GDP. The lowest level manufacturing reached 
as a share of GDP during the commodity boom was 12.6 percent, in 2014 – still quite a 
bit higher than its share of environmental conflicts. Thus, in LAC, primary production is 
much more environmentally conflict-intensive than manufacturing.  
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I.5 LAC’s Halting Progress Toward Diversification  
Both Prebisch and Singer wrote that some level of industrialization – to 
complement developing countries’ current comparative advantage in raw materials – was 
a necessary step toward development. Singer referred to industrial capital accumulation 
as one of the “seeds” of development (with human development goals such as reduced 
malnutrition and poverty as the “fruits” thereof), while Prebisch saw industrial capital 
accumulation as a necessary precursor for improvements in productivity – and ultimately, 
in living standards. Notably, neither called for the elimination of commodity production 
(despite later characterizations of their work by others) but rather sought what would 
today be called “diversification” or “moving up the value chain” to include higher value-
added production.  Thus, the present work focuses on efforts to diversify production, 
rather than to shift entirely to industrial production.  
Another reason for choosing diversification rather than industrialization as the 
framework for this work is the region’s experience with import substitution 
industrialization (ISI), which failed to catapult LAC into the realm of developed 
countries. Reasons for the LAC’s incomplete transition during ISI are myriad and go 
beyond the scope of the present work. However, a few points merit mentioning. Amsden 
(2001) shows that Latin American governments – particularly Argentina and Brazil – 
failed to implement “reciprocal control mechanisms” to discipline firms that did not meet 
state-directed goals such as innovation or employment. This problem touches on long-
standing aspects of the political economy of Latin America, distinguished as the world’s 
most unequal region in which well-connected executives are notoriously difficult to 
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regulate (see for example Campos and Nugent, 1999; O’Donnell, 1998; and Schneider 
and Soskice, 2009).  
Concurrent with, and partly due to, these institutional struggles with 
industrialization, Bértolo and Ocampo (2012) demonstrate that, counter to Prebisch’s and 
Singer’s urging to attract and mobilize international capital for development, most 
economic growth in LAC during the ISI era stemmed from increased domestic 
consumption rather than investment or exports.  Furthermore, they explain that ISI 
policies largely relied upon the importation of capital goods for industrialization, which 
required more foreign exchange than these nascent sectors generated through exports.  
The resulting debts could not withstand the interest rate shock of 1980s, contributing to 
the Latin American debt crisis and the end of ISI (for more, see Thorp and Whitehead, 
1987). 
After the ISI period, LAC shifted back toward commodity production and exports 
in a process of “re-primarization.” This shift began in the 1990s through a globalization-
led shift back toward LAC’s traditional sectors of comparative advantage. A second 
phase of re-primarization, beginning in the 2000s, can be attributed to the rise of China as 
a major trading partner (discussed further in Essay 1). This period of neo-extractivism is 
not exactly like the previous period, however. Groundswells of civil society organization 
(discussed more thoroughly in Essay 2 and 3) ushered in left-of-center governments 
across the region, most notably in South America, on promises of more broadly 
distributing the benefits – and limiting the costs – of mining, oil, gas, and agricultural 
production. These new governments – dubbed the “pink tide” by political scientists and 
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commentators – brought a long series of reforms, varying among locations, including 
environmental regulation, labor protections, indigenous rights guarantees, and the use of 
natural resource rents (either through nationalization or taxation) from the most recent 
commodity boom to fund increases in infrastructure and social spending. It should be 
noted that this increase in social spending has not completely offset the impacts of re-
primarization, which has resulted in weaker and less stable labor markets. As Bértolo and 
Ocampo (2012) note, “As a whole, social trends can … be summarized as involving 
increased social spending and coverage of social services accompanied by rising job 
precariousness and economic insecurity (248).” For more on the “pink tide,” these 
reforms, and their limits, see Ballón et al (2017); Fritz and Lavinas (2015); Lavinas and 
Simões (2017); Lustig (2014); and Vakis, Rigolini, and Lucchetti (2016).  
I.6 Structure of the Remainder of This Work  
It is this last period – the “pink tide” concurrent with the most recent commodity 
boom – that this collection of essays examines through the framework of social, 
environmental, and economic sustainability. It explores how LAC reforms have 
interacted with trends in international flows – trade, development finance, and investment 
– to impact the region’s long-standing goals of establishing a more diversified and 
sustainable economic paradigm. In two out of the three essays, it also considers the 
introduction of new or strengthened partnerships with China. As mentioned above, the re-
primarization that has characterized the most recent commodity boom has been driven by 
demand for raw materials from China. However, Chinese investors and lenders have also 
shown themselves to be willing to adapt to local regulatory environments (Buckley et al.; 
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2007; Ramasamy, Yeung, and Laforet, 2012; Gallagher, Irwin, and Koleski, 2012). 
Between these two factors, then, the entrance of China as a major partner for the region 
has reinforced the region’s re-primarization with social and environmental protections – 
referred to here as “high-road re-primarization” or “high-road extractivism.”  
In doing so, the present research attempts to update Prebisch and Singer’s 
diagnosis. Rather than focusing on Singer’s goal of “sustained development and 
industrialization,” it broadens its view to include the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) framework, which 
encompasses economic, social, and environmental sustainability (UNDP, 2016). 
Underlying Prebisch and Singer’s analyses was a deep concern for avoiding crises. The 
UNDP SDGs address crisis avoidance on the economic and social levels envisioned by 
Prebisch and Singer, complemented with avoidance of environmental crises, which can 
no longer be isolated from social and economic stability, especially considering the 
confluence of social and environmental conflicts in LAC discussed above.  Addressing 
each of the 17 SDGs independently would be beyond the scope of this work. Instead, it 
takes the “three pillars” approach to sustainability (encompassing economic, social, and 
environmental realms, as discussed by Littig and Griessler, 2005 and reflected in the 
UNDP SDGs) as an updated version of Prebisch and Singer’s view.  
This work applies the “three pillars” framework to LAC’s interaction with each of 
the three global flows, at three different levels of detail: 
• Essay 1 examines trends in trade for the entire LAC region. 
  
 
20 
• Essay 2 examines development finance for infrastructure for the western Andean 
nations of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. 
• Essay 3 examines foreign direct investment in the oil sector in Ecuador. 
The first essay weighs the environmental (and indirectly, due to the links 
discussed above, social) impacts of LAC re-primarization in its most recent, China-driven 
phase. It finds that, regardless of the region’s attempts to improve the distribution of costs 
and benefits of with re-primarization, LAC natural resource production is intrinsically 
crisis-prone environmentally and socially. It generates more net carbon emissions, and 
uses or contaminates more water, per million dollars of exports than manufacturing does. 
Applying these findings to the so-called “China boom” of re-primarization from 2003 to 
2013, it finds that LAC exports to China are associated with significantly more carbon 
emissions and over twice as much water use and contamination as other exports. 
The second essay explores ways in which new environmental and social 
protections have altered the profile of development lending for infrastructure in the 
Andean nations of Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, which have experienced an 
infrastructure boom concurrent with the commodity boom and which are home not only 
to the most biodiverse sections of the Amazon rainforest but also the highest 
concentration of uncontacted and voluntarily isolated indigenous communities on Earth. 
During this time, these countries – and some of the international development finance 
institutions (DFIs) that lend to them – developed regulatory protections to limit potential 
social and environmental costs, including environmental impact assessments (EIAs); 
prior consultations with affected indigenous communities and in some cases, free, prior, 
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and informed consent (FPIC) of those communities; and grievance mechanisms (GM). 
This essay measures the environmental impact (using geospatial imaging of tree cover 
change) associated with the 84 infrastructure projects financed by international DFIs 
between 2000 and 2015 in these countries. It finds that those projects undertaken under 
policy regimes including prior consultation provisions were associated with significantly 
less tree cover loss. This finding reinforces the intertwined nature of environmental and 
social concerns in LAC and reinforces other scholars’ work on the “environmentalism of 
the poor,” that environmental impacts can be mitigated by empowering those most likely 
to be affected by them (see for example Martinez-Alier, 2002).  
The third essay more closely examines the mechanisms of “high-road 
extractivism,” characterized by ambitious environmental and social protections. It traces 
the development of a new regulatory regime overseeing oil production in Ecuador, the 
severing of relationships with oil investors with unsatisfactory environmental and social 
performance records, and the welcoming of new partners in the form of Chinese SOEs. It 
explores the extent to which these new partnerships gave Ecuador policy space to 
implement its new regulatory framework. It finds that the Chinese oil SOEs in Ecuador 
have avoided the environmental degradation and social conflicts that characterized US-
based MNC oil investment in past commodity booms. However, Ecuador’s model of 
“high-road extractivism” cannot be labelled a success. Legal research and key 
stakeholder interviews show that Ecuador is falling back into a pattern of conflict-ridden 
oil extraction, due in large part to the Ecuadorian government’s inability to implement its 
own prior consultation protections before auctioning new oil concessions.  
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CHAPTER 1 
1. THE PANDA’S PAWPRINT:  
THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE CHINA-LED  
RE-PRIMARIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In the last 10 years, China has grown into a major trade and investment partner for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). It is now South America’s top export 
destination and the second-largest source of FDI inflows for the LAC region. However, it 
has also come to symbolize the trend of “re-primarization” in LAC: the shift away from 
state-led industrialization back toward LAC’s traditionally competitive production of raw 
commodities.  While much has been written about how this new relationship fits into the 
history of industrial policy in LAC, less has been written about its environmental impacts 
in LAC, one of the world’s most biodiverse regions and home to most of the world’s 
annual tropical deforestation. Several prominent scholars have hypothesized that primary 
production should be less environmentally intensive than manufacturing in middle-
income countries like those in LAC. This chapter sets out to test that hypothesis against 
evidence from the last decade in LAC. It finds that primary production is more 
environmentally intensive than manufacturing in LAC (measured through net greenhouse 
gas emissions and water use), and LAC exports to China are significantly more 
environmentally intense than other LAC exports.  
1.2 Context: LAC’s China-Led Re-Primarization and its Environmental Impacts 
Many scholars have discussed re-primarization in LAC and the importance of 
China in driving it. Other scholars have posited that LAC has a comparative advantage in 
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inexpensive production of environmentally-intensive goods and serves as a “pollution 
haven,” attracting investment in these sectors from countries with stronger environmental 
safeguards. Finally, the work of a third group of scholars, grounded in the environmental 
Kuznets curve, predicts that primary production should be environmentally less intensive 
than industrial production in middle-income countries such as those in LAC. This chapter 
aims to complement the existing literature by testing the differences in the environmental 
impact of production in LAC by the level of technology involved, and whether the China-
driven trend of re-primarization in Latin America has, in fact, driven production into 
environmentally “cleaner” or “dirtier” sectors.  
1.2.1 Re-primarization in LAC 
Scholars and policy makers alike have noted the tendency of LAC production to 
shift back toward primary commodity production over the last few business cycles, 
dubbed “re-primarization.” The seminal works by Amsden (2001) and Bértolo and 
Ocampo (2012) both draw a direct link between this trend and the broader switch in Latin 
American development strategy from one based on state-led industrialization through 
import substitution (ISI) toward one based on neoliberal macroeconomic policy and 
export orientation. Bértolo and Ocampo point out that the late ISI period was 
characterized by trade deficits, counter to its stated goals. Amsden resolves this seeming 
paradox by explaining that LAC continued to rely foreign capital goods in order to 
support domestic manufacturing. Bértolo and Ocampo show that only in the last decade, 
since 2004, has Latin America regained positive trade balances. However, these trade 
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surpluses came at the cost of an erosion of the gross fixed capital formation, and a shift 
back toward the primary production that characterized the period before ISI.  
It is important to resist overstating the extent of re-primarization. As Bértolo and 
Ocampo (226) note, much of this apparent shift is an artifact of rising commodity prices. 
Thus, to more accurately assess the timeline of re-primarization, it is important to 
measure it in real terms. Figure 1.1 shows real growth by sector over the last 20 years.   
As Figure 1.1 shows, goods production of all types has slowed relative to overall 
GDP growth in the last decade, but this is especially true for manufacturing. In fact, of 
the three merchandise-producing sectors (agriculture, extraction, and manufacturing), 
only agriculture has largely kept up with overall value added in the LAC economy. (In 
the 2015 recession, all sectors suffered, but none so much as extraction, which was set 
back by decades. Its growth appears to be the most volatile of any sector shown here, but 
it is too early to tell when it will recuperate.) The manufacturing slowdown relative to 
overall real GDP growth began in the early 2000s, so the remainder of this chapter will 
look more closely at the last decade. 
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Figure 1.1: Real GDP growth for the LAC region, selected sectors, 1990-2016 
Source: ECLAC CEPALStat database. 
1.2.2 China’s Role in LAC’s Re-Primarization  
Scholars attribute LAC’s re-primarization over the last decade to the rise of China 
as the world’s largest economy and as a major trading partner for the LAC region. China 
has contributed to LAC’s re-primarization in two ways: by raising global demand (and 
prices) for raw commodities and by intensifying competition in the production of 
inexpensive manufactured goods.  The UN Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC, 2015) and Myers and Jie (2015) expand on the former point, 
showing that Chinese investment and import demand have spurred LAC primary 
production. Gallagher and Porzecanski (2010) and Mesquita Moreira (2007) expand on 
the latter point, showing that China has out-competed LAC for market share in world 
manufacturing exports.  
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All of the authors listed above agree on one important point: China’s demand for 
LAC exports has been overwhelmingly concentrated in low-technology goods. Figure 1.2 
shows China’s rising share of LAC merchandise exports during the 2003-2013 
commodity boom, according to the Lall (2000) technology scale. Overall, China’s share 
of LAC exports more than doubled, from 3.4 to 7.8 percent of the total. China is now the 
largest market for South American goods, and the second-largest market for goods 
exports from LAC overall. The fastest growth was seen among primary goods, in which 
China more than tripled its market share, growing from just 4.2 to 13.1 percent of the 
region’s exports in a decade. However, this growth has left manufacturing behind at just 
two percent of the total.  
Figure 1.2: China’s share of LAC exports, by technology level 
	
Source: Author’s calculations using Lall (2000) and UN Comtrade data.  
Note: Detailed information can be found in Appendices A.1 and A.2. 
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China’s importance as an LAC export market jumped in 2009 because of the 
global downturn, which China survived relatively unscathed. Instead of falling back to its 
pre-recession levels, however, China’s importance continued to grow. By 2013 its market 
share was about twice its level from a decade before for total exports and for resource-
based goods, and over four times as large for primary exports.  
As Table 1.1 shows, China drove the growth in non-manufactured exports from 
Latin America. China accounted for about 40 percent of the growth in the LAC region’s 
primary and resource-based exports, compared to about 20 percent of total export growth 
and just four percent of the growth in manufactured exports, in real terms.2 
Table 1.1: China’s contribution to the re-primarization of LAC exports 
 Sectors Total 
Primary Res.-based Manuf. 
LAC Exports to China (billions of real USD)  
   
2003 3.6 7.9 3.3 14.8 
2013 20.4 19.2 7.0 46.6 
Growth 466.7% 143.0% 112.1% 214.9%      
Total LAC Exports (billions of real USD)  
   
2003 111.8 104.0 217.4 437.7 
2013 154.0 132.0 305.1 600.2 
Growth  37.7% 26.9% 40.4% 37.1%      
China’s share of LAC exports   
  
2003 3.2% 7.6% 1.5% 3.4% 
2013 13.3% 14.5% 2.3% 7.8% 
Growth 314.9% 91.3% 51.2% 129.4%      
China's contribution to LAC export growth 40.0% 40.3% 4.2% 19.6% 
Source: Author’s calculations using CEPALStat, FAO World Food Price Index, Lall (2000), UN Comtrade, 
and the World Bank GEM Commodity Database. Detailed information can be found in Appendices A.1 and 
A.2. 
                                               
2 See Appendix A.2 for details on the deflation methods used in this essay. 
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Interestingly, Table 1.1 also shows that LAC exports overall did not tilt 
dramatically away from manufactured goods: primary and manufactured goods both grew 
by about the same amount, and significantly more than resource-based goods. This 
implies that the re-primarization shown in Figure 1.1 may be due to switching from 
consuming domestically-produced to imported manufactured goods.   Nonetheless, it 
remains clear from Table 1.1 that the effect of China’s demand has been one of spurring 
primary production much more than it would be otherwise.  Based on the information 
presented above, it is safe to conclude that China has pushed LAC exports toward 
primary and resource-based products.  The sections below estimate the environmental 
impact of this re-primarizing pressure. 
1.2.3 LAC as a “Pollution Haven:” an Imperfect Fit for the China Boom 
Given LAC’s new surge in investment and exports, the “pollution haven” 
framework is an intuitive fit for predicting the expected effect on of the China boom on 
the environmental intensity of LAC exports. This approach posits that developing 
countries attract pollution-intensive investment and specialize in those sectors under 
conditions of free trade. Stern (1998) expresses this as an extension of the Heckscher–
Ohlin trade theory, in which developing countries have a comparative advantage in 
pollution-intensive production because of a dearth of costly regulation.  In this line, 
Levinson and Taylor (2004) find a significant, positive impact of US environmental 
regulations on imports within that industry, implying that environmental protections 
discourage investment at home but encourage investment abroad instead. In contrast, 
Birdsall and Wheeler (1993) find that openness to trade among Latin American countries 
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(with relatively weak environmental protection) was associated with less pollution-
intensive growth in the 1960s through 1980s, and hypothesize that market forces such as 
the introduction of newer technology and shareholder pressure can account for the 
seeming paradox, in line with the “pollution halo” hypothesis. However, neither of these 
approaches can adequately address LAC’s “China boom,” because each of them assumes 
a North-South trade and investment relationship, where the importing country has higher 
environmental standards than the exporting country. So, LAC’s “China boom” is fertile 
territory for new explorations of the environmental impact of South-South relationships. 
1.2.4 Environmental Effects of Re-Primarization in Middle-Income Countries  
A more apt framework must incorporate the relative environmental intensities of 
different sectors within developing countries. Grossman and Krueger (1995) and 
Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001) both allow for further exploration in this area. 
Grossman and Krueger describe a mechanism behind the observed “environmental 
Kuznets curve,” in which in which middle-income countries have more environmentally-
damaging production than either poor or rich countries. In their framework, developing 
countries’ pollution intensity rises as those countries industrialize, and then falls again, in 
part due to an “induced policy response” demanded by the citizenry to curtail the 
environmental damages caused by industry. Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001) 
develop a model to measure the impact of trade liberalization on emissions in poorer and 
richer countries. Their model anticipates that under free trade, poor and middle-income 
countries will switch from industrial to primary production, following the Heckscher–
Ohlin theory that countries will gravitate toward specialization in either capital- or labor-
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intensive production depending on the relative strengths of their endowments.3 Primary 
commodity production is treated as intrinsically environmentally cleaner than 
manufacturing, as Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor incorporate Grossman and Krueger’s 
“induced policy response” by modeling an environmentally beneficial scenario of free 
trade in which rich countries (with more stringent environmental safeguards) specialize in 
capital-intensive industry, satisfying both their comparative advantage in capital-
intensive industry and their ability to mitigate its pollution.   
Both of these models suffer from limitations associated with data availability on 
emissions at the time of their publication. To operationalize their models, both studies 
rely on estimates of SO2 emissions, which are strongly associated with industrial 
production. Thus, both of these papers assume that technology level and emissions are 
directly related, absent policy interventions controlling industrial emissions. The 
Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor model assumes two kinds of production: one with low 
technology inputs and no emissions, and one with high technology inputs and high 
emissions. Grossman and Krueger envision three levels of production: clean primary 
production; emissions-intensive industrial production in middle-income, recently 
industrialized countries; and clean industrial production in wealthy countries with 
intensive environmental regulations. It is now possible to revisit their original approaches 
as they apply to the more politically pressing environmental impacts of the early 21st 
                                               
3		While	both	sides	of	the	China-LAC	trade	relationship	are	middle-income	countries,	Antweiler,	Copeland	and	Taylor’s	approach	is	still	applicable	here.	As	Gallagher	and	Porzecanski	(2010)	show	in	great	detail,	China’s	greater	capital	intensity	(and	relatedly,	higher	labor	productivity)	has	allowed	Chinese	manufactured	goods	to	displace	Latin	American	manufactured	goods	not	only	within	the	LAC	region	but	also	in	traditional	LAC	export	markets	such	as	the	United	States.	Thus,	China	has	taken	the	role	of	the	richer	trading	partner	in	Antweiler,	Copeland	and	Taylor’s	model.	
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century: greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and water use and contamination. The former 
is now the subject of global negotiations, with active debates surrounding the proper role 
for developing countries in limiting global carbon emissions. The latter is the most 
frequent cause of environmentally-based social conflict in LAC, according to the case 
studies of Ray et al (2017).  More recently published estimates of GHG intensity, 
technology levels, and trade data that have been published since those studies allow for 
such an exercise, detailed below. 
1.3. Testing the Models: Should Middle-Income Countries Specialize in Primary 
Production? 
Thanks to recently published, detailed estimates of the environmental impacts of 
specific commodities for most countries in the world, it is now possible to test the 
expectation that specializing in primary production is environmentally beneficial for 
developing countries, and for Latin America in particular.  Specifically, this is possible 
for two forms of environmental impacts, one global (greenhouse gas emissions, GHG) 
and one local (water use).  Each of these analyses is conducted separately in the sections 
below, drawing on the various methodologies to measure the embodied carbon and water 
in exports used by Peters (2011), Biewald et al (2014), and Sato (2014).  They focus on 
exports rather than overall production, because export data is available disaggregated into 
highly specific categories through the UN Comtrade database.  
For both GHG emissions and water use, environmental science literature has 
estimated the environmental footprints of most exports, disaggregated by the traded items 
and countries of origin. These disaggregated trade line items can be further classified into 
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technology levels using the method developed by Sanjaya Lall (2000).4  Lall’s 
classification system has five main categories: primary products (unrefined agricultural 
and extractive products), resource-based products (processed agricultural and extractive 
products such as soybean oil and refined petroleum), low-technology manufactured 
goods (such as apparel and basic metal products), medium-technology manufactured 
goods (such as vehicles and chemical products), and high-technology manufactured 
goods (such as electronic and medicinal products). The resulting technology-based 
environmental footprints are explained in detail below. 
1.3.1 Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Contrary to the expectation suggested by the environmental economics literature 
cited above, the most GHG-intensive products in poor and middle-income countries are 
not high-technology manufactured goods but primary goods, resource-based goods (such 
as soybean oil and refined petroleum), and lower-technology manufactured goods. Figure 
1.3 shows the average carbon intensity (measured in kilograms of CO2 equivalent per 
dollar) for exports in each of Lall’s technology categories and each income level of 
countries.  
  
                                               
4 Details for these calculations can be found in Appendix A.1. 
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Figure 1.3: Net GHG emissions of exports by technology level and country income 
level, 2007 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Lall (2000), Peters (2013), and UN Comtrade. Country income 
levels are defined using World Bank categories. Detailed information can be found in Appendix A.1. 
These emissions calculations use GHG intensity data from a model developed by 
Peters (2011), which establish the net GHG embedded in each dollar of exports, by 
country of origin and GTAP category.5 By applying these intensities to UN Comtrade 
export data for each country in the world and classifying that data into Lall’s (2000) 
technology categories, it is possible to calculate average net GHG intensities of globally 
traded merchandise by technology level. Figure 1.3 shows the result for the year 2007, 
the most recent year of Peters’ data.6   
                                               
5 The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) classifies trade into 57 categories of goods and services, with 
heavy disaggregation among agricultural products.  Because they are much broader categories than the 
SITC categories used by the UN Comtrade database, it is simple to establish a corresponding GTAP 
category for each SITC category. More information on GTAP is available at 
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/.  
6 For a detailed explanation of the calculations behind Figure 1.3, see Appendix A.1.  
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Figure 1.3 shows GHG intensity on a net basis, including the destruction of 
natural carbon sinks through deforestation and the clearing of grasslands. It also includes 
non-CO2 sources of carbon emission, such as methane from agricultural production. 
Finally, it includes emissions from upstream inputs. For example, for electronic goods, 
these intensity estimates include emissions embedded in the entire supply chain, from the 
mining the metals involved through the manufacturing process itself.   
According to Figure 1.3, for middle-income countries, net GHG emissions peak in 
resource-based goods before falling again as technology levels continue to rise. These 
falling emissions associated with higher-technology goods indicate that as technology 
levels increase, the value of these exports is rising more quickly than the emissions. For 
goods whose emissions are associated with the upstream inputs (for example, leather 
goods whose emissions are associated with cattle ranching), this means that the value of 
the primary inputs is falling as a share of the final value of the exports.  
A prima facie analysis would support the hypothesis, associated with the 
environmental Kuznets curve, that if middle-income countries have more 
environmentally-intensive production, it is because they traditionally specialize in natural 
resource processing and lower-technology manufacturing.  However, this inverted-U 
relationship between technology level of merchandise exports and net GHG emissions 
does not appear to hold for Latin America and the Caribbean, as Figure 1.4 shows. While 
in other regions, emissions are higher for natural resource refining and low-technology 
manufacturing, LAC shows the highest net GHG emissions from primary productions 
and falling emissions with each increase in technology.  
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Figure 1.4: Net GHG emissions of export baskets by region and technology level, 
2007 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Lall (2000), Peters (2013), and UN Comtrade (n.d.). Detailed 
information can be found in Appendix A.1. 
LAC is unique among world regions in the fact that the GHG emission intensity 
of exports falls with every increase in technology. Every other region shown in Figure 1.4 
exhibits an inverted-U relationship between technology level of merchandise exports and 
their net GHG emissions.7  This outsized GHG intensity for primary products in LAC is 
likely related to the importance of land-use change as a driver of GHG emissions in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. However, LAC is not totally unique among regions in the 
                                               
7  A seeming paradox emerges between Figure 1.3, which shows a downward-sloping relationship for low-
income countries (LIC), and Figure 1.4, which shows and inverted-U relationship for Sub-Saharan 
African (SSA). That paradox is resolved because of the importance of Nigeria and the Southern African 
Customs Union countries, which are not LIC but collectively accounted for over half of SSA exports in 
2007. The technology-GHG relationship for these countries resembles that shown for SSA in Figure 1.4: 
an inverted U.  In contrast, LAC is a mix of lower-middle, upper-middle, and high-income countries. The 
largest exporters in the region (Mexico and Brazil) comprise over half of all LAC exports and are both 
upper-middle income countries, but they are outliers for that income level, with a downward-slowing 
relationship between technology and GHG intensity. More country-specific disaggregation of LAC 
results can be found in Figure 1.10 and Appendix A.3. 
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importance of land use change as a contribution to total net GHG emissions. WRI (2014) 
shows that in 2007 (the year shown in Figure 1.4), land use change and forestry 
accounted for 31 percent of net GHG emissions in LAC, a rate much higher than the 
world average (seven percent) but surpassed by the rate of Sub-Saharan Africa (47 
percent). Thus, the results shown in Figure 1.4 should be interpreted as the total GHG 
impact of various sectors of economic activity for export, with the understanding that 
LAC is among the highest – but not the highest overall – among regions for the 
importance of land use change among drivers of GHG emissions. The use of net, rather 
than gross, emissions in this analysis is intentional, as the inclusion of land use change 
incorporates the social impacts of environmental damages (for more on this relationship 
in Latin America, see Chapter 2). Across the Amazon basin as a whole, ecologists have 
shown that agriculture, extraction, and most importantly, the access roads necessary to 
get those products to cities and ports, have been the major drivers of deforestation (see 
for example Cattaneo 2001, Fearnside 2006, and Swing 2011).   
In sum, from a GHG perspective, it is unambiguously better for the LAC region to 
produce high-technology goods.  This is especially true in an era of export-oriented 
growth, in which planners depend on export revenue for boosting GDP.  
1.3.2 Water Footprints 
Regarding water footprints (which incorporate both water use and water 
contamination), the trend is clearer: primary products are overwhelmingly more water 
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intense. Figure 1.5 shows that this relationship holds globally, regardless of country 
income level.8 
Figure 1.5: Water intensity of exports by tech. level in 2005, by country income level 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Lall (2000), UN Comtrade (n.d.), and WaterStat (n.d.). Country 
income levels are defined by World Bank categories. Detailed information can be found in Appendix A.1. 
All regions share this same basic profile, as Figure 1.6 shows. There is a stark 
difference between the primary and manufactured goods worldwide, and the LAC region 
is no different.  
  
                                               
8	The	water	footprints	incorporated	into	this	analysis	include	green,	blue,	and	grey	water	footprints,	defined	as	(respectively)	the	use	of	water	by	plant	root	uptake;	surface/ground	water	uptake	for	domestic,	industrial	or	irrigation	uses;	and	the	use	of	water	to	assimilate	pollutants	(ie,	the	creation	of	greywater).	These	three	types	of	water	footprints	are	collectively	called	“water	use	and	contamination”	in	this	chapter,	though	it	is	worth	pointing	out	that	the	impacts	of	each	are	not	interchangeable.	Groundwater	used	for	irrigation,	for	example,	may	in	some	circumstances	be	reused	for	other	purposes.	Nonetheless,	this	chapter	aggregates	the	three	types	of	water	footprints	both	for	the	sake	of	simplicity	and	in	order	to	take	into	account	the	various	sources	of	water-based	social	conflict,	as	competition	for	clean	water	can	arise	from	either	the	use	or	contamination	of	water	sources.		
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Figure 1.6: Water intensity of exports by region and technology level in 2005 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Lall (2000), UN Comtrade (n.d.), and WaterStat (n.d.).  Detailed 
information can be found in Appendix A.1. 
The water footprint calculations included here rely on the Water Footprint 
Network’s WaterStat database, developed by Mekonnen and Hoekstra (2011 a, b; 2012). 
Mekonnen and Hoekstra identify the water footprints (expressed as cubic meters of water 
per thousand USD) for each six-digit Harmonized System (HS) code of exports, averaged 
across the period 1996-2005. Figure 1.6 applies those average intensities to UN Comtrade 
export data for every country in the sample for the year 2005, the most recent year of 
Mekonnen and Hoekstra’s calculations.  (See Appendix A.1 for a full explanation of the 
calculations used here.) 
In sum, it seems that from an environmental standpoint LAC would be wise to 
concentrate on manufacturing. In fact, the greater the technology used in production, the 
better the environmental impact of each dollar of exports will be. 
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1.4. The China Effect on GHG and Water Intensities of LAC Exports 
The previous sections have established two key points. First, LAC market 
deregulation coincided with Chinese demand for raw materials to drive re-primarization 
of LAC exports. Second, primary commodity production is much more environmentally 
intensive than manufacturing in Latin America, as measured by GHG and water 
intensities. From these two points, it is reasonable to expect that LAC exports to China 
have been more environmentally intensive than other LAC exports. It is possible to test 
that expectation by repeating the analysis behind figures 1.3 through 1.6, dividing the 
LAC export basket by destination market.9 The sections below do so, and find that LAC 
exports to China have indeed produced more net GHG emissions and used more water 
than other LAC exports.    
1.4.1 Greenhouse Gas Intensity of LAC Exports to China and Elsewhere 
The same method used to calculate relative GHG intensities of exports based on 
technology levels in Figures 1.3 through 1.6, above, can be used to compare the GHG 
intensities of LAC exports to China and other LAC exports. The results appear in Figure 
1.7.10  
  
                                               
9 These differences over time and between export market are due entirely to export basket composition. 
Differences in production technology are impossible to trace, because of opaque value chains from 
factory or farm to final destination country. Moreover, even if such granularity were available for one 
year, supply chains would be unlikely to remain constant between years, especially for highly-
substitutable primary products.  
10 In order to trace the relative GHG intensities of exports over time, this section uses the same deflation 
technique as Table 1.1, above, described in Appendix A.2. 
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Figure 1.7: Average GHG intensity, LAC exports by destination 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using CEPALStat, FAO World Food Price Index, Peters (2013), UN 
Comtrade, and the World Bank GEM Commodity database. Information for the GHG intensity of overall 
economic activity is from World Resources Institute 2013. Detailed information can be found in 
Appendices A.1 and A.2. 
From 2004 through 2013, LAC exports to China were about 16 percent higher in 
net greenhouse gas emissions per dollar than other exports. Regression analysis shows 
that this difference was highly statistically significant (t=6.1), as shown in Appendix A.3.  
However, it should be noted that among individual countries, the “China effect” 
ranges widely. In Guatemala, for example, exports to China are only 81 percent as GHG-
intensive as other exports, whereas in neighboring Honduras and El Salvador, exports to 
China are over twice as GHG-intensive as other exports (201 and 254 percent, 
respectively). Figure 1.8 compares the average GHG intensity of exports to China and 
other exports for each LAC country and sub-region in this study, as well as for the LAC 
region as a whole, from 2004-2013. 
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Figure 1.8: Average GHG intensity, exports to China and the R.o.W., by country 
and region 
 
Note: GHG intensity is measured as kg of CO2 equivalent in net emissions per real (2004) US dollar. 
Regions shown here include the Caribbean, Mexico and Central America, and South America.  
Source: Author’s calculations using CEPALStat, FAO World Food Price Index, Peters (2013), UN 
Comtrade, and the World Bank GEM Commodity database.  
1.4.2 Water Intensity of LAC Exports to China and Elsewhere 
By focusing the water analysis in Figures 1.5 and 1.6 on LAC exports and 
comparing the results by export basket, it is possible to determine how much LAC 
exports to China differ from other exports in their water footprint. As Figure 1.9 shows, 
LAC exports to China have used or contaminated two to three times as much water as 
other exports, per real dollar over the years of the most recent commodity boom.11  
  
                                               
11 As in the GHG analysis above, these differences over time and between export markets are due entirely 
to basket composition. 
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Figure 1.9: Average water intensity, LAC exports by destination 
l 
Source: Author’s calculation using CEPALStat, FAO World Food Price Index, UN Comtrade, WaterStat, 
and the World Bank GEM Commodity database.  Detailed information can be found in Appendices A.1 
and A.2.  
Regression analysis (detailed in Appendix A.4) shows that on average over the 
last decade, LAC exports to China used or contaminated 2.75 times as much water per 
dollar than other exports, and that this relationship is highly statistically significant 
(t=22.0).  These differences are due entirely to basket composition differences, as LAC’s 
exports to China are much more heavily concentrated in agricultural commodities than is 
the remainder of LAC exports. As with GHG emissions, LAC countries have had a wide 
variety of experiences, but in this case the largest exporters (Mexico, Brazil, and 
Argentina) all have much higher water footprints in their exports to China than in other 
exports. Figure 1.10 shows the average water intensities of LAC exports to China and to 
the rest of the world, for each country, sub-region, and for LAC overall, from 2004-2013.  
0.8
1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9
2.7
2.6
2.8
3.0 3.0 3.0
2.1
2.5 2.5
2.3
2.6
0
1
2
3
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
M
3 
of
 H
2O
 p
er
 th
ou
sa
nd
 re
al
 (2
00
4)
 U
SD
Exports to China
Exports to R.o.W.
  
 
43 
Figure 1.10: Average water intensity, exports to China and the R.o.W., by country 
and region 
 
Note: Water intensity is measured as cubic meters of water per real (2004) US dollar. Source: Author’s 
calculation using CEPALStat, FAO World Food Price Index, UN Comtrade, WaterStat, and the World 
Bank GEM Commodity database.   
1.4.3. Considering GHG and Water Together: Scale and Composition Effects 
From 2003 to 2013, the real value of LAC exports rose by 37 percent, while the 
net GHG emissions from exports rose by 40 percent and the water used in exports rose by 
59 percent. From this information alone, it is clear that the composition of LAC exports is 
shifting toward more environmentally intensive production.  
How much of the rise in export-based GHG emissions and water use is due to the 
simple growth of exports, and how much is due to the shift in basket composition toward 
more environmentally-sensitive sectors? Following the example of Grossman and 
Krueger, it is possible to disaggregate the effect by scale and by composition. (It is not 
possible to distinguish an effect for technology changes, Grossman and Krueger’s third 
Water intensity higher in exports to China than other 
exports 
Water intensity lower in exports to China than other 
exports 
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category, because this analysis applies Peters’ GHG intensity estimates for 2007 and 
WaterStat’s estimates for 1996-2005 to the entire decade of trade data.) 
From 2003 to 2013, net GHG emissions from LAC exports rose by 40 percent, 
from 709 to 996 megatons. If the carbon intensity of those exports had remained stable 
and only their volume changed, the emissions would have risen 37 percent, or 92 percent 
of the actual rise. So, between scale and composition effects, scale accounted for 92 
percent of the increase in export-based GHG emissions and composition accounts for the 
remainder.  Thus, if the total amount of LAC exports had remained at its 2003 level, but 
had still shifted toward China, net GHG emissions from exports would have risen by 
about eight percent.   
Regarding water use, the total water footprint of LAC exports rose by 59 percent, 
from 383 to 608 billion cubic meters from 2003 to 2013. If the water intensity of exports 
had remained at its 2003 levels, the water used by those exports would have risen by just 
37 percent, or about 62 percent of the actual rise in export-related water use. So, the 
basket composition of exports accounted for the other 38 percent of the rise in the water 
use associated with exports. 
Of course, in reality, scale and composition interact. The growth in exports to 
China represents not only a shift in the trade basket toward China, but also an overall 
growth in exports, concentrated in primary sectors. Table 1.2 explores the share of 
growth in emissions and water use resulting from the rise of China’s importance and the 
rise of exports in each technology level.  It shows that China had an outsized influence on 
this increase. China accounted for 7.8 percent of the real volume of LAC exports in 2013 
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(using 2004 USD), but accounted for 19.6 percent of LAC’s export growth over the 
previous decade, 22.7 percent of the increase in export-based GHG emissions, and 33.4 
percent of the increase in export-based water usage. 
The majority of LAC’s growth in both export-based net GHG emissions and 
water use was due to a rise in primary goods. As Table 1.1 shows, above, China was 
responsible for about 40 percent of the growth in both primary and resource-based goods.  
Table 1.2: China’s role in the growth of LAC’s export-based GHG emissions and 
water use 
 Share of real 
exports 
 Share of total growth, 2003-2013 
2003 2013 
Volume of exports  
(real 2004 USD) 
Export-based net 
GHG emissions 
Export-based 
water use 
By destination       
   China 3.4% 7.8%  19.6% 22.7% 33.4% 
   Rest of World 96.6% 92.2%  80.4% 77.3% 66.6% 
   Total 100.0% 100.0%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
By technology level      
   Primary  25.5% 25.7%  30.3% 51.0% 96.6% 
   Resource-based 23.8% 22.0%  21.7% 26.3% 4.4% 
   Low-tech manuf. 9.9% 7.4%  -1.1% 0.4% -1.6% 
   Med.-tech manuf. 28.7% 33.4%  39.2% 19.9% 0.4% 
   High-tech manuf. 11.0% 10.0%  7.7% 1.4% 0.1% 
   Other 1.0% 1.5%  2.2% 1.0% 0.0% 
   Total 100.0% 100.0%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Author’s calculation using CEPALStat, FAO World Food Price Index, Peters (2013), UN 
Comtrade, WaterStat, and the World Bank GEM Commodity database.  For detailed information, see 
Appendices A.1 and A.2. 
1.4.4 LAC-China Environmental Balance of Payments: Importing Carbon, 
Exporting Water 
The analysis above accounts only for one side of the LAC-China relationship: 
exports from Latin America to China. But LAC imports from China are not without their 
own environmental impact. For example, Peters (2011) shows that measuring the carbon 
emissions associated with a country’s consumption – rather than production – changes 
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the global emissions profile dramatically. For most countries, including trade with China 
(including the carbon in imports from China and excluding the carbon in exports to 
China) results in much higher carbon emissions than simply calculating the amount of 
emissions produced domestically.  This effect is due to the high concentration of Chinese 
exports in light manufacturing, and the relatively weaker environmental standards in the 
country.     
While Peters does not specifically address Latin America, the trend he notes 
appears to hold for the LAC region as a whole. Even though the region’s exports to China 
are more GHG intensive than other exports, the region’s imports from China are even 
more GHG intensive, in part due to differences in the energy matrix and differences in 
the composition of the trade basket. The GHG intensity of LAC imports from China 
ranged from 2.5 to 2.7 kg CO2 equivalent per USD between 2004 and 2013 – much 
higher than the intensities of 1.8 to 2.0 for LAC exports to China. As a result, LAC is a 
net importer of greenhouse gas emissions from China, of 289 kilotons in 2013. For 
reference, the World Resources Institute estimates that the LAC region produced a total 
of 4.6 gigatons of CO2 equivalent in net GHG emissions in 2012.  
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Figure 1.11: LAC-China “balance of payments” in net greenhouse gas emissions 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on UN Comtrade (n.d.), Peters (2013), CEPALStat (n.d.), FAO World 
Food Price Index (n.d.), and the World Bank GEM Commodity Database (n.d.). For detailed information, 
see Appendices A.1 and A.2.   
This relationship is reversed when it comes to water use, as Figure 1.12 shows.  In 
2013, LAC exported nearly 120 billion cubic meters of embedded water to China, or 
nearly eight times as much water as the amount embedded in its imports from China. For 
reference, Lake Nicaragua holds 108 billion cubic meters.  
  
31 34 34
45 41
64 64 71
77
95
58 67
95
128
165
140
214
259
294 289
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Ki
lo
to
ns
 o
f C
O2
 e
qu
iv
al
en
t
LAC exports to China
LAC imports from China
  
 
48 
Figure 1.12: LAC-China “balance of payments” in water 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on UN Comtrade (n.d.), CEPALStat (n.d.), FAO World Food Price 
Index (n.d.), WaterStat (n.d.), and the World Bank GEM Commodity Database (n.d.). For detailed 
information, see Appendices A.1 and A.2.   
Figures 1.11 and 1.12 show that LAC is, in effect, exporting water and importing 
carbon. Overall, LAC’s boom in exports to China has driven the region’s production into 
carbon- and water-intensive sectors. At the same time, LAC’s boom in imports from 
China has indirectly increased the region’s carbon footprint.  
1.5 Discussion 
 The results shown here suggest a need for continued research in this area, on both 
theoretical and empirical fronts. Theoretically, there is room to bring together threads 
from environmental and structuralist economic literature in relation to the LAC region. 
Literature on structural transformation in developing economies, from Prebisch and 
Singer to Mazzucati (2013)’s theory of the “entrepreneurial state” is ripe for expansion to 
consider not only the impact of structural transformation on capital accumulation, terms 
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of trade, and living standards, but also on environmental aspects of quality of life such as 
climate and natural resource management. For example, a relevant new theoretical 
framework might incorporate these aspects into the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis (that 
commodity exporters face secular, long-term declines in their terms of trade) or Bhagwati 
(1958)’s theory of immiserizing growth (in which economic growth associated with 
primary commodity booms can lead to deteriorating terms of trade and ultimately 
declining incomes). Likewise, the area of trade and the environment is ripe for expansion 
to include the impacts of commodity booms on countries’ ability to meet their Paris 
Agreement commitments and the likelihood of natural resource-based social conflict.   
 Empirically, this line of research could benefit from an examination of 
technological differences in LAC’s export basket to different markets. The analysis here 
relies on publicly-available trade data, and the changes in the scale and composition of 
trade baskets reflected therein.  However, Grossman and Krueger (1995) famously 
disaggregate trade changes into three types: scale, composition, and technology. It may 
be possible to test for differences in technology between similar LAC merchandise 
exports to China and elsewhere. To do so, future research might benefit from identifying 
representative firms in LAC that exclusively or overwhelmingly produce for export to 
China and similar firms that produce for export elsewhere. If significant differences 
emerge in the labor or capital intensity of those firms’ production methods, those findings 
may indicate that the environmental and social impacts of LAC’s “China boom” go 
beyond the scale and composition changes examined here and include technology 
changes as well. 
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1.6 Conclusion 
China’s importance to the LAC economies is well established, as the largest 
export market for South American goods and the second-largest export market for LAC 
overall. But it is also well established that Chinese demand for raw materials and the 
competition from cheap Chinese manufactured goods have driven LAC away from 
manufacturing and back toward primary commodity production. Contrary to the 
hypothesis of the environmental Kuznets curve, primary production is more 
environmentally sensitive than manufacturing in LAC: it creates more net greenhouse gas 
emissions and uses or contaminates more water per million dollars. Thus, it is not 
surprising that LAC exports to China are more environmentally sensitive than other LAC 
exports. Given these risks associated with this important new economic relationship, 
LAC governments would be wise to approach it with reinforced emphasis on setting 
environmental safeguards that meet the needs of their development strategies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT FOR PEOPLE OR WITH PEOPLE? 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL SAFEGUARDS,  
INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT, AND DEFORESTATION IN THE 
ANDEAN AMAZON, 2000-2015 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the turn of the 21st century, South America’s Andean nations have adopted 
some of the world’s most ambitious environmental and social protections surrounding 
infrastructure investment, including most notably the right to prior consultation for 
affected indigenous communities. These reforms have been matched by the adoption of 
equally ambitious environmental and social safeguards (ESS) by the international 
development finance institutions (DFIs) who provide the projects’ financing, including 
not only prior consultation but also the establishment of formal grievance mechanisms for 
affected communities.  
These reforms could hardly have arisen at a more crucial time. Since the end of 
the recent commodities boom, Andean nations have undergone an infrastructure boom to 
take its place. For example, between 2008 and 2015, infrastructure investment rose from 
3.6 to 8.4 percent of GDP in Bolivia, from 3.4 to 6.5 percent of GDP in Colombia, and 
from 3.3 to 6.9 percent of GDP in Peru (INFRALATAM, 2017). Given the extreme 
biodiversity of the Andean Amazon and the high concentration of indigenous territories 
there, appropriate regulatory frameworks may help prevent damage to marginalized 
communities and the forests where they live.  
This essay specifically examines the role of these ESS in limiting the 
environmental impact of infrastructure projects in the Andean Amazonian countries of 
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Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, since 2000. It finds that prior consultation, though 
it is often considered a social rather than environmental safeguard,12 has a significant role 
in limiting infrastructure-related deforestation. Formal grievance mechanisms, however, 
are not found to have a significant deforestation impact, though they may prove crucial in 
limiting other risks such as social conflict or reputational damage for the development 
finance institution (DFI) involved. 
2.2 Background 
This section reviews the established connection between infrastructure projects 
and environmental degradation, and the history of DFIs’ and nations’ reforms to lessen 
that degradation. While infrastructure projects – especially roads and dams with 
reservoirs – have a long history of association with environmental problems, Andean 
nations and the international DFIs have established an ambitious array of protections to 
buffer these impacts. 
2.2.1 Infrastructure and Deforestation 
Scholars have long noted the connection between Amazonian deforestation and 
new infrastructure projects. Most of the resulting literature focuses on two types of 
infrastructure projects specifically: roads (especially paved roads) and dams (especially 
those with reservoirs).  
The use of satellite imagery to trace deforestation around roads is a decades-old 
practice with an established track record. For example, Malingreau and Tucker (1988) 
use satellite imagery to trace deforestation in three states of the Brazilian Amazon, and 
                                               
12  For example, CAF (2016) lists prior consultation under “Consultation and Community Relations” in its 
2016 ESS framework, and the IADB (2006b) lists it as a crucial part of “support for indigenous peoples 
governance.”   
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find strong visual evidence linking new roads in this area with nearby deforestation.  
Pfaff (1997), also using satellite imagery, develops a statistical model and finds that 
paved roads – and the arrival of the first settlers to use those roads to establish new 
settlements – are both strong predictors of Amazonian deforestation. Furthermore, Pfaff 
also finds that this impact can be observed not only in the same county were the roads 
occurred, but in nearby counties as well. Laurance, Goosem, and Laurance (2009) 
perform a meta-analysis to compile additional mechanisms for the connection between 
roads and deforestation, and find causes including the “edge effect” of drastic changes in 
temperature and sunlight from within the forest canopy to the roadside, which impacts 
animal and plant life near new roads, periodic flooding of nearby forests due to poorly-
maintained culverts, and disrupted paths for animal migration and plant pollination.  
The environmental impact of dams is somewhat more complex than that of roads. 
While it is true that the electricity produced by hydroelectric dams can be considered 
“renewable,” it is not necessarily ecologically sound. Beyond initial forest clearing for 
reservoir installation, they can also become what Fearnside (2004) calls “virtual methane 
factories,” converting biodegrading organic material on the reservoir floor to methane 
instead of the much less greenhouse-potent carbon dioxide (which would be the product 
of such biodegradation on a forest floor).  The International Development Finance Club, 
a global umbrella organization which includes all of the DFIs studied here, considers 
hydroelectric dams to be “sustainable” only when they can demonstrate a net reduction in 
carbon emissions (IDFC 2015). The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism 
considers dams to have net reductions in carbon emissions only when they have a power 
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density ratio (the ratio of the dam’s potential output in megawatts divided by the surface 
area of its reservoir, measured in square kilometers) of no less than four.  
While the present analysis focuses solely on deforestation and not carbon 
emissions, abundant evidence links new dams – especially those with reservoirs – to 
forest loss. Finer and Jenkins (2012) find that dams contribute to deforestation both 
directly, at the site of their construction or by the flooding necessary for reservoirs, and 
indirectly, along the paths of the power transmissions lines and roads that connect the 
dams to nearby cities and power markets.  
2.2.2 A Brief History of International DFIs’ and Countries’ Environmental and 
Social Safeguards 
This chapter focuses on projects financed by international DFIs – which includes 
multilateral development banks (MDBs) as well as national development banks (NDBs) 
and national export credit agencies (ECAs) operating abroad – because of their unique 
governance structure. For MDBs as well as NDBs and ECAs operating abroad, project 
governance and responsibility is shared between national governments and external DFIs.  
This dual structure may lead to mutually reinforcing networks of governance: affected 
communities may be able to look to one institution for recourse when the other does not 
adequately mitigate their risks.   
Major ESS reforms have taken place in DFIs and among Latin American 
governments since 2000.  This section reviews the development of ESS among those 
DFIs that have seen major reforms since 2000 (the World Bank, the Inter-American 
 55 
Development Bank, the Development Bank of Latin America, and the Export-Import 
Bank of China) and the nations of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia.13 
2.2.2.1 ESS Reform Among International DFIs: Not from Within but from Without 
Of the international DFIs studied here, four institutions have undergone major 
ESS reform: The World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the 
Development Bank of Latin America (CAF, for its original Spanish acronym), and the 
Export-Import Bank of China (CHEXIM). In each case, ESS reform arose not simply out 
of enlightened management or even far-sighted risk mitigation on the parts of 
international DFIs. Rather, ESS arose in large part thanks to external pressure from a 
variety of sources. Mikesell and Williams (1992) cite three main external avenues for 
pressure on international DFIs’ environmental performance: public opinion in the country 
where the DFI is based, NGOs in affected countries, and international organizations such 
as arms of the United Nations.  In the cases of Washington, DC-based World Bank Group 
(WBG) and Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), civil society in both affected 
and headquarter countries cooperated to improve lending governance. In the case of CAF, 
reform has come through changing incentives thanks to action on the part of international 
organizations.  
Plater (1998), examining the reform process within the World Bank, points to 
alliances between organizations of affected people in developing countries and partners 
                                               
13  The World Bank Group (WBG) and the Inter-American Development Bank each have multiple lending 
arms, which financed different types of projects. The statistical analysis below considers four of these 
windows separately: the World Bank’s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (which 
provides sovereign loans to middle-income countries) and International Finance Corporation (which 
lends to private sector projects), and the Inter-American Development Bank’s main IADB (sovereign) 
lending window as well as its private-sector lending arm, the International Investment Corporation (IIC). 
Where the phrase “World Bank” occurs, the intention is to indicate the WBG institution rather than a 
particular lending arm. For the IADB, context should be sufficient to distinguish institution from lender. 
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in wealthy countries, coalescing around so-called “glocal” conflicts, in which global civil 
society organized around local environmental problems caused in turn by global capital 
flows. Anguelovski and Martinez (2014) highlight the importance of organizing that 
continued after Plater published his work, including the gathering of 200 NGOs in Kyoto 
in 1997. 
This history is especially important here, given the catalytic function that 
(Brazilian) Amazonian deforestation played in spurring international DFI ESS reform, as 
Rich (1994) and Blanton (2007) explain. Between 1981 and 1983, the World Bank lent 
$443.4 million to Brazil for projects related to Polonoroeste, Brazil’s Amazonian 
highway and agricultural expansion program. Showing the importance of this case in 
catalyzing future reforms, Blanton (2007, 254) refers to it as the “paradigm case of 
controversial World Bank projects and effective NGO opposition.” Unfortunately, 
although World Bank involvement was conditioned on government commitments to 
respect established indigenous territories and nature reserves, the ensuing rapid migration 
of a half-million settlers into the newly-accessible forest outpaced legal protections, 
leading to widespread deforestation and displacement of traditional communities. In 
1984, US Congressional Rep. James Sheuer invited Brazilian ecologist and future 
Minister of the Environment José Lutzenberger to testify before the House Committee on 
Science and Technology’s Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agricultural Research 
and Environment (Eckholm 1984). Sheuer later wrote to the U.S. Treasury Secretary, 
urging Treasury to pressure the World Bank to tighten its oversight of Polonoroeste 
loans, while 32 NGOs from 11 countries jointly wrote their own letter to the World Bank 
itself with similar demands (Rich 1994, 122). In May 1985, the World Bank announced 
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in a meeting with environmental groups that it had halted all Polonoroeste disbursements 
two months earlier.  
Also in 1985, the US abstained when a Polonoroeste-related project came up for a 
vote in front of the IADB, prompting a moratorium on disbursement until Brazil 
established a project plan to limit environmental degradation and impacts on indigenous 
lands. In October of that same year, 120 Amazonian rubber-tappers met with 
representative of the Environmental Defense Fund, Brazil’s Institute for Amazonian 
Studies, and Oxfam. These organizations lobbied the U.S. Treasury Department, who in 
turn forwarded a report by them to the World Bank and the IADB. In the face of the 
public perception of moral authority of international environmental groups – and the 
dominant political power of the U.S. Treasury Department on these MDB boards – the 
World Bank and the IADB both began to reformulate their approaches to projects in 
sensitive social and environmental territories.  
Within a few years, these efforts bore fruit in significant reforms to loan 
governance at the World Bank and the IADB. In 1989, U.S. Congressional Rep. Nancy 
Pelosi sponsored an amendment (later known simply as the “Pelosi Amendment”) to the 
Oil Pollution Act (which would be passed in 1990 as H.R. 1465), requiring US 
representative to MDB boards to abstain or oppose MDB project proposals that did not 
give board members adequate environmental impact assessments (EIAs) at least 120 days 
before the board vote (Sanford, 1998). That same year, the World Bank formalized its 
commitment to conducting EIAs with Operational Directive 4.00, Annex A on 
Environmental Assessment (reprinted in WB 1999). In 1991 it expanded this oversight to 
including prior consultation with affected indigenous communities, with Operational 
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Directive 4.20 on Indigenous Peoples (WB 1991). In 1990, the IADB followed suit and 
published its “Strategies and Procedures on Sociocultural Issues as Related to the 
Environment,” enshrining “the principle of community consultation and participation 
throughout project design and implementation” (IADB 1990, 6). This principle was 
codified in 1996, with a requirement that all IADB proposals “contain a chapter and/or 
annex approved by the CESI [Committee on Environment and Social Impact]” (IADB 
1996, 9).    
While Brazilian civil society was mobilizing around issues of deforestation and 
community displacement due to the Polonoroeste highway program, NGOs in India were 
mobilizing over the similarly-problematic Narmada Dam in Gujarat, India, which 
resulted in the displacement of approximately 120,000 people.  The World Bank 
responded with the establishment of a panel of outside experts (headed by Bradford 
Morse, United Nations Development Programme officer) to review Bank policy and 
performance in the Narmada case. The resulting “Morse Commission” report, published 
in 1992, called for a greater role for civil society in monitoring project outcomes and 
envisioned the establishment a formal grievance mechanism (“Accountability,” 2009). 
Meanwhile, during the 1994 IDA replenishment, the US pressured the World Bank to 
create such a mechanism. Within months, the World Bank established their Inspection 
Panel and the IADB established their Independent Investigation Mechanism, the 
predecessor to today’s ICIM (Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism). 
As mentioned above, CAF’s history of ESS reform came after its financial 
incentives changed, thanks to trends among international organizations. In 1992, the 
Global Environment Facility was established in the preparations for the Rio Summit, to 
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support qualifying “green” development projects. In 2009, the Green Climate Fund was 
established at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, with a 
similar mission. In order to quality for accreditation by these two organizations, CAF had 
to establish its own formal ESS out of the general principles that had guided its lending 
beforehand (CAF 2010). In 2015, CAF published formal safeguards to govern its joint 
projects with GEF (CAF 2015) and received GEF accreditation (GEF 2015). In 2016, 
CAF published overall ESS and received accreditation with the GCF (CAF 2016, GCF 
2016).  
Unlike the MDBs listed above, the Export-Import Bank of China (CHEXIM) 
introduced reforms after pressure from its own national government rather than from civil 
society or international organizations. The China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC), together with China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection, published a new 
“Green Credit Policy” in 2007, calling on banks to take responsibility over the 
environmental impact of their lending projects (Aizawa and Yang 2010). Five years 
thereafter, the CBRC issued another decree, the “Green Credit Guidelines,” encouraging 
banks to create their own criteria for environmentally-responsible lending (CBRC 2012). 
In 2016, CHEXIM complied by publishing its “White Paper on Green Finance,” which 
makes specific commitments to “foreground” and mitigate social and environmental risks 
in its loans.  
2.2.2.2 ESS Reform among Andean Nations: Not from Above but from Below 
For the most part, the nations studied here adopted ESS related to new 
development projects more recently than did the DFIs discussed above. These ESS arose 
mostly out of ongoing struggles between indigenous communities and foreign extractive 
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(oil, gas, and mining) investors. These struggles have been well-documented elsewhere 
(see for example Bebbington and Bury, 2013; Fontaine, 2003; and Ray et al, 2017). 
Because of the ethnic and economic nature of these conflicts, the primary outcome has 
been the right of indigenous communities to be consulted in conjunction with 
development projects that affect them.  
All four countries studied here signed on to the International Labour 
Organisation’s Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples within a decade of its 
introduction (ILO 1989). Furthermore, all four have enshrined ILO 169 in their national 
legal standards, as Table 2.1 shows. As Baluarte (2004) and Larsen (2016) note, the 
ratification of ILO 169 brought a seismic shift in how governments and communities 
approached resource disputes.14  
Table 2.1: Adoption of ILO 169 and incorporation into national law, by country 
Country ILO 169  Ratification Year 
National Legislation 
Year Mechanism 
Bolivia 1991 2009 Nueva Constitución Política del Estado 
Colombia 1991 1997 Supreme Court Decision SU039/1997 
Ecuador 1998 2010 Ley Orgánica de Participación Ciudadana 
Peru 1994 2011 Ley de Consulta Previa 
Sources: Asamblea Constituyente de Bolivia (2009), Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador (2010a), Congreso de 
la República (2011), ILO (1989), Ocampo and Agudelo (2014). 
The mechanism by which ILO 169 is reflected in national legal protections varies 
widely across these four countries, discussed below. Colombia was the first country in 
which national legal protections were established. These emerged out of conflict, similar 
                                               
14  ILO 169 is a revision and replacement of the 1957 ILO Convention 107, which protected indigenous 
peoples from labor exploitation in European overseas colonies.  In 1986, an ILO Committee of Experts 
concluded that ILO 107 was written for the benefit of indigenous peoples but without sufficient 
allowances for self-determination for the indigenous communities themselves. ILO 169 explicitly 
addresses the rights of indigenous communities to decide if, when, and how they are to integrate with 
surrounding cultures.  In effect, the transition from ILO 107 to ILO 169 represents a concerted effort to 
move from a model of development for people to one of development with people (ILO, n.d.) 
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to the World Bank and IADB ESS discussed above.  Colombia’s 1991 constitution 
dictates that indigenous territories are to be governed by indigenous councils, including 
in matters of resource use and distribution and the preservation of natural resources 
(“Constitución Política de Colombia”, 1991, Art. 330). Nonetheless, in 1992, Occidental 
Petroleum signed a contract with the Colombian oil company Ecopetrol for seismic 
exploration of the Samoré Block in the territory of the U’wa indigenous community. The 
U’wa sued Occidental in 1995 and won in court, only to have the Supreme Court 
overturn the decision. However, in 1997, the national ombudsman’s office (Defensoría 
del Pueblo) challenged this ruling to the Constitutional Court on behalf of the U’Wa 
people, and won. This ruling, SU039/1997, set the stage for future rulings, as Haller, et al 
(2007) note. For example, Decree 1320 of 1998 was established to provide a framework 
for indigenous consultation but was struck down itself for having been enacted without 
the indigenous consultation required by SU039/1997 (Ocampo and Agudelo, 2014). 
The other countries shown here (Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru) enacted legal 
protection to codify ILO 169 in a less combative context. In each of these three countries, 
leftist (in the cases of Bolivia and Ecuador) and center-left (in the case of Peru) 
governments were elected in the early-to-mid 2000s thanks to coalitions built among 
indigenous, labor, and environmentalist organizations. Intrinsic to these victories were 
promises to enact major legal reforms to enshrine the causes dear to these groups.  
Both Bolivia (2009) and Ecuador (2008) established new constitutions as part of 
this process. Bolivia’s constitution was the stronger in this regard, guaranteeing that rural 
indigenous communities should have the right to prior and informed consultation over 
any use of natural resources found in their territories (Asamblea Constituyente de Bolivia 
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2009, Article 403). Ecuador’s new constitution did not explicitly enshrine the right to 
indigenous consultation but did give Mother Nature (Pachamama) her own legal rights, 
specifying that anyone would be legally allowed to sue public authorities to force them to 
defend these rights. In practice, this meant that communities need not prove that their 
private property is damaged in order to use the courts to stop and mitigate the damage 
(Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador 2008, Art. 71), a move especially favorable to NGOs, 
indigenous communities with uncertain land tenure, and the poor. Tanasescu (2013) notes 
that in its first enforcement, a municipal was made to pay for restoration of a river whose 
path it had modified to make room for a new road, thanks to a lawsuit on behalf of nature 
by local citizens.  
Both Ecuador and Peru have enacted laws to directly address the right to prior 
consultation for indigenous communities. Ecuador’s 2010 Citizen Participation Law 
states that the national government must consult with indigenous, Afro-Ecuadorian, and 
coastal Montubio communities regarding all decisions that might affect their environment 
(Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador 2010a, Art. 83). Peru’s 2011 “Law of Prior 
Consultation” codifies these rights in much more detail, recognizing the rights of 
communities’ elected officials to negotiate on their behalf and laying out a seven-step 
process for the consultations (Congreso de la República 2011). For more on these 
electoral changes and the resulting legal protections in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, see 
Ray and Chimienti (2017), Sanborn and Chonn (2017), and Saravia López and Rua 
Quiroga (2017).  
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2.3 Model of Analysis  
This chapter aims to further the literature on infrastructure, development banks, 
and the environment, by testing the association between major ESS reforms and the 
environmental performance of infrastructure projects financed thereafter. This section 
explains the choices of environmental impact studied (deforestation), method (tree cover 
change as measured by satellite imagery) and location (the nations of Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru, and Bolivia).  
2.3.1 Choice of Impact Studied: Deforestation 
The analysis below examines only one of many possible environmental impacts: 
deforestation. Many other important social and environmental aspects of infrastructure 
expansion exist, of course, including water quality, air quality, access to ancestral lands, 
and the cultural politics surrounding the popular conceptualizations of natural resources 
as spiritual, community, or economic entities are all important aspects of the social and 
environmental impacts of the expansion of infrastructure projects in Latin America (see 
for example Carruthers 2008, Wickstrom 2008).  
Nonetheless, as the history section above mentions, NGO mobilization regarding 
DFI-backed projects in these countries centered on the preservation of forests for the sake 
of communities therein. Thus, this chapter chooses deforestation as its primary impact 
variable in order to measure whether civil society participation requirements improved an 
outcome demonstrated to be highly important to civil society. Furthermore, deforestation 
is an attractive choice of environmental impact to study, as the preservation of the 
Amazon rainforest unites the concerns of international DFIs concerned with their climate 
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impacts and the local concerns embodied in what Martinez-Alier (2014) calls “the 
environmentalism of the poor.”  
2.3.2 Choice of Method: Satellite Imagery 
As mentioned above, the use of satellite data to measure tree cover change is 
well-established. This chapter uses the “Global Forest Change” database managed by the 
University of Maryland in conjunction with Hansen et al (2013). At the time of this 
writing, the Hansen et al data included data for tree cover change between 2000 and 
2015. It is compiled based on USGS LANDSAT imagery with 30m resolution. As Chen 
et al (2015) note, this resolution is fine enough to show deforestation, though it is too 
coarse to show forest degradation. However, it cannot distinguish between forest cover 
and plantation-based tree cover. For that reason, this analysis mostly uses the term “tree 
cover loss” instead of “deforestation,” unless it clear from the satellite images that no 
plantations are involved.  
Methodologically, this chapter expands on the work of Buchanan et al (2013) at 
William and Mary’s AidData Research Lab. These authors use the Hansen database to 
investigate the relative tree cover change rates within 10km of World Bank projects 
globally. Instead of seeking differences among lenders, the present analysis investigates 
the impacts of ESS reforms, regardless of DFI or national government involved.  It also 
relaxes the traditional use of 10km radii around projects, and instead uses site-specific 
radii established using a common set of rules across projects, discussed in more detail 
below.    
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2.3.3 Choice of Location: Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia 
This chapter takes as its geographic focus the western Amazon, home to some of 
the most sensitive territory, both socially and environmentally, in the Western 
Hemisphere. Figure 2.1 shows all of the international DFI-financed infrastructure projects 
in Amazonian countries from 2000 to 2015, together with indigenous territory and 
varying levels of biodiversity. The richest biodiversity in South America is found along 
the western periphery of the Amazon basin, especially in eastern Ecuador and northern 
Peru. Among the indigenous territories shown here, arguably the most sensitive are those 
in the “Uncontacted Frontier” of the border region between Peru, Brazil, and 
northwestern Bolivia: home to the highest concentration of uncontacted and voluntarily 
isolated indigenous communities in the world (Survival international, n.d.).   
Of the 100 projects shown in Figure 2.1, 84 are in the western Andean countries 
of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. Nearly all of the projects shown to be in areas 
that are both highly-biodiverse and home to indigenous communities are in a few sections 
of these four countries: The Pacific coast of Colombia, central Ecuador, inland Peru, and 
western Bolivia.  Venezuela is home to just three projects, Suriname has one, and Brazil 
has 17 – but none in areas that are both highly biodiverse and indigenous territory. 
Because of this geographic distribution of international DFI-financed infrastructure 
projects, this chapter specifically focuses on the history and performance of projects in 
the four countries of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia.   
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Figure 2.1: Completed international DFI-financed infrastructure projects in 
Amazon-basin countries, 2000-2015 
 
Note: Individual projects considered here are listed in Appendix B.1. Source: DFI annual reports, Bass et 
al. (2010), LandMark (n.d.), Red Amazónica de Información Socioambiental Georreferencial (n.d.). 
2.3.4 Choice of Projects 
For the purposes of this analysis, infrastructure projects are defined as all “hard” 
infrastructure projects (energy and transportation) that contribute to an increase in a 
country’s fixed capital stock. Thus, while roads form a crucial element of this dataset, not 
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all roads are included. Specifically, roads are included when they entail paving 
previously-unpaved roads or rehabilitating paved roads, but they are excluded in the 
following cases: 
• Repairing roads after natural disasters, 
• Re-grading of unpaved roads, which must occur repeatedly in order to maintain 
usability, 
• Periodic maintenance of paved roads 
• All work regarding neighborhood (as opposed to inter-municipal) roads  
However, major rehabilitations of paved roads, which make the difference between a 
road being passable by truck year-round or otherwise, are included.  
2.4. Data Description 
As mentioned, this chapter examines the tree cover change surrounding 84 
infrastructure projects financed by international DFIs from 2000 to 2015. The following 
sections describe the characteristics of these projects, tree cover change around them, and 
the ESS that applied to them, either from DFI or national authorities. 
2.4.1 Tree Cover Change Near international DFI-Financed Infrastructure Projects 
Between 2000 and 2015, the 84 projects studied here were associated with the 
loss of 5,663 km2 in tree cover within 10km of the projects, or 14.2 percent of the total 
nearby tree cover. As Table 2.2 shows, this rate of tree cover loss is much higher than the 
overall rate of deforestation in those four countries over this time period, which was just 
3.9 percent.  This level of tree cover loss is equivalent to 25.4 kilotons of new CO2 
emissions, or about seven percent of the total loss in carbon sequestration from 
deforestation in these countries over this time period.  
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Table 2.2: Tree Cover loss within 10km of international DFI-financed infrastructure 
projects, 2000-2015 
 Country Total 
 Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru 
Within 10km of projects:      
Total tree cover change (km2) -2,937.9 -156.7 -45.0 -2,523.5 -5,663.1 
Total initial tree cover (km2) 14,730.8 4,219.2 2,570.7 18,400.0 39,920.7 
Tree cover change (%) -19.9% -3.7% -1.7% -13.7% -14.2% 
Emissions equiv. (MMT CO2) 97.0 7.9 2.5 146.2 253.5 
      
Remaining territory:      
Total tree cover change (km2) -35,138.1 -21,917.2 -3,631.6 -18,487.8 -79,174.6 
Total initial tree cover (km2) 503,812.0 675,512.3 147,430.1 711,338.2 2,038,092.6 
Tree cover change (%) -7.0% -3.2% -2.5% -2.6% -3.9% 
Emissions equiv. (MMT CO2) 1,159.6 1,109.0 198.4 1,071.1 3,538.0 
Note: Emissions are calculated using the average carbon intensity per km2 of forest in each country, using 
median estimates in Saatchi et al (2011): 9.0 kT/km2 in Bolivia, 13.8 in Colombia, 14.9 in Ecuador, and 
15.8 in Peru.  
However, as Table 2.2 also shows, the rate of tree cover loss associated with DFI 
projects varied widely among the four countries studied here. The highest rate was seen 
in Bolivia, where nearly 20 percent of tree cover within 10km of DFI projects was lost 
between 2000 and 2015. On the other extreme, the projects in Ecuador were associated 
with a loss of just 1.7 percent of tree cover within 10km, a lower rate than in the rest of 
the country.  
Figure 2.2 explores this variation across individual projects, by country.  
“Relative tree cover change” is defined here as the log difference between tree cover 
change within 10km of the project and tree cover change in parts of the country not 
within 10km of an international DFI-financed infrastructure project, in order to take into 
account different national contexts.  As the figure clearly shows, great variation exists, 
with some projects exhibiting much less tree cover loss than the rest of the countries 
where they occurred (shown as positive relative tree cover change), and others exhibiting 
much more, especially among projects in Peru. 
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Figure 2.2: Relative tree cover change within 10km of international DFI-financed 
infrastructure projects, 2000-2015 
 
N 18 20 14 29 81 
Mean +0.4% -5.8% +0.2% -5.4% -3.3% 
Median +7.2% -0.2% +1.8% +2.6% +1.5% 
St. Dev. 11.2pp 15.1pp 3.9pp 29.2pp 19.8pp 
Note: The total number of projects is only 81 instead of 84, because this model results in three 
observations’ elimination from the dataset. This problem is resolved in the following section. Relative tree 
cover change is measured as the log difference between local and national treed cover change percent rates: 
ln(1+D local TC) – ln(1+D nation TC excluding areas near projects).  
The areas within 10km of international DFI-financed infrastructure projects had a 
median tree cover loss that was 1.5 percent better than the remainder of the nations where 
they were built. They had a mean level of 3.3 percent worse tree cover loss, but that was 
driven primarily by a few extreme outliers, so that level is not statistically significantly 
different from zero, as Figure 2.2 shows.  
2.4.2 Safeguards 
The high variance shown in Figure 2.2 raises the question of what DFIs and 
governments can do, in the face of such divergent outcomes, to limit the possibility of 
their projects experiencing the tree cover loss of the highly-negative outliers.  This 
chapter attempts to answer this question by seeking relationships between DFIs’ ESS 
processes and the tree cover change in the areas surrounding their infrastructure projects. 
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Table 2.2 shows the most common ESS among the DFIs most active in financing 
infrastructure projects in the Western Andean countries studied here.  
CAF’s approach to safeguards has been unique and bears explanation. CAF 
established formal ESS in 2016, after the time period studied here. Before that point, its 
lending was governed by its 2010 “Environmental Strategy,” which states that CAF 
“makes sure operations have complied with the participation process demanded by the 
country’s legal system and, where it sees a need, calls for additional step of public 
consultation” (CAF 2010, 18). This principle is certainly laudable in its intent, but its 
ambiguity makes it impossible to label as having across-the-board requirements beyond 
respect for national laws. Thus, for the sake of accuracy, Table 2.3 shows CAF requiring 
prior consultation (as it currently does), but the case-by-case analysis below recognizes 
that it did not have a formal prior consultation requirement from 2000-2015.  
All eight of the DFIs shown in Table 2.3 require the completion of EIAs and 
compliance with host-country environmental standards. Six require consultation with 
affected communities, while only four MDBs – the World Bank, and IADB, and their 
private-sector lending arms – have (or require the establishment of) formal grievance 
mechanisms to address problems that arise. Due to DFIs’ unanimity regarding EIAs and 
host-country standards, this chapter examines the association between the other 
commonly-accepted safeguards – prior consultation and formal grievance mechanisms – 
and tree cover loss near project sites. The recent enactment of stronger versions of these 
policies – free, prior, informed consent of affected communities (known as FPIC) and 
project-level grievance mechanisms – are crucial developments, but unfortunately too 
few projects in this dataset have those protections for this chapter to analyze the impacts 
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of these reforms. Finally, it is important to note that Table 2.3 shows only prior 
consultation provisions that have incorporated formal processes of engagement, using the 
approach of Kvam (2017). While many more DFIs have statements broadly supporting 
the principle of public information or consultation, only the World Bank and IADB had 
standardized processes with space for affected communities to impact project design. 
Table 2.3: Required safeguard processes for infrastructure project planning  
 MDBs  NDBs Operating Abroad IBRD IFC IADB IIC CAF CDB CHEXIM BNDES 
Environmental impact 
assessments (EIAs) X X X X X 
 
 X X X 
Compliance with host-
country env. standards X X X X X  X X X 
Assistance with host-
country standards     X     
Consultation with affected 
communities X X X X X  
 
 X  
Consent of affected 
communities (FPIC)  X X       
Formal grievance 
mechanisms X X X X  
 
    
Project-level grievance 
mechanisms X X        
Note: CAF and CHEXIM established their community consultation safeguards in 2016, after the time 
period studied here. Thus, while those slots are marked here, the analysis below takes into account the 
absence of those protections before 2016. The IADB requires consent of affected communities only in 
cases of involuntary resettlement.   
Sources: Baker (2013), CAF (2016), CHEXIM (2016), Goodland (2004), Himberg (2015), IADB (1990, 
2006a, 2006b), IFC (1998, 2006a, 2006b), IIC (2013), ILO (1989), IR (2007), Kennedy (1999), Ocampo 
and Agudelo (2014), Rivasplata et al (2014), WB (no date), Yuan and Gallagher (2017).  
The distribution of which institutions guarantee prior consultation and access to 
grievance mechanisms is more complicated than Table 2.3 suggests, because 
international DFIs have gradually adopted these ESS over the last few years. Prior to the 
adoption of formal prior consultation processes, many DFIs had principles or guidelines 
related to consultation, but most have adopted standardized prior consultation more 
recently. Thus, for example, not every CAF project examined here required prior 
consultation, and not every IFC project had a formal grievance process.   
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Countries also have their own history of the adopting safeguards that apply to the 
projects studied here, as mentioned in the previous section.  All four countries examined 
here are signatories to the International Labour Organisation’s Convention 169 (ILO 
1989) and have enacted their own legislation recognizing the right to prior consultation 
for indigenous communities affected by new development projects. 
Combining the evolution of DFI prior consultation safeguards and national 
legislation yields the matrix of DFI and country consultation standards shown in Table 
2.4. Projects in a given country, financed by a given DFI, have prior consultation 
guarantees if they were approved after the prior consultation enactment date shown in the 
table. 
Table 2.4: Prior consultation adoption for infrastructure projects, by country and 
DFI 
 Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru 
MDBs     
IBRD 1992 1992 1992 1992 
IFC 2006 1998 2006 2006 
IADB 1996 1996 1996 1996 
IIC 1990 1990 1990 1990 
CAF 2009 1998 2010 2011 
NDBs Operating Abroad     
BNDES 2009 1998 2010 2011 
CDB 2009 1998 2010 2011 
CHEXIM 2008 1998 2008 2008 
Sources: Asamblea Constituyente de Bolivia (2009), Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador (2010a), Baker 
(2013), CAF (2016), CHEXIM (2016), Congreso de la República (2011), Deruyttere (2004), Goodland 
(2004), Himberg (2015), IADB (1990, 2006a, 2006b), IFC (1998, 2006a, 2006b), IIC (2013), ILO (1989), 
IR (2007), MacKay (2005), Ocampo and Agudelo (2014), WB (no date), WB (1992), WB (2003).  
The adoption of formal grievance mechanisms by WBG and IADB lending 
offices evolved over time in a similar way to prior consultation safeguards, with the 
IBRD and IADB adopting them in 1994 (with the IADB further reforming theirs in 
2010), followed by the IIC in 2002 and the IFC in 2006 (Bradlow, 2005; Brown et al, 
2013; Cordonier Segger and Weramantry, 2017; Himberg 2015; IADB, 2009; IFC, 2009; 
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IIC, 2009). There is no equivalent evolution in grievance mechanisms in national 
legislation, because such complaints are handled through national judicial systems.  
2.5. Results 
Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of relative tree cover change among projects that 
do and do not have prior consultation and formal grievance mechanisms.  The presence 
of prior consultation mechanisms appears to be associated with a sizeable reduction in 
tree cover loss. Having a prior consultation mechanism appears to raise the average 
relative tree cover change from a median level of -0.8 percent +1.8 percent and from a 
mean of -12.3 percent to -0.5 percent, compared to the remainder of the territory in the 
nations where the projects occurred. However, these differences are not conclusive, as the 
extremely high standard deviations mean that the means are not statistically significantly 
different from zero. However, the results seem more ambiguous for formal grievance 
mechanisms. Projects with these mechanisms in place had a higher mean relative tree 
cover change, but a lower median than the surrounding territory.  
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Figure 2.3: Relative tree cover change near international DFI-financed 
infrastructure with and without ESS 
 Prior Consultation Grievance Mechanism 
 
N 19 62 N 38 43 
Mean -12.3% -0.5% Mean -5.3% -1.4% 
Median -0.8% +1.8% Median +1.7% +1.4% 
St. Dev. 32.9pp 12.6pp St. Dev. 24.4pp 14.6pp 
Note: Relative tree cover change is measured as the log difference between local and national treed cover 
change percent rates: ln(1+D local TC) – ln(1+D nation TC excluding areas near projects).  
2.5.1 Regression Analysis of ESS on Tree Cover Change 
To more closely examine the impacts of the two safeguards requires a formal 
difference-in-difference model, using the form !"#∆%&' = ) + +,-&' + +./0' + 1,∆-23' + 1.4"56' + +78%&0' 
where: !"#∆%&' is the relative tree cover change with 10km of a project, measured as the log 
difference of the local tree cover change and the tree cover change in all parts of 
the country not within 10km of such a project. -&' is a binary variable expressing the presence or absence of a prior consultation 
mechanism. 
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/0' is a binary variable expressing the presence or absence of a formal grievance 
mechanism. ∆-23' is the annual rate of population growth in the state (or department) of the project, 
in the five years prior to the project. 4"56' is the year in which the project was approved. 8%&0' is a binary variable indicating countries with zero initial tree cover within 10km in 
2000.  
Relative tree cover change is expressed as  
!"#∆%&' = #: ;%&<,.>,?%&<,.>>>@ − #: ;%&~<,.>,?%&~<,.>>>@ = #:C %&<,.>,? %&<,.>>>D%&~<,.>,? %&~<,.>>>D E	
= #: ; %&<,.>,?%&~<,.>,?@ − #: ; %&<,.>>>%&~<,.>>>@ 
where P indicates areas within 10km of an international DFI-financed infrastructure 
project and ~P indicates all national territory not within 10km of such a project.  Using 
log differences rather than simple ratios allows for a more straightforward interpretation 
of results, as coefficients are expressed in positive or negative percent for tree cover 
change that is more positive or negative than what was experienced in the surrounding 
area. The second line of the expression above shows that defining !"#∆%& as the log 
difference of tree cover change rates is arithmetically identical to defining it as a more 
classic difference-in-difference model form: the change in the ratio of tree cover levels 
between areas near projects and other areas. 
Local population growth prior to project approval is included in order to 
differentiate whether tree cover loss is due to an area growing in population regardless of 
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the project, from the change related to the project itself. It is measured as the annual rate 
of population increase at the state (or department) level during the five years prior to the 
project’s approval. Project approval year is included because this model relies on end-
point estimates of tree cover, in 2000 and 2015, so it is important to distinguish projects 
approved in 2000 (which show 15 years of tree cover change in this sample) from those 
approved in 2014 (which show only 1 year), for example.  The model also differentiates 
projects with zero tree cover nearby in 2000, because these projects cannot possibly 
experience tree cover loss, only gain.  
Table 2.5 shows the results of this model for each safeguard considered separately 
and for both together. While the presence of a prior consultation mechanism is 
significantly associated with 13.5 percent less tree cover loss (the coefficient on prior 
consultation in Model 1), there is no significant result for the presence of formal 
grievance mechanisms.15 Furthermore, an F-test for over-specification shows that 
including grievance mechanisms does not explain observed variation any better than 
considering prior consultation mechanisms alone. Thus, for analytic purposes, Model 1 
should be considered the primary model.  
The significant correlation between prior consultation provisions and more 
positive (less negative) relative tree cover change is not unexpected, given the history of 
scholars in other contexts finding the importance of knowledge as a common-pool asset 
(see for example Ostrom and Hess 2007), and the significant impact that information 
                                               
15  These findings reinforce those of Buntaine (2016, 133-136), who finds that having a World Bank 
Inspection Panel case lowers the environmental risk of a country’s future World Bank loan portfolio only 
for countries that predominantly borrow from the Bank’s IDA concessional window – which applies to 
none of the countries studied here. 
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disclosure (“right to know”) requirements have had on firm behavior (see for example 
Bennear and Olmstead 2007; Foulon, Lanoie, and Laplant 2002; Konar and Cohen 1995; 
and Wolf 1996).  It is worth noting that the lack of significant results for grievance 
mechanisms may be misleading, because of possible survivor bias. If a filed grievance 
results in the cancellation of funding for a project, that project will no longer be included 
in the present dataset. For example, in 2011 the Bolivian environmental NGO Foro 
Boliviano Sobre el Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo (FOBOMADE) filed a complaint with 
the IADB’s Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanisms (ICIM), the bank’s 
formal grievance office, about allegedly inadequate EIA and prior consultation processes 
in the construction of a bridge over the Bení river, connecting the towns of San 
Buenaventura and Rurrenabaque (IADB 2014, Molina Carpio 2014). Before the 
complaint could be adjudicated, the government of Bolivia shifted the IADB funds from 
that loan to another project. Thus, that project no longer appears in the present data.  
Furthermore, Buntaine (2016) finds that MDBs are less likely to approve projects in 
countries where grievances have been filed in the prior five years. Thus, formal grievance 
mechanisms may impact outcomes through the exclusion of problematic projects from 
the present dataset in one of two ways: projects may be cancelled, and future projects 
may be denied in countries where complaints have been filed.  
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Table 2.5: Regression results: association with net tree cover change (N=81) 
  Prior Consultation  
(Model 1) 
Grievance Mech.  
(Model 2) 
Both  
(Model 3) 
 Coef-
ficient 
St. 
Error 
Coeff-
icient 
St. 
Error 
Coef-
ficient 
St. 
Error 
Safeguards:       
     Prior Consultation 0.135** 0.051  
 
0.157* 0.065 
     Grievance Mech.   0.057 0.049 -0.033 0.060 
Controls:    
   
     Prior local D pop. -1.026 2.477 -0.402 2.569 -0.896 2.500 
     Year  -0.002 0.007 0.003 0.007 -0.005 0.008 
     Zero initial TC 0.107* 0.052 0.101 0.054 0.108* 0.052 
Intercept 4.732 13.699 9.023 15.879 9.023 15.879 
R2 0.1262 0.0627 0.1296 
F-Statistics:       
     This model F (4,76) = 2.74* F (4,76) = 1.27 F (5,75) = 2.23 
     Compared to Model 1    F (1,75) = 0.29 
Note: * indicates P£0.05 Standard errors are shown in italics. Model 1 is shaded because it explains the 
observed variation best, based on the F-tests shown here. 
The results discussed follow the pattern of Buchanan et al (2013) of measuring 
tree cover change within 10km of infrastructure projects. However, that method is not 
without its drawbacks. Most importantly, the choice of 10km is an arbitrary one, which in 
some cases may include impacts from extraneous sources while in other cases it may not 
encompass all of the source-related tree cover change. Thus, the resulting tree cover 
change rates include substantial variation in tree cover change that cannot be explained 
by any of the variables considered here, leading to low R2 values and mostly statistically 
insignificant model F-statistics shown in Table 2.5. 
This section explores a possible improvement over the traditional use of 10km 
radii, by measuring tree cover change at site-specific radii, based on each project’s 
surroundings. Site-specific radii apply the same rules for radius selection to each project, 
to allow flexibility for variations in individual projects’ surroundings, without sacrificing 
comparability among projects. These radii are defined as the point where the local 
source-based tree cover change fades into the background rate of the change of 
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surrounding area. It takes into account as much as possible of the source-based tree cover 
change, while including as little as possible of the tree cover change from other, 
unrelated, nearby sources.  
Mathematically, a site-specific radius is defined using a third-degree polynomial 
trend line for tree cover change as a function of an expanding radius, as measured at 1km, 
2km and so on. The second derivative of this trend line yields an inflection point, after 
which the tree cover change ceases to be dominated by source-related tree cover change 
and begins to be dominated by the background rate of change. For most projects, the tree 
cover change trend line reaches an inflection point at or before 10 km; in those cases, 
there is no need to measure tree cover change beyond 10km. However, in cases where no 
inflection point is forthcoming within 10km, further measurements are taken until an 
inflection point emerges.  
A few exceptions exist to this process. First, for projects with zero tree cover 
change in the area immediately surrounding a project (which is only the case for very 
small projects), then the site-specific radius is the largest radius with zero tree cover 
change, before unrelated tree cover changes can be taken into account. Similarly, where 
there is an obvious introduction of a new source of unrelated tree cover change, the site-
specific radius must be small enough to avoid taking it into account. 
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Figure 2.4: Examples of site-specific radii and their definitions (red=loss, blue=gain) 
2.4A: Puerto Bahía, Colombia 
Tree Cover Change, Trendline, and Infl. Point. Resulting radius: 3km  
   
2.4B: Corredor Vial Interoceánico Sur, Route 3, Peru 
Tree Cover Change, Trendline, and Infl. Point. Resulting radius: 7km  
   
Note: Maps are not to scale relative to each other, to preserve visibility given Puerto Bahía’s much smaller 
size. 
Figure 2.4 illustrates the process of choosing site-specific radii using two 
examples: Puerto Bahía near Cartagena, Colombia, and Route 3 of the Corredor Vial 
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Interoceánico Sur in southern Peru. As the included tree cover change maps show, the 
choice of site-specific radii allows for the exclusion of extraneous tree cover change in 
smaller projects, while still encompassing applicable tree cover change for larger 
projects. It is useful in situations with extremely volatile tree cover changes within 10km 
(like Puerto Bahía) as well as projects where the tree cover change simply slowly fades 
out as the radius increases (as in Route 3).  
Using site-specific radii has another important advantage compared to using 10km 
radii, beyond measuring project-related tree cover change more accurately. It also allows 
the inclusion of three projects for which tree cover change cannot be measured at 10km. 
These observations all had zero tree cover near the projects sites in 2000, and extremely 
low tree cover (less than 0.01 percent each) within 10km of the project sites. 
Nevertheless, in each case, the few trees in the area disappeared by 2015, yielding -100 
percent tree cover changes, making it impossible to measure tree cover change in the 
form ln(1+D local TC) – ln(1+D nation TC excluding areas near projects).  These three 
observations are as follows. 
• Bolivia’s Tiquina-Copacabana road, on the desert shores of Lake Titicaca, had zero 
tree cover within 3km of the road. However, the entire area within 10km of it had a 
tree cover rate of 0.002 percent in 2000, which fell to zero by 2015, yielding a tree 
cover change of -100 percent.  
• Bolivia’s Rio Seco-Huarina road had zero tree cover within 4km of the road in 2000. 
However, the entire 10km area had 0.002 percent tree cover in 2000, which fell to 
zero by 2015. Thus, using the 10km measure yields a tree cover change rate of -100 
percent. 
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• Peru’s Cerro Mulato micro-dam is surrounded by farmland (outside of the town of 
Chongoyape), and so had zero tree cover within several kilometers in 2000. 
Nonetheless, the entire area within 10km of the dam had 0.009 percent tree cover in 
2000, which fell to zero by 2015, yielding a tree cover change of -100 percent. 
In each of these cases, small unrelated changes in tree cover within 10km of the project 
sites yield extreme tree cover change percentages. Nonetheless, this factor alone does not 
warrant excluding them entirely from the analysis, as they are otherwise unremarkable 
projects. Using site-specific radii addresses the outlier problem without removing them 
from the analysis.  
Table 2.6 shows the tree cover change associated with projects when measured 
with site-specific radii. As explained above and demonstrated statistically below, this 
method is more accurate as it includes only tree cover change that is demonstrably 
associated with the project sites.  When measured with this higher standard, the tree cover 
change associated with international DFI-financed projects is actually greater than when 
it is measured conventionally within a 10km radius: 15.9 percent, four times the 3.9 
percent rate in the remaining territories.    
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Table 2.6: Tree cover loss associated with international DFI-financed infrastructure 
projects, 2000-2015 
 Country Total 
 Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru 
Associated with projects:      
Total tree cover change (km2) -1,788.5 -63.5 -11.1 -2,587.4 -4,450.5 
Total initial tree cover (km2) 8,387.1 2,116.3 670.7 16,898.5 28,072.6 
Tree cover change (%) -21.3% -3.0% -1.7% -15.3% -15.9% 
Emissions equiv. (MMT CO2) 59.0 3.2 0.6 149.9 212.7 
      
Remaining territory:      
Total tree cover change (km2) 511,702.2 676,909.7 149,459.5 713,360.7 2,051,432.1 
Total initial tree cover (km2) -36,331.4 -21,985.5 -3,666.0 -18,409.2 -80,392.1 
Tree cover change (%) -7.1% -3.2% -2.5% -2.6% -3.9% 
Emissions equiv. (MMT CO2) 1,198.9 1,112.5 200.3 1,066.5 3,578.2 
Note: Emissions are calculated using the average carbon intensity per km2 of forest in each country, using 
median estimates in Saatchi et al (2011): 9.0 kT/km2 in Bolivia, 13.8 in Colombia, 14.9 in Ecuador, and 
15.8 in Peru.  
Figure 2.5 shows the distribution of relative tree cover change, when measured at 
site-specific radii, by country. The outliers that dominate Figure 2.2 have been curtailed, 
with the range of observations here stretching only from -60 percent to +10 percent, 
rather than the -150 percent to +50 percent shown above. However, the standard 
deviations are still strong enough to prevent the means from being statistically 
significantly different from zero. 
  
 84 
Figure 2.5: Relative tree cover change measured within site-specific radii of 
international DFI-financed infrastructure projects, 2000-2015 
 
N 20 20 14 30 84 
Mean -0.6% -1.7% +1.1% -1.3% -0.8% 
Median +7.4% +2.4% +2.5% +2.6% +2.6% 
St. Dev. 16.6pp 9.4pp 4.1pp 9.4pp 10.9pp 
Note: Relative tree cover change is measured as the log difference between local and national treed cover 
change percent rates, as explained in the following section.  
Figure 2.6 shows the distribution of relative tree cover change rates over the two 
safeguards examined here, when measured at site-specific radii (as Figure 2.3 does for 
tree cover change measured within 10km). As in Figure 2.3, above, prior consultation 
appears to be associated with less tree cover loss: having a prior consultation requirement 
raises the average relative tree cover change from -5.2 percent to +0.4 percent. However, 
these means are dominated by outliers; the standard deviations (while much smaller than 
those in Figure 2.3) are still quite large, and the means are not significantly different from 
zero. Also as above, grievance mechanisms show an ambiguous – at best – relationship 
with tree cover change.  
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Figure 2.6: Distribution of relative tree cover change (measured within site-specific 
radii), by ESS, 2000-2015 
 Prior Consultation Grievance mechanism 
 
N 19 65 N 38 46 
Mean -5.2% +0.4% Mean -2.2% +0.3% 
Median +2.4% +2.6% Median +2.5% +2.6% 
St. Dev. 16.8pp 8.2pp St. Dev. 14.0pp 7.4pp 
 
Table 2.7 shows the results of repeating regression Models 1 through 3 with tree 
cover change measured at site-specific radii.  Considered jointly, these models nearly 
double the R2 values of Table 2.5 without losing degrees of freedom (or observations, as 
noted above). Furthermore, they have highly-significant model F-statistics. Thus, these 
models explain the variation in relative tree cover change among projects much better 
than those shown above. 
As above, prior consultation mechanisms are significantly related to tree cover 
loss: projects with a prior consultation requirement have 5.6 percent less tree cover loss 
than other projects, relative to the surrounding territory.  Also as above, formal grievance 
mechanisms are not significantly related to tree cover change, and including this variable 
fails an F-test for over-specification, so it should be omitted. Thus, Model 4 is preferable 
to Model 6. Finally, whether a project has zero initial tree cover is the most significant 
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factor in relative tree cover change, which is to be expected given the impossibility of 
tree cover loss at these sites.   
Table 2.7: Regression results using site-specific radii: association with net tree cover 
change 
  Prior Consultation  
(Model 4) 
Grievance Mech.  
(Model 5) 
Both  
(Model 6) 
 Coef-
ficient 
St. Error Coef-
ficient 
St. 
Error 
Coef-
ficient 
St. Error 
Safeguards:       
Prior Consultation 0.056* 0.026  
 
0.060 0.034 
Grievance Mech.   0.028 0.025 -0.007 0.032 
Controls:    
   
Prior local D pop. 0.529 1.361 0.758 1.396 0.570 1.381 
Year  0.001 0.003 0.003 0.004 -0.000 0.004 
Zero initial TC 0.092*** 0.024 0.092*** 0.025 0.093*** 0.024 
Intercept -1.359 6.833 -6.251 7.358 -0.455 7.952 
R2 0.2100 0.1783 0.2105 
F-Statistics:       
   This model F (4,79) = 5.25*** F (4,79) = 4.29** F (5,78) = 4.16** 
   Compared to Model 4      F (1,78) = 0.05 
Note: N=84. * indicates P£0.05; *** indicates P£0.001. Model 4 is highlighted because it offers the most 
explanatory power of these three, based on the F-test shown. 
2.5.1.1 The Role of Initial Tree Cover 
It is worth exploring the impact of including projects with zero initial tree cover 
on the results of the analysis. Among the 84 projects included in Table 2.7, only 49 had 
non-zero tree cover in 2000. Theoretically, there is reason to include the projects with 
zero initial tree cover. While the literature cited above has established a significant 
relationship between road construction and tree cover loss in forested areas, at the time of 
this writing no literature known to the author rules out the possibility of a relationship 
between road construction in non-forested areas and tree cover gain, either through 
reforestation or agro-forestry activities. Empirically, however, none of the observations 
studied here with zero initial tree cover experienced any change in in that tree cover level 
between 2000 and 2015. Figure 2.7 shows the relationship between tree cover change and 
project ESS just among projects with non-zero levels of tree cover in 2000; the resulting 
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relationships are essentially unchanged, though the resulting distributions are broader as 
the universe of observations is smaller.  
Figure 2.7: Distribution of relative tree cover change (measured within site-specific 
radii) among projects with positive initial tree cover, by ESS, 2000-2015 
 Prior Consultation Grievance mechanism 
 
N 10 39 N 22 27 
Mean -12.5% -2.2% Mean -6.9% -2.1% 
Median -0.6% +2.1% Median +1.0% +2.1% 
St. Dev. 20.4pp 9.5pp St. Dev. 16.6pp 8.8pp 
 
Furthermore, among projects with positive levels of initial tree cover, no obvious 
relationship exists between the initial level of tree cover and subsequent tree cover loss, 
as Figure 2.8 shows. The projects with the most severe tree cover loss between 2000 and 
2015 had initial tree cover levels of 63.3, 73.8, 7.3, 85.0, and 53.6 percent, respectively. 
Areas with low, mid-level, and heavy forestation rates are all represented in those five 
observations. On the other end of the spectrum, observations with zero tree cover change 
during the time period studied here have an initial tree cover levels ranging from zero to 
90.9 percent – only five projects had higher initial tree cover rates than that level. For this 
reason, the model shown in Table 2.7 does not include any references to differences 
among non-zero levels of initial tree cover.  
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Figure 2.8: Absolute tree cover change and initial tree cover level, 2000-2015 
 
2.5.1.2 The Role of Site Selection 
In all of the models shown thus far, the one variable with consistently significant 
results has been whether a project site had zero local tree cover in 2000. Thus, it is 
important to distinguish whether projects with prior consultation mechanisms perform 
better relative to tree cover change because of their initial conditions. In other words, this 
raises the question of whether prior consultation requirements simply add a bureaucratic 
hurdle that encourages countries to avoid using international DFIs with those 
requirements for projects in heavily forested areas. Such a finding would be consistent 
with the work of Buntaine (2016, 82), who interviewed 54 individual staff members at 
four Washington, DC-based MDBs and found that it was common for World Bank staff 
to report avoiding certain projects because of the added “hassle factor” of pursuing 
safeguards in environmentally or socially risky loans. Furthermore, the World Bank’s 
own Independent Evaluations Group reported in 2010 that most Latin American and 
Caribbean team leaders “had encountered clients who wanted to avoid all or part of a 
project because of safeguard policies” (46). If the results seen in Table 2.7 are simply a 
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restatement of these observed tendencies, then they do not speak to the usefulness of 
prior consultation in preventing deforestation so much as its impact on sending risky 
projects to DFIs with looser safeguards – surely not the intention of safeguard designers.  
Figure 2.9 shows the distribution of initial tree cover levels among projects with 
and without prior consultation requirements. Projects with prior consultation safeguards 
do appear to be more heavily concentrated in areas with zero or very low tree cover. (The 
bi-modal distribution shown here is not unexpected, as the region is characterized by 
dense tropical forest and open desert). 
Figure 2.9: Distribution of initial tree cover levels among projects with and without 
prior consultation safeguards (kernel density)  
 
 N Mean ITC Median ITC St. Dev., ITC % with zero ITC 
With P.C. 65 25.8% 8.7% 31.1pp 40.0% 
Without P.C. 19 31.6% 8.8% 36.1pp 42.1% 
Total 84 27.1% 8.7% 32.2pp 40.5% 
 
Based on Figure 2.9, it does appear to be the case that DFIs with stricter 
safeguards are likely to choose less risky projects. However, this tendency alone does not 
explain all of the difference seen in Table 2.7. A Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, shown 
in Table 2.8, can more explicitly differentiate the importance of prior consultation 
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safeguards in Model 4. The results show that almost all of the observed difference in 
performance between projects with and without prior consultation requirements is due to 
the coefficients, rather than the endowments. In other words, the difference is related to 
how well projects with prior consultation safeguards performed given the initial 
characteristics of the project, and not those characteristics themselves.  
Table 2.8: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the observed differences in Model 4 
(Table 2.7) 
 Absolute Difference Share of total 
Endowments -0.002 4.0% 
Coefficients -0.059 105.8% 
Interaction 0.005 -9.8% 
Total difference in observed means 0.056 100.0% 
 
2.5.2 Country and Type 
Table 2.9 shows the result of including country and project type variables, both 
individually and together. Even without including an explicit country control, the model 
implicitly includes differences in national tree cover changes (in that the dependent 
variable’s calculation includes national tree cover in 2000 near projects and elsewhere, 
nationally). However, it is worth exploring whether the differences in the national 
institutions that oversee project implementation have their own impact. This is especially 
true given that, in the cases of Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, prior consultation 
requirements were enacted by regimes that had come to power with the support of 
indigenous and environmentalist groups, as mentioned above, and might be expected to 
have important institution-specific mechanisms for improved performance under prior 
consultation-requiring regimes. 
It is also worthwhile to seek out any differences among project type, given the 
extensive literature linking certain types of infrastructure projects (especially paved roads 
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and dams with reservoirs) to deforestation in the Amazon basin, as mentioned above. 
When differentiating by type, this model divides projects into seven categories: biofuel, 
dams (divided into those with and without reservoirs), fossil fuel power plants, ports, 
roads, and unconventional renewable energy (including solar and wind farms).  
Table 2.9 shows the results of including country and project type controls into the 
basic model. Every variation fails an F-test for over-specification when compared to 
Model 4 in Table 2.7. Thus, even though Model 7 shows a significant result for Ecuador, 
this result should be disregarded, as an extraneous artifact of over-specification. The lack 
of significant differences among project type is a particularly striking given the existing 
literature linking certain types of infrastructure projects (especially paved roads and 
larger dams) with deforestation.   
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Table 2.9: Regression results with country and type variables, using site-specific 
radii: association with net tree cover change 
 Country (Model 7) Type (Model 8) Both (Model 9) 
 Coef-
ficient 
St. 
Error 
Coef-
ficient 
St. 
Error 
Coef-
ficient 
St. Error 
Prior Consultation 0.039 0.029 0.050 0.029 0.044 0.033 
Controls: 
 
     
     Prior local D pop.  0.135 1.358 0.440 1.422 -0.033 1.469 
     Year -0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.004 
     Zero Initial TC 0.118*** 0.027 0.105*** 0.025 0.125*** 0.029 
Country: 
 
     
     Colombia 0.029 0.035   0.042 0.039 
     Ecuador 0.085* 0.040   0.078 0.057 
     Peru 0.003 0.030   0.011 0.034 
Type:       
     Dam: R.o.R.   0.088 0.105 0.058 0.110 
     Dam: w/ res.   0.007 0.106 0.002 0.107 
     Fossil fuel power   0.034 0.116 0.005 0.121 
     Port   0.004 0.108 -0.003 0.112 
     Road   0.026 0.102 0.036 0.105 
     Unconv. R.E.   0.073 0.117 0.046 0.121 
Intercept 2.730 7.126 3.261 7.644 4.590 8.082 
R2 0.2616 0.2612 0.2840 
F-statistics:      
     This model F (7,76) = 3.85** F (10,73) = 2.58** F (13,70) = 2.14* 
     Compared to Model 4 F (3, 76) = 1.77 F (6, 73) = 0.84 F (9, 70) = 0.80 
     Compared to Model 7   F (6, 70) = 0.36 
     Compared to Model 8   F (3,70) = 0.74 
Note: N = 84. * indicates P£0.05; ** indicates P£0.01; *** indicates P£0.001. R.o.R. indicates “run of the 
river” dams, without reservoirs. 
Finally, even if institutional differences between countries are not significant, 
differences in the institutional will and capacity across countries – and DFIs – may be 
relevant. Table 2.10 shows the results of including considerations for the environmental 
performance of the institutions related to each project, measured as the Environmental 
Performance Index for each project’s international DFI and nation.16  As Table 2.10 
shows, however, EPI scores do not help explain variations in tree cover. Not only are 
                                               
16  The methodology for calculating country and international DFI EPI scores for each project is discussed 
in Appendix B.2. 
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their impacts insignificant, but F-tests show that these models have less explanatory 
power than Model 4, which excludes EPI scores.  
Table 2.10: Regression results with EPI scores for countries and international DFIs 
at site-specific radii: association with net tree cover change 
 Country (Model 10) Type (Model 11) Both (Model 12) 
 Coef-
ficient 
St. Error Coef-
ficient 
St. Error Coef-
ficient 
St. 
Error 
Prior Consultation 0.046 0.030 0.053 0.027 0.041 0.031 
Controls:       
     Prior local D pop.  0.581 1.369 0.366 1.404 0.374 1.407 
     Year -0.002 0.006 0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.006 
     Zero Initial TC 0.094*** 0.024 0.094*** 0.024 0.097*** 0.025 
EPI:       
     Borrower 0.002 0.003   0.002 0.003 
     DFI   -0.102 0.197 -0.137 0.202 
Intercept 4.472 11.264 -2.114 7.018 4.837 11.316 
R2 0.2143 0.2127 0.2190 
F-statistics:      
     This model 4.26** 4.22** 3.60** 
     Compared to Model 4 0.41 0.25 0.43 
     Compared to Model 10   0.46 
     Compared to Model 11   0.62 
Note: N = 84. * indicates P£0.05; ** indicates P£0.01; *** indicates P£0.001. The methodology for 
calculating environmental performance index (EPI) scores is discussed in Appendix B.1. 
2.5.3 The Role of International DFIs 
Beyond the enactment of prior consultation provisions, the implementation of 
these requirements is a crucial element in project impacts. This is an intrinsically 
institutional topic. This section explores the role of international DFIs by examining the 
comparative performance of the different DFIs, the importance of international DFIs 
prior consultation requirements compared to national prior consultation standards, and 
the importance of DFI involvement with the prior consultation process.  
Table 2.11 shows the results of comparing DFIs to each other within Model 4. 
The DFIs shown in Table 2.11 are not mutually exclusive. Since projects are often co-
financed (and some road segments are financed under multiple different loans from 
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different DFIs operating separately), this is a test of the participation of particular DFIs 
in particular projects.  
Table 2.11: Regression results, disaggregated by DFI: association with net tree cover 
change  
Simple (Model 13)    With Countries (Model 14)  
Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error 
Prior Consultation 0.051 0.035 
 
0.032 0.045 
DFI: 
     
     IBRD -0.024 0.043 
 
-0.012 0.051 
     IFC -0.064 0.039 
 
-0.068 0.042 
     IADB -0.056 0.041 
 
-0.048 0.044 
     IIC 0.050 0.053 
 
0.039 0.055 
     CAF -0.055 0.039 
 
-0.053 0.039 
     BNDES 0.041 0.080 
 
0.003 0.089 
     CDB 0.013 0.073 
 
-0.012 0.079 
     CHEXIM 0.005 0.084 
 
-0.017 0.090 
Controls: 
     
     Prior Local Population Growth 0.630 1.485 
 
0.329 1.516 
     Approval Year 0.001 0.005 
 
0.001 0.005 
     Zero initial Tree Cover 0.110*** 0.026 
 
0.126*** 0.029 
Country: 
     
     Colombia 
   
0.036 0.040 
     Ecuador 
   
0.060 0.050 
     Peru 
   
0.005 0.034 
Intercept  -2.135 9.449 
 
-1.565 10.780 
 Model:           
R2 0.3036 
 
0.3211 
F-statistics: 
     
     This model F (12, 71) = 2.58** 
 
F (15, 68) = 2.14* 
     Compared to Model 4 F (8, 71) = 0.53  F (11,68) = 0.54 
     Compared to Model 13   
  
F (3, 68) = 0.58 
Note: N = 84. * indicates P£0.05; ** indicates P£0.01; *** indicates P£0.001.  
None of the DFIs significantly out-perform any other and including them yields 
an F-statistic that indicates over-specification when compared to Model 4. This is a useful 
result because it indicates that the difference shown above is due to policy, rather than 
other institutional aspects of the DFIs that have adopted them (mostly northern-based 
MDBs).  
Another relevant question is the importance of whether the DFI or the national 
government provides the prior consultation protection. After all, as established above, in 
many cases the DFIs here established their ESS only after civil society groups in affected 
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countries complained of not being taken into account by the relevant authorities in their 
national governments. With this in mind, it is worthwhile to disaggregate Model 4 by the 
type of institution that requires prior consultation: the DFI, the host country, or both.  
Table 2.12 shows the results of this analysis. It also includes country controls, 
because of the institutional nature of the question asked in this section: Given an active or 
passive DFI, do any countries perform better than others? While prior consultation 
continues to show significant results, neither DFI leadership nor any particular country 
makes a significant difference.  
Table 2.12: Regression results, disaggregated by source of prior consultation 
requirement: country, DFI, or both: association with net tree cover change  
Simple (Model 15) 
 
With Countries (Model 16) 
Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error 
Safeguards: 
     
     Country-only P.C. 0.085* 0.036 
 
0.097* 0.048 
     DFI-only P.C. 0.028 0.032 
 
0.019 0.031 
     Both 0.076* 0.034 
 
0.150* 0.060 
Controls:           
     Prior local population growth 0.065 1.415 
 
-0.960 1.443 
     Approval year -0.004 0.004   -0.009 0.005 
     Zero initial tree cover 0.097*** 0.024 
 
0.102*** 0.028 
Country:       
  
     Colombia  
  
-0.056 0.054 
     Ecuador       0.070 0.040 
       Peru 
   
0.022 0.033 
Intercept  7.611 8.946   17.346 10.701 
 Model: 
     
R2 0.2355 
 
0.3040 
F-statistics: 
   
     This model F (6,77) = 3.95** 
 
F (9,74) = 3.59*** 
     Compared to Model 15  
 
F (3, 74) = 2.46 
Note: N = 84. * indicates P£0.05; ** indicates P£0.01; *** indicates P£0.001.  
However, as above, before drawing conclusions from Table 2.12, it is important 
to disaggregate the role of site selection from the role of policy. As Figure 2.10 shows, 
projects with country prior consultation protections but without DFI prior consultation 
protections are much likelier than other projects to be located in areas with low initial tree 
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cover. The mean initial tree cover level for these projects is 21.1 percent, compared to 
other groups with means between 27.0 percent and 31.6 percent.  
Figure 2.10: Tree cover in 2000 at infrastructure project sites, by prior consultation 
protection type 
 
 N Mean ITC Median ITC St. Dev., ITC Pct. with zero ITC 
No P.C. 19 31.6% 8.8% 36.1pp 42.1% 
Country-only P.C. 20 21.1% 4.4% 31.6pp 35.0% 
DFI-only P.C. 25 27.0% 0.0% 34.4pp 52.0% 
Co. & DFI P.C. 20 29.1% 33.9% 26.9pp 30.0% 
Total 84 27.1% 8.7% 27.1pp 40.5% 
 
Since the type of prior consultation enforcement is a categorical variable, to test 
the importance of ITC as an interaction variable, a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is not 
useful in this case. Thus, to eliminate the interference of differences in site selection, 
Table 2.13 limits Models 12 and 13 to those observations with non-zero initial tree cover, 
yielding Models 17 and 18. Of the resulting two models, only Model 18 (including 
country controls) has a significant F-statistic (and also shows that adding country controls 
significantly helps explain the variation in tree cover change). Model 18 shows that the 
lack of significant impact of DFI prior consultation requirements seen in Table 2.12 is a 
mere artifact caused by the “zero initial tree cover” variable. It also shows that projects in 
0
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countries with national prior consultation requirements are expected to have 30.4 percent 
better tree cover change around infrastructure projects, relative to the rest of the country, 
than projects with no prior consultation protections. In cases with no national prior 
consultation policy, a project’s related relative tree cover change can still improve by 
10.6 percent from the associated DFI’s prior consultation policy. This rate rises to 32.4 
percent if country and the DFI both have prior consultation policies. 
Table 2.13: Regression results, disaggregated by source of prior consultation 
requirement, where initial tree cover >0: association with net tree cover change  
Simple (Model 17) 
 
With Countries (Model 18) 
Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error 
Safeguards: 
     
     Country P.C. 0.122* 0.060 
 
0.304** 0.096 
     DFI P.C. 0.063 0.053   0.106* 0.051 
     Both 0.129* 0.056 
 
0.424*** 0.116 
Controls:           
     Prior local population growth -0.430 2.018 
 
-2.890 1.978 
     Approval year -0.004 0.007   -0.021* 0.008 
Country:         
     Colombia  
  
-0.144 0.092 
     Ecuador       0.080 0.061 
     Peru 
   
0.169* 0.064 
Intercept  7.178 14.657   41.749* 16.623 
 Model: 
     
R2 0.2484 
 
0.3593 
F-statistics: 
   
     This model F (5,43) = 1.390 
 
F (8, 40) = 2.87* 
     Compared to Model 17  
 
F (3, 40) = 7.29*** 
Note: N = 49. * indicates P£0.05; ** indicates P£0.01; *** indicates P£0.001.  
Table 2.14 tests the difference in strength of the associations shown in Table 2.13. 
The only non-significant difference is between country-only prior consultation 
requirements and double-source prior consultation requirements. In other words, while 
the introduction of a prior consultation requirement into a context that previously did not 
have one is significant, regardless of the source of this new safeguard, an additional DFI 
requirement – in a context where the host government already requires prior consultation 
– is useful mostly in that it prevents future projects from losing all prior consultation 
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protections if the host country drops its protection. In this way, DFI and country systems 
act in a form of productive redundancy. They serve as insurance policies that even if 
partner institutions back out of their commitments, the vulnerable populations affected by 
infrastructure projects will still have a place at the planning table.  
Table 2.14: F-tests for significance of differences in coefficients shown in Table 2.10 
 Source of Prior Consultation Requirements  
Country only DFI only Country and DFI 
No P.C. Requirement 9.96** 4.21* 13.41*** 
Country-only P.C. Req. 
 
5.42* 3.11 
Bank-only P.C. Req. 
  
8.98** 
Note: All F-tests here are F (1,41). 
Based on the results of Model 18, DFI safeguards appear to act as a form of 
productive redundancy, or insurance against the possibility of countries rolling back their 
protections.  As row 1 shows, country and bank safeguards are associated with significant 
improvements in outcomes compared to no safeguards at all. As row 2 shows, bank 
safeguards are not associated with significant improvements in addition to country 
safeguards but serve as an insurance policy against countries rescinding their protections. 
Finally, as row 3 shows, country safeguards are associated with significant improvements 
in addition to bank safeguards. These results suggest that in countries outside of this 
region, which may not have similar legal protections, bank safeguards may fill the void 
left by national governments in the protection of their most vulnerable communities.   
2.6. Discussion 
This chapter shows that within a limited scope of analysis, prior consultation 
protections can have significant impact on deforestation related to infrastructure projects, 
while the existence of development bank grievance mechanisms do not. The sections 
below discuss these findings in more detail, extrapolate them to relevant policy 
discussions and lays out a research agenda for continuing this work. 
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2.6.1 Discussion of Findings 
This analysis shows a significant relationship between reduced tree cover loss 
during international DFI-financed infrastructure projects and prior consultation 
safeguards, while it finds no such relationship for DFI grievance mechanisms. These 
results may seem surprising, but likely simply reflect the difference in purpose and design 
of the different safeguards. By definition, prior consultation safeguards slow down 
project planning until the environmental and social risks posed by land use change to 
vulnerable ethnic minority groups have been discussed thoroughly. Grievance 
mechanisms, in contrast, are akin to other mediation or arbitration processes in that they 
are post-hoc tools to halt or mitigate social or environmental damage that has already 
occurred or compensate populations that have suffered from that damage. Stakeholders 
may seek relief through grievance mechanisms for many different kinds of damages, 
ranging from the type of environmental impacts studied here to unrelated impacts such as 
labor disputes, gender or racial disparities in the distribution of project costs and benefits, 
or inadequate progress on promised social compensation measures. Seen from this 
perspective, then, grievance mechanisms may have significant but diffuse impacts across 
many different aspects of project implications.  For this reason, section 2.6.3 below 
suggests that future work seek out possible impacts of grievance mechanisms on social 
conflict surrounding projects, regardless of the type of perceived harm triggering such 
conflict.  
Another possible explanation for the significant relationship shown here between 
prior consultation safeguards and reduced tree cover loss may be some institutional 
characteristics not captured here. For example, DFIs and national governments may be 
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more committed to project oversight in general after instituting safeguard reform, because 
of the pressure from civil society that brought about those safeguards. However, the lack 
of a significant result for grievance mechanisms makes this explanation unlikely. Similar 
groundswells of civil society activity spurred both of these reforms, in rather rapid 
succession, and yet only one shows a significant relationship with tree cover change. It is 
more likely that the results shown here are attributable to the reforms themselves.  
2.6.2 Policy Implications 
Prior consultation is a relatively new protection in the countries studied here, but 
unfortunately it is already under attack. Ballón and Molina (2017) document a significant 
rollback in national prior consultation protections since the end of the commodities super-
cycle in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, as governments have prioritized expanding 
extractive production quickly given falling prices.  
Moreover, even before the end of the super-cycle, indigenous communities in 
these countries have not always been ensured adequate inclusion in prior consultation 
processes. Sanborn, Hurtado, and Ramírez (2016) and Pozo (2012) explain that prior 
consultation has been unevenly applied in Perú, because the military government of the 
1970s relabeled many indigenous communities as “peasant” communities as a rhetorical 
push to unite disadvantaged groups around their shared economic challenges. These 
“peasant” groups – many of whom speak Quechua and self-identify as such – have not 
always been included in the prior consultation processes. Ray and Chimienti (2017) show 
that, while that Ecuador’s 2010 Citizen Participation Law allows the government to push 
forward with planned development projects in the face of majority opposition by local 
communities only if higher environmental and employment standards are applied, the 
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prior consultation process has not always kept a record of what percent of consulted 
communities expressed favor or opposition, in order to determine which set of standards 
applies.  
Maintaining political will for the importance of prior consultation safeguards at 
the national level, then, is a crucial area for policy implications of this work. As 
Humphrey (2015) states, without the buy-in of governments seeking financing for 
particular projects, they may avoid the “hassle factor” associated with international DFI 
ESS and simply take their proposals to banks with fewer requirements. Humphrey and 
Machaelowa (2013) show that MDB lending patterns in Latin America suggest that 
borrower demand is an important factor in which projects receive financing from which 
banks, so a situation with bank ESS but without country commitment to the process could 
simply result in countries taking their proposals to less-strict banks. 
Another possibility is for countries to self-finance projects that have failed 
international DFI ESS processes. For example, in the example cited above in which 
Bolivia shifted funding away from a project that had been challenged through the IADB’s 
MICI grievance mechanism, the Bolivian government has continued to pursue that 
project with its own financing. In 2014, the Bolivia Highway Administration 
(Administradora Boliviana de Carreteras, or ABC) announced that it would self-finance 
the bridge, having signed a contract with Chinese contractor Sinopec (Escóbar 2014).  
Given the ability of governments to “shop around” for the most favorable terms 
for an infrastructure loan, or even self-finance these projects, it is crucial for international 
DFIs to maintain their commitments to prior consultation processes.  After all, most bank 
safeguards were enacted absent national standards. Furthermore, banks that have not yet 
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adopted prior consultation protections, such as BNDES and the CDB when they operate 
outside of their home countries, would be well-served to consider incorporating them. 
Though these requirements are often conceptualized as social safeguards, this chapter 
shows that they have significant environmental impacts.  
2.6.3 Areas for Future Research 
This chapter serves as an initial inquiry into the environmental impacts of ESS 
reform. Nevertheless, it is important to interpret the results discussed above with a 
healthy level of caution, as the total number of projects carried out in the region and time 
period studied here is modest. Thus, ample space remains for this work to be continued 
with added breadth and/or depth.  
This line of research would be well served to be continued with greater breadth of 
types of infrastructure projects and types of impacts. Other forms of hard infrastructure 
undoubtedly contribute to countries’ fixed capital stock, including telecommunications, 
water, sewer, and power distribution networks as well as oil and gas pipelines. 
Unfortunately, however, it is not possible to trace the precise locations of every kilometer 
of new power or phone lines, or water and sewer pipes, with the same level of detail as 
for roads, dams, and power plants. However, they might reasonably be expected to have a 
significant relationship with tree cover change, by opening up rural areas for new housing 
developments and encourage in-migration from other areas, in addition to their stated 
purposes of increasing local living standards and competitiveness. Furthermore, as Finer 
and Jenkins (2012) find, some of the deforestation associated with dams happens not at 
the site of dams, but along the associated power transmission lines. If precise information 
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about the locations of these networks and pipelines becomes publicly available in the 
future, it would be worthwhile to repeat the present analysis with these inclusions.  
The breadth of the current study could be constructively expanded by including 
infrastructure-related tree cover change in other tropical deforestation hotspots such as 
Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as Brazil. Doing so may allow the model’s degrees 
of freedom to expand sufficiently to support other contributing factors, such as the prices 
of the major commodity exports supported by new roads and ports (metals, hydrocarbons, 
soy, coffee, and palm oil) as well as exchange rate fluctuations (which might make 
primary commodity exports more profitable).  Many researchers have found significant 
relationships between prices, exchange rates, and tropical deforestation (see for example 
Fearnside, 2008; Gaveau et al, 2009; Richards et al, 2012; and Swensen et al, 2011); such 
an expansion of the current model would allow for the incorporation of these impacts. 
Furthermore, it may allow for the incorporation of variables identifying differences in the 
social, economic and governance contexts, which are quite similar among the Andean 
nations studied here but differ broadly across regions.  
As crucial as deforestation may be as a social and environmental impact, it is 
hardly the only one worth considering. For example, the line of research cited here would 
be well served to incorporate environmentally-motivated social conflict. This is 
especially true given the lack of significant relationship between international DFIs’ 
formal grievance mechanisms and deforestation shown here. It may be that the impact of 
those mechanisms is better observed in preventing and mediating conflict rather than 
preventing deforestation. CLACSO (2000-2012) list every social conflict and protest in 
Latin America from 2000-2012. It would be highly useful for future research to pair 
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individual protests listed in the CLACSO database with development projects to measure 
projects’ tendency to inspire conflict, and the ability of national governments and 
development banks to resolve these conflicts.  
This essay examined projects before and after the enactment of free, prior, 
informed consultation protections for indigenous communities. A further wave of reform 
enshrined free, prior, informed consent of those communities for projects overseen by the 
World Bank and IFC. As of year-end 2015, only two infrastructure projects in the 
Andean region have incorporated this protection: the Callao Muelle Norte port in Lima, 
Peru, and the Puerto Bahía port outside Cartagena, Colombia. Thus, FPI-consent could 
not be incorporated into the present analysis. Nonetheless, if consultation mechanisms are 
associated with better environmental outcomes, as the results of this essay suggest, 
further benefits may be visible once sufficient projects have been approved with FPI 
consent have been completed. It would be helpful to revisit the present analysis after this 
practice has garnered a larger presence in the global infrastructure finance portfolio, to 
test the potential environmental impact of this ambitious social protection. 
There is also a significant need for future research of a deeper nature than this 
study can provide. This analysis is limited to the de jure presence or absence of social 
and environmental protections. It does not take into account the institutional factors 
behind how – or how well – these are implemented. For example, it would be worthwhile 
to examine whether banks without their own prior consultation requirements have better 
environmental performance when they co-finance projects with banks that do have such 
requirements. Unfortunately, this dataset is not large enough to explore these questions, 
 105 
as it contains just 10 projects that were co-financed by banks that do and do not oversee 
prior consultation processes, and just 16 projects with co-financing of any type.   
Finally, having a prior consultation requirement is not equivalent to ensuring 
adequate community participation. For example, the universe size examined here does 
not allow for the consideration of prior consent (FPIC), only consultation. A broader 
array of projects may expand the dataset sufficiently to probe the impacts of full FPIC 
rather that simple prior consultation shown here. Furthermore, institutions vary in their 
ability and willingness to ensure that communities have truly been incorporated into prior 
consultation processes. Laurance et al (2015) note that the level of compliance with ESS 
can vary greatly. They urge, inter alia, a deeper commitment to stakeholder engagement, 
one that goes beyond what they call “superficial box-ticking” (260) to true stakeholder 
engagement. Unfortunately, while the differences in outcomes according to the 
thoroughness of safeguard application continues to be an important area for future 
exploration, it is well beyond the capabilities of the present work.  
2.7. Conclusion 
Though prior consultation is often conceptualized as a social safeguard, this 
chapter shows that it can have significant environmental impact. Furthermore, its impact 
is consistently positive, regardless of whether it is imposed by the national governments 
that propose the projects or by the transnational development banks that finance them. In 
this sense, governments and banks form a system of productive redundancy, in which 
each serves as an insurance policy for affected communities, so that if one institution 
rolls back its protections, prior consultation guarantees will be preserved. The same 
impact was not observed for the other major new ESS reform, the establishment of 
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formal avenues for communities to pursue grievances against projects in case of 
damages. However, as these are traditionally considered social safeguards, it is likely that 
this protection’s impact is felt in other avenues, such as the prevention of social conflict 
or reputational damage.   
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CHAPTER 3 
3. CROSSROADS IN THE EQUATORIAL FORESTS:  
CHINESE INVESTMENT AND “HIGH-ROAD EXTRACTIVISM” IN 
ECUADOR 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 Ecuador has been a predominantly oil-driven economy since crude was first 
discovered in the country in the middle of the 20th century. However, instead of bringing 
the country wealth and development, Ecuador’s time as an oil producer has been plagued 
by economic instability, social conflicts, and environmental degradation. During the most 
recent oil boom, Ecuador enacted a sweeping series of reforms aimed at mitigating the 
worst aspects of the sector while ensuring that its benefits were shared broadly. 
Simultaneously, it sought to limit its dependence on oil (through supporting non-
traditional sectors and through seeking payment for environmental services) while 
welcoming non-traditional oil investment partners, from China. Thus, Ecuador represents 
an “all of the above” strategy to repairing the damage from commodity dependence, by 
seeking to incorporate new industries, a new regulatory environment for oil production, 
and new partners within a short period of time.  
 In this regard, Ecuador presents a uniquely apt test case for whether Latin 
American commodity-dependent nations can successfully pursue an alternative to the 
problems of commodity dependence, in what this essay will refer to as a “high-road 
extractivism” model. Elements of this model include shifting away from reliance on the 
United States and U.S.-based investors in favor of new partners, ones whose identity as 
Chinese state-owned enterprises gives them incentives to cultivate long-term 
relationships with the government of Ecuador rather than seeking short-term profits. The 
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model also involves establishing a comprehensive regulatory framework – encompassing 
new environmental protections, labor rights, human rights guarantees, and taxation and 
devolution schema to ensure that the revenue from oil production benefits impacted 
communities.  
The oil boom from 2003 to 201317 provided an opportunity to evaluate the 
viability of this new rubric of investment governance. A new investment partner, a new 
regulatory environment, and oil exploration in new geographic areas gave Ecuador the 
opportunity to restart and redefine the terms of its reliance on oil investment. This essay 
explores the extent to which this re-initiation of Ecuador’s oil economy with new partners 
enabled it to re-establish its identity as an oil economy on its own terms and pursue 
“high-road extractivism.” 
This essay is structured as follows. The first section reviews the various ways in 
which reliance on oil production and export has hampered Ecuador’s ability to pursue 
sustained and sustainable economic development, through terms of trade volatility, 
anemic employment opportunities, environmental damage, and the history of relative 
impunity with which traditional (U.S.-based) oil firms have operated in Ecuador. The 
second section explores Ecuador’s institutional attempts to change the paradigm that has 
governed its relationship with foreign petroleum investors: working towards less 
dependence on the oil sector, building a regulatory framework to govern investors’ 
environmental and social performance in Ecuador, and seeking out new investment 
partners in China. The third section examines the extent to which these efforts have lived 
                                               
17 For the purposes of the present analysis, the most recent global oil boom is defined as lasting between the 
years of 2003 and 2013 based on world oil prices, which tripled in real terms and more than tripled in 
nominal terms over that decade, as shown in Figure 3.3 below. 
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up to their potential, by evaluating the social and environmental performance of Chinese 
oil companies’ operations in Ecuador as well as the Ecuadorian state’s performance in 
overseeing new oil operations. Finally, a discussion section brings together the results 
from the previous sections, inquires into institutional explanations for the observed 
outcomes, and draws lessons for other Latin American countries seeking to improve the 
economic, social, and environmental sustainability of their extractive sectors.  
3.2 Ecuador: Oil as an Impediment to Sustainable Development 
Oil has been paramount in Ecuador’s economy since its discovery in the 1970s. It 
quickly displaced bananas as the country’s most important export, as Figure 3.1 shows, 
and has dominated exports ever since. At their highest level, in 2008, oil exports reached 
61.7 percent of all Ecuadorian exports, and 18.7 percent of national GDP.  
Figure 3.1: Ecuador exports as a share of GDP, by commodity  
 
Source: Author’s analysis based on COMTRADE (SITC Rev.1). Note: seafood includes fish and 
crustaceans; petroleum includes crude petroleum and petroleum products. 
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diversification a major long-term policy priority. The 2013 National Development Plan 
states that “the existence of oil fields brings opportunities to generate income … 
However, the socio-environmental impacts of this extraction are very high, such as 
settling protected lands, deforestation, and the resulting habitat degradation, loss of 
biodiversity, contamination of soils and water sources, and others” (SENPLADES 2013, 
460-461, author’s translation).  
Specifically, the dominance of the oil industry hampers Ecuador’s prospects for 
sustainable economic development in four ways. First, the price of petroleum is highly 
volatile globally, leading to volatile terms of trade and potentially dampening inbound 
FDI. Second, it supports few jobs per $1 million in exports, either directly or indirectly, 
so an oil boom does not necessarily benefit many Ecuadorians. Third, the oil reserves 
themselves are located in some of the most sensitive territory in the country: the Amazon 
rainforest, often under traditional indigenous territory. Finally, oil production in Ecuador 
has traditionally been carried out by large multinational corporations that have operated 
with lower social and environmental performance than they utilized elsewhere, and done 
so with relative impunity given Ecuador’s relatively weak institutional capacity for 
setting and enforcing environmental standards. 
3.2.1 Terms of Trade Disadvantages 
The tendency of raw materials prices to fall relative to other prices in the long 
term has been the basis of much writing over the last half-century, since Raúl Prebisch 
(1950) and Hans Singer (1949) famously posited that countries relying on commodity 
exports would suffer a long-term decline in their terms of trade. Attempts to test the 
Prebisch-Singer hypothesis include Cuddington (1992), Harvey et al (2010) and Arezki et 
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al (2013), which all use long-term price indices to determine which commodities fit the 
Prebisch-Singer hypothesis. Cuddingon and Arezki et al find a significant negative 
downward trend in the price of oil, while Harvey et al find no significant long-term oil 
price trend. These results suggest that while no consensus exists as to whether oil 
producing countries are bound inexorably to declining terms of trade, neither will oil help 
these countries catch up to countries that export manufactured goods.  
Ecuador is an interesting test case for terms of trade trends in oil-exporting 
countries because it began exporting in the 1970s, so trade statistics are readily available 
for its entire oil-exporting period as well as the decade beforehand. Ecuador’s oil export 
sector took off in earnest in the early 1970s, rising from just 38.8 metric tons and 0.0 
percent of GDP in 1970, to 9,276.1 metric tons and 7.3 percent of GDP in 1973. So, it is 
particularly noteworthy that Ecuador’s export price index experienced a decline during 
those years, as Figure 3.2 shows. Its export price index recovered with 1974’s global 
petroleum price spike, but the nation had already lost ground relative to its import price 
index. This gap has persisted in the decades since, and Ecuador’s terms of trade have 
never recovered to their pre-oil levels.  The latest data available (2014) show that 
Ecuador’s terms of trade index is still 17.3 percent below its 1970 level.  
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Figure 3.2: Ecuador’s terms of trade, 1960 - 2014 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of Penn World Table 9.0 data (Feenstra, Inkaar, and Timmer, 2015). 
Beyond the importance of the declining terms of trade, terms of trade volatility is 
another important link between the importance of oil in Ecuador’s economy and its 
middle-income trap.  Blattman et al (2007) find in their study of long-term trends in terms 
of trade and GDP growth in periphery countries that terms of trade volatility was a 
significant determinant of economic growth, while terms of trade growth was not.  
Figure 3.3 shows the average world price of oil since 1960 in two ways: 
nominally and deflated by the world export price deflator.  The volatility is clear from a 
prima facie visual analysis. During the oil boom of 2003 to 2013, its price tripled in real 
terms and more than tripled in nominal terms, but since its peak it has lost nearly all of 
that ground.  
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Figure 3.3: World oil prices, nominal and real, 1960-2015 
 
Note: As of this writing, export price indices are not yet available for 2015. The world export price deflator 
is estimated as the weighted average of national export price deflators, with weights defined as share of 
world exports. Source: author’s calculation using world average prices, as listed in the World Bank GEM 
Commodities database, and Penn World Table 9.0 data (Feenstra, Inkaar, and Timmer, 2015).  
Moreover, oil price volatility is extreme even among raw commodities. Table 3.1 
shows the volatility (measured as coefficient of variation) in prices for 50 commodities 
with publicly available world price data between 1960 and 2016. In each case, crude oil 
stands out as particularly volatile, occupying second and third places (depending on its 
origin) for nominal prices, and first and second places for real prices.18  
 
  
                                               
18	The	ranking	of	goods	changes	significantly	depending	on	whether	commodity	prices	are	measured	in	nominal	or	real	terms.	The	difference	is	related	to	whether	a	particular	commodity’s	prices	tend	to	move	with	other	prices	or	not,	which	determines	to	what	extent	price	volatility	is	dampened	when	deflated	by	the	overall	prices	index.		
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Table 3.1: Price volatility (coefficient of variation) for commodities, 1960-2016 
A. Nominal Prices 
Good CV Good CV Good CV 
1. Phosphate 1.08 18. Zinc 0.67 35. Soybean oil 0.50 
2. Crude oil, Dubai 1.07 19. Barley 0.64 36. Maize 0.49 
3. Crude oil, world 1.03 20. Sugar, world 0.63 37. Sorghum 0.49 
4. Potassium chloride 1.01 21. Oranges 0.62 38. Sugar, EU 0.48 
5. Iron 1.00 22. Logs 0.60 39. Palm oil 0.47 
6. Gold 0.98 23. Bananas 0.59 40. Wheat 0.47 
7. Silver 0.95 24. Meat, chicken 0.57 41. Rice 0.46 
8. Natural gas, US 0.94 25. Timber 0.56 42. Soybeans 0.46 
9. Natural gas, Europe 0.89 26. Coffee, Robusto 0.55 43. Aluminum 0.46 
10. Platinum 0.87 27. Sawnwood 0.55 44. Meat, beef 0.45 
11. Nickel 0.86 28. Groundnut oil 0.55 45. Sugar, US 0.43 
12. TSP 0.84 29. Copra 0.54 46. Tobacco 0.40 
13. Lead 0.83 30. Cocoa 0.53 47. Tea, world 0.39 
14. Copper 0.81 31. Tea, Colombo 0.53 48. Cotton 0.38 
15. Rubber 0.75 32. Coconut 0.53 49. Tea, Mombasa 0.36 
16. Urea 0.74 33. Coffee, Arabica 0.51 50. Tea, Kokata 0.34 
17. Tin 0.68 34. Soybean meal 0.51   
B. Real Prices 
Good CV Good CV Good CV 
1. Crude oil, Dubai 0.79 18. Lead 0.45 35. Soybeans 0.30 
2. Crude oil, world 0.77 19. Rice 0.44 36. Tobacco 0.30 
3. Natural gas, US 0.76 20. Coconut 0.43 37. Sorghum 0.30 
4. Sugar, world 0.70 21. Tin 0.43 38. Groundnut oil 0.30 
5. Gold 0.66 22. Rubber 0.42 39. Wheat 0.29 
6. Phosphate 0.66 23. Copra 0.42 40. Sugar, US 0.29 
7. Silver 0.61 24. Coffee, Arabica 0.40 41. Meat, beef 0.28 
8. Potassium chloride 0.60 25. Tea, Mombasa 0.38 42. Barley 0.26 
9. Natural gas, Europe 0.58 26. Palm oil 0.37 43. Oranges 0.25 
10. Coffee, Robusto 0.57 27. Zinc 0.37 44. Logs 0.24 
11. Iron 0.56 28. Soybean oil 0.37 45. Bananas 0.21 
12. TSP 0.52 29. Tea, Kokata 0.35 46. Aluminum 0.20 
13. Urea 0.52 30. Soybean meal 0.34 47. Meat, chicken 0.19 
14. Platinum 0.49 31. Tea, Colombo 0.34 48. Sugar, EU 0.18 
15. Nickel 0.49 32. Cotton 0.34 49. Sawnwood 0.17 
16. Cocoa 0.47 33. Tea, world 0.34 50. Timber 0.16 
17. Copper 0.45 34. Maize 0.32   
Source: Author’s analysis of World Bank GEM Commodities database data.  
Given the extreme uncertainty presented by the volatility of oil prices, and the 
long-term decline in Ecuador’s terms of trade, it is no surprise that since 1970, per the 
Penn World Table, Ecuador’s terms of trade volatility has been above average, ranking in 
place 60 out of 156 countries for which terms of trade information is available. The fact 
that it does not rank higher may be due to the fact that its exports are concentrated in 
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three relatively-uncorrelated categories of bananas, seafood, and petroleum, as Figure 3.1 
shows.  
Blattman et al (2007) find a mechanism for the connection between slow long-
term growth and terms of trade volatility: a significant, negative relationship between 
terms of trade volatility and capital inflows, suggesting that price uncertainty dampens 
foreign investment. These findings echo Eichengreen (2008) who argues that terms of 
trade volatility brings exchange rate volatility to periphery countries: another investment 
disincentive as well as a source of financial market instability. Aiyar et al. (2013) find 
similar results, using a probit model to show that sudden stops in capital inflows are a 
strong predictor of growth slowdowns that can lead to countries succumbing to the 
middle-income trap.19 Domínguez and Caria (2016) point to these connections when they 
cite Ecuador’s “imperfect structural transformation” away from raw commodities 
dependence as a key element in Ecuador’s experience with the middle-income trap.  
Given these connections between terms of trade shocks, capital inflow shocks, 
and long-term growth slowdowns, it comes as no surprise that scholars such as Wade 
(2016) and Paus (2012) recommend that commodity-reliant countries employ strategic 
uses of industrial policy as a path out of the middle-income trap, following the examples 
of those successful “latecomers” chronicled by Amsden (2001).  
3.2.2 Employment, or the Lack Thereof 
Petroleum is significantly less labor-intensive than other tradable sectors, so every 
$1 million in extractive exports supports far fewer jobs than the same amount of 
                                               
19 The phrase “middle-income trap” is here used to indicate scenarios in which countries fail to transition 
from middle to high-income status because of lagging export competitiveness, following Griffith (2011).  
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agricultural or manufacturing exports.  Figure 3.4 compares the labor intensity of 
Ecuador’s exports, by major sector. Based on the Central Bank’s three input-output tables 
from the oil-boom decade (2007, 2010, and 2012), it shows the average direct and 
indirect employment (in upstream industries) supported by each $1 million in exports 
across these years. Petroleum stands out as supporting by far the least number of jobs per 
$1 million of exports of any major sector shown here: less than one direct job and fewer 
than 20 indirect jobs.  
Figure 3.4: Labor intensity of Ecuadorian exports, 2007-2012, by major sector 
 
Source: Author’s analysis based on BCE and UN COMTRADE data. Note: Direct jobs are within a given 
sector, and indirect jobs are in upstream sectors. 
The government recognized the difficulty that this employment differential 
creates for the national job market in the 2009-2013 Plan Nacional. Since petroleum 
creates so few jobs, employment has to come from other sectors, and the Plan states that, 
“slow growth in non-petroleum exports shows the scarcity of options for the creation of 
good jobs, which has contributed to the deterioration of standards of living, via 
unemployment, underemployment, precarious employment, and falling real wages 
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(SENPLADES 2009, 76, author’s translation).” It specifically calls for diversifying 
national production away from oil, by developing local value chains in other sectors such 
as renewable energy, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, vehicles, transportation, and others 
(Ibid. 393).  
3.2.3 Environmentally and Socially Sensitive Territory 
A final important obstacle to sustainable oil production in Ecuador is the location 
of most oil deposits, shown in Figure 3.5: in the Amazon rainforest, and often under 
traditional indigenous land.  The Ecuadorian Amazon is one of the world’s most 
biodiverse areas (more on this below), but the oil boom brought intensified threats. From 
2005 to 2010, Ecuador’s forest cover shrank by 1.9 percent per year, the fastest rate of 
deforestation in South America and the 12th highest rate worldwide. This represents an 
acceleration of its previous deforestation rates: 1.7 percent per year from 2000 to 2005 
and just 1.5 percent per year from 1990 to 2000 (FAO, 2010). Not all of the deforestation 
has been due exclusively to oil fields, but ecological research by Fearnside et Al. (2013) 
and Lovejoy (2014) have concluded that the construction of access roads and railways for 
these extraction projects are among the most important causes of deforestation. These 
road and rail projects interrupt animal migration patterns and open the forest to human 
settlement, large-scale agriculture, and logging. 
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Figure 3.5: Sensitive territory and active oil blocks in Ecuador, 2003-2013 
 Biodiversity Indigenous territory 
 
Note: Very high biodiversity is defined as being within the highest 6.4 percent of all South American land.  
Source: Compiled from Bass et Al. (2010), LandMark (no date), ARCH (2011-2013, 2017), Ministerio de 
Hidrocarburos (2014), and MRNNR (2012).  
While the environmental impacts of Amazonian oil production are well known, 
the social impact on Amazonian communities is equally severe. According to the 2009 
Plan Nacional, indigenous communities comprise a large share of the population in the 
Amazonian provinces, including half of all children in those provinces (SENPLADES 
2009, 143). Oil drilling threatens their access to their traditional hunting, fishing, and 
gathering grounds (usually village-adjacent forests, which are not deeded to them and 
therefore open to exploration). Moreover, contamination from oil spills can make these 
traditional livelihoods unsafe, poisoning aquifers and downstream waterways. The 
consequences can be dire even for the oil companies themselves, which have often faced 
large-scale protests. The case study below explores these issues in more detail. As the 
Plan Nacional states, “the growing problems from environmental degradation – the 
accelerated loss of natural spaces, constant occupation of indigenous land, and the 
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unequal distribution of the benefits of economic development – have been accompanied 
by socio-environmental conflicts since the 1970s” (221).  
3.2.4 Relative Impunity of Foreign Investors 
Over the course of the most recent few business cycles, scholars have noted that 
foreign investments have not necessarily contributed to long-term growth, domestic 
investment, or human development in their host countries, particularly among developing 
nations.  This phenomenon is particularly acute among extractive industries in 
ecologically and socially sensitive territory such as oil investment in Ecuador.  
Rodrik (1998) shows no relationship between capital account liberalization in 
developing countries and GDP growth or domestic investment. Mody and Murshid 
(2005) examine capital flows into 60 developing countries over 20 years (from 1979 to 
1999) and discover that over this time period, inflows were dominated by portfolio 
investment or FDI “with characteristics of portfolio capital” – in other words, highly-
liquid FDI that was not associated with appreciable domestic investment. They attribute 
their findings to the incentives driving FDI: investors are seeking diversification in their 
own portfolios, not responding to long-term unmet needs in host countries. These 
findings are reinforced by later work showing that FDI responds strongly to changing 
conditions in developed-economy markets. For example, Blanchard and Acalin (2016) 
show that FDI inflows to emerging markets rise during times of low US interest rates. 
These findings imply that FDI investors are motivated by the same incentives usually 
associated with portfolio investment: an interest rate differential between source and 
target markets. Rey (2015) finds that FDI inflows into LAC are positively correlated with 
the VIX (an index of US financial-market volatility), while portfolio investment is 
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negatively correlated with the VIX. She concludes that FDI should not be considered 
separately from portfolio investment, but that together, these correlations form one cycle 
of global capital flows, all “dancing to the same tune.” It is noteworthy that, while the 
FDI-VIX correlations she finds are positive for every region of the world, they are 
stronger by far in LAC (0.35) than for any other region (ranging from 0.06 in Western 
Europe to 0.16 in Asia).   
Given these well-documented incentives of foreign investors in developing 
countries to portfolio diversification and shorter-term returns over long-term production 
goals, the environmental and social performance of foreign oil investors in Ecuador 
should not be surprising. Rather than investing in long-term prospects, they have 
frequently endangered their ability to continue operating in the country through poorly-
managed environmental and social risk management.  Most notable are the records of the 
largest two US-based multinational corporations (MNCs) to develop Ecuadorian oil: 
Texaco (now part of Chevron) and Occidental Petroleum.  
As mentioned above, Ecuador’s oil production and exports began in the early 
1970s, while Ecuador was ruled under dictatorship. Thus, the conditions under which 
early oil development occurred were not subject to democratic approval or popular 
oversight. The 1978 Hydrocarbons Law set the terms for exploration contracts, but 
significant flexibility remained in the details of specific contracts into the 1980s. 
Institutional capacity for oversight and enforcement of environmental, human rights, and 
labor law continued to be developed through the most recent oil boom, as ministries 
worked to catch up to a booming sector. As a result, a few large multinational 
corporations (MNCs) were able to operate with relative impunity.  
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Two landmark examples stand out as examples of the extent of impunity, 
involving the US-based oil MNCs Occidental Petroleum and Texaco (now owned by 
Chevron). Texaco’s case has become known as “trial of the century” (ECLAC, 2004; 
Valdivia, 2007) for the world-famous lawsuit brought by multiple groups seeking 
economic redress for environmental damages. Though less infamous, Occidental’s case 
involves specifying in its contract with the Ecuadorian state a lower level of 
environmental standards than would be applicable elsewhere.  
Texaco was the first oil MNC to discover, produce, and export Ecuadorian oil. It 
began operations in Ecuador in 1967, and produced oil there from 1972 to 1990, when it 
handed operations over to Ecuadorian SOE PetroEcuador, leaving the country completely 
in 1992. In 1993, a group of 30,000 indigenous filed a class-action suit against Texaco in 
New York, claiming it had failed to sufficiently remediate the environmental damage it 
had caused before leaving (“Indians sue Texaco,” 1993).  
Texaco was a minority partner in its Ecuadorian operations, but responsible for 
technology and oversaw daily operations with “complete autonomy,” according to Gen. 
René Vargas Pazzos, PetroEcuador executive during the 1970s (Schemo, 1998). Texaco 
spent $40 million on remediation before leaving Ecuador, including cleaning out 268 
waste lagoons. However, 400 similar lagoons remain were not covered under its 
remediation agreement with the government before leaving. Paola Carrera, 
Undersecretary for Environmental Quality at the Ministry of Environment, claimed in an 
interview that the exclusion of these waste pools from the initial agreement was due to 
Texaco’s intentionally hiding them by covering them with organic debris so they would 
not be found during the audit that established the agreement’s parameters (Carrera, 2013). 
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According to Carrera, these pools continue to be discovered by PetroEcuador during its 
operations in the same oil blocks. For its part, Texaco maintains that the Ecuadorian 
government bears responsibility for its institutional inability to set and enforce its own 
environmental standards, as the alleged actions were not explicitly prohibited by 
Ecuadorian law before 1990 (Brooke, 1994; Schemo, 1998). Nonetheless, Texaco’s 
environmental performance in Ecuador was well below that permitted in its home 
country.  A 1994 independent water analysis by the Center for Economic and Social 
Rights found polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon concentrations between 28 and 2,793 
nanograms per liter in drinking and bathing water of affected communities; at that time 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency had set a maximum recommended level of 
zero (Brooke, 1994). Though the case was originally brought by private citizens, 
President Rafael Correa weighed in publicly, stating that “the techniques they used here 
were against the law in their own country. They weren’t interested in the human beings 
who lived in the Amazon region.” (North, 2015). 
Though the lawsuit was filed in 1993, it played out throughout the most recent oil 
boom. The plaintiffs filed their original lawsuit in New York because of perceived 
corruption and bias toward oil MNCs in the Ecuadorian judiciary as well as the lack of a 
class-action lawsuit option (“Agunida v. Texaco,” 2002). Nonetheless, Texaco (by then 
having merged with Chevron to become ChevronTexaco, later known simply as 
“Chevron”) successfully argued for a dismissal of the case, claiming that Ecuador was the 
appropriate venue given the fact that several cases against MNCs were currently ongoing 
in the Ecuadorian courts (Strong, 2013).  Though the plaintiffs appealed, the U.S. Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the ruling in 2002, moving the forum to Ecuador 
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(Whytock, 2013). The plaintiffs filed suit in Ecuador in 2003, and a judgement was 
finally declared in 2011, ordering Chevron to pay $18 billion toward remediation. 
However, that award would not be forthcoming. Chevron sought relief via arbitration, 
through the US-Ecuador bilateral investment treaty, and won a 2012 injunction against 
enforcement of the Ecuador judgment (Erichson, 2013). Chevron then sued the original 
plaintiffs, alleging racketeering and corruption during the Ecuadorian phase of the trial, 
and in 2014 a US district court ruled that corruption did in fact take place (Krauss, 2014). 
Finally, in 2017, citing the 2014 ruling, a U.S. federal court voided the award, freeing 
Chevron from the obligation (Hurley, 2017).  
Chevron’s gamble on the Ecuadorian courts, which all parties seem to agree was 
nearly universally plagued with corruption in the 1990s and 2000s, may seem brilliant in 
retrospect. Any judgment not in their favor could effectively be voided, as occurred. 
However, the case also had the effect of souring the relationship between the Ecuadorian 
government and US-based oil MNCs. In a 2011 speech, President Correa noted this by 
stating that Ecuadorian shipments of oil to the U.S. had traditionally been sent with 
“nothing in return” – signifying that this relationship yielded only private gains for oil 
MNCs instead of spurring development in Ecuador (“Presidente Destaca”, 2011). As is 
discussed in detail below, this interpretation of the Ecuador-U.S. relationship created an 
incentive for Ecuador to seek out new investment partners to develop its oil reserves 
under new conditions.  
The other major US-based oil MNC active in Ecuador, Occidental Petroleum, 
signed its exploration and development contract with Ecuador in 1985 and renewed it in 
1999. This contract established that its environmental performance would be based on the 
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methods with widespread use across the global petroleum industry, rather than accepted 
best practices (Kimerling, 2001). This omission importantly opened the door to effective 
self-regulation in Occidental’s operations. In subsequent years Occidental was associated 
with several instances of social and environmental misconduct, which gained national 
notoriety.  
Occidental’s main conflict during its operations was with the Secoya people, who 
resisted acculturate and settlement well into the 20th century. Occidental signed an 
agreement with the Secoya people in 1996, permitting unspecified oil activities in 
exchange for a package of compensation including outboard motors, water pumps, metal 
tanks, cooking stoves, and medicines (Fontaine, 2003). The agreement led to several 
months of intra-Secoya conflict, after which Occidental agreed to a series of re-
negotiations, which led to a final agreement in 1998 in which Occidental agreed to 
postpone operations until the completion of a social and environmental impact 
assessment. Notably, the latter of these requirements (an environmental impact 
assessment) had long since been required for its operations in the United States and 
particularly so in its home state of California, under the National Environmental Policy 
Act California Environmental Quality Act, both enacted in 1969 (Ibid; CNRA, 2016; 
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011).   
Occidental also came into conflict with members of the Kichwa people a few 
years later regarding careless environmental management.20 In 2000, Occidental built a 
                                               
20 The Kichwa people and language are also commonly referred to as “Quichua,” following traditional 
Spanish grammar rules. However, the Kichwa people have chosen the name “Kichwa” for themselves 
(Limerick, 2014).  Furthermore, their choice has been recognized by Ecuador’s Ministry of Education, 
which offers officially-sanctioned “Kichwa” language courses (Ministerio de Educación, 2016). For those 
reasons, this essay refers to them as such.  
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road into the buffer zone on the periphery of the Yasuní National Park, spurring a legal 
complaint in which local Kichwa community members noted 12 examples of 
Occidental’s alleged contamination of their territory but did not receive compensation or 
recognition of wrongdoing (Finer and Huta, 2005). While Occidental successfully argued 
that the road was not illegal because it was not an access road but an in-road between 
production facilities (and therefore unlikely to contribute to deforestation), subsequent 
GIS-based research has revealed that these facilities are also within the buffer zone, 
leading to a total of 60 hectares of illegal deforestation (Pappalardo and De Marchi, 
2009).  
3.3 Ecuador’s Moves Toward a New Paradigm 
During the most recent oil boom, and especially during the tenure of President 
Rafael Correa (who took office in early 2007), Ecuador took several important steps to 
move away from the model of oil-based economic development that left the country 
vulnerable to misconduct by U.S.-based oil MNCs. Three possible approaches exist to 
challenge that scenario: moving away from reliance on oil, reforming the regulatory 
environment in which oil-based FDI occurs, and moving away from reliance on the US as 
a partner for investment. Ecuador has pursued all three paths, with varying degrees of 
success. Each is discussed in turn below. 
3.3.1 Challenging the Reliance on Oil 
Ecuador’s attempts at diversification away from reliance on petroleum exports 
have proven difficult for several reasons. First, Ecuador’s use of the US dollar as its 
national currency means that in practice, its currency faces long-term pressure to become 
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overvalued.21 As a result, Ecuador’s exports are more expensive on the world market than 
they would otherwise be, which hurts the competitiveness of non-petroleum industries. 
The Plan Nacional (66) calls the deterioration of competitiveness the “Achilles Heel” of 
dollarization. Compounding this problem is the “Dutch disease” phenomenon: nations 
that primarily export raw commodities tend to have overvalued currencies because their 
exports’ prices are determined by the world market rather than by manufacturing costs. 
The resulting fall in competitiveness in other industries makes it difficult to escape 
dependence on those commodities, creating a vicious cycle. As the 2009 Plan Nacional 
states, in an economy “based on … extraction and export of commodities, long-term 
economic growth revolves around external market dynamics, especially the price of oil, 
and neglects internal demand … to the detriment of national production and 
employment” (SENPLADES 2009, 331, author’s translation). Any effort Ecuador makes 
to spur investment in non-petroleum sectors is at a significant disadvantage because of 
this context.  
Divestment efforts to date have included microloans with preferential terms, with 
special attention to the non-petroleum sectors that the government committed to boosting 
in the Development Plan. From 2007 to 2012, the National Development Bank and the 
Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion issued more than a million small loans 
totaling nearly $3 billion (about 0.4 percent of GDP) to individuals and small businesses. 
(BNF 2010-2012). Furthermore, the infrastructure and education projects mentioned 
                                               
21  Dollarization raises the risk of an overvalued exchange rate because the value of the US dollar is based 
on the US economy, not the Ecuadorian economy. Currency overvaluation, in turn, can undermine the 
manufacturing sector and prevent growth or recovery, as had occurred in the US in the 2000s and Japan 
in the 1990s. For more on dollarization and an overvalued exchange rate, see Vernengo and Bradbury 
2011. For more on the effects of an overvalued currency on the manufacturing sector, see Palley 2003.  
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above provide support for businesses of all sectors and can help support competitiveness 
in non-traditional industries. As beneficial as these programs may prove to be in the long 
term, however, they have not proven to be a sufficiently large push to reduce Ecuador’s 
dependence on oil.  
Another obstacle to diversification is that oil represents a significant portion of 
public revenue. As Figure 3.6 shows, petroleum revenues have represented 
approximately 30 percent of central government revenues for most of the past decade.  
One major attempt to diminish this public dependence on oil revenue, the so-called 
Yasuní ITT initiative, is discussed in detail below. 
Figure 3.6: Ecuador central government revenue by source, 2003-2013 (percent of 
GDP) 
 
Source: BCE (2014).  
 Shortly after his election, President Correa sought to mitigate the Ecuadorian 
state’s dependence on oil production for revenue through the 2007 Yasuní Ishpingo-
Tambococha-Tiputini (ITT) Initiative. The ITT oil deposits lie within or bordering 
Ecuador’s Yasuní National Park, one of the most biodiverse sections of the entire 
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Amazon basin but could add substantially to Ecuador’s oil horizon. Estimates of the size 
of the deposit range from 412 to 960 million barrels of oil, or between 10 and 25 percent 
of the nation’s proven oil reserves (Álvarez, 2013; Bass et al., 2010; Finer, Moncel, and 
Jenkins, 2010; OEM, 2018; OPEC, 2017).  Correa launched the Yasuní ITT Initiative at 
the 2007 United Nations General Assembly, offering to commit to never extracting that 
oil if world governments pledged to donate $360 million per year for 10 years to Ecuador 
in exchange. This value represents approximately half of the opportunity cost of leaving 
that oil block untouched, and about 60 percent of Correa’s estimate of the cost of 
purchasing carbon credits for the amount of carbon emissions that oil would be expected 
to produce (Larrea and Warnars, 2009; Rival, 2010).  
In proposing the Yasuní ITT initiative, Correa initiated a shift in the international 
dialog surrounding payments for environmental services, in which wealthy, industrialized 
countries that benefit from mitigating climate change pay developing countries to 
preserve the forests that are key to climate change mitigation (Rival, 2010). Whereas 
traditionally payments for environmental services had been initiated by multilateral 
groups, this proposal set a precedent for the way in which it was unilaterally proposed by 
a developing country (Pellegrini et al, 2014). Whether despite – or because– of this new 
approach to negotiations, less than 10 percent of the proposed amount was raised, and the 
proposal was scrapped (Pellegrini et al, 2014). In 2016, Ecuadorian oil SOE 
Petroamazonas began production in the ITT oil block (ARCH, 2017).  
3.3.2 Enhancing the Regulatory Environment of Oil FDI 
 In addition to Ecuador’s – admittedly limited – movements away from oil reliance 
discussed above, it has also enacted several important reforms to mitigate damages from 
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particularly unstainable aspects of the sector. These reforms fall into three categories: 
those aimed at taming the impacts of volatile prices, those aimed at broadening social 
inclusion, and those aimed at limiting environmental degradation. In doing so, Ecuador 
adopted what may be termed a “high-road extractivism” approach to an oil-driven 
economy, aimed at limiting the social and environmental cost of oil production while 
ensuring that its benefits were shared as broadly as possible. 
3.3.2.1 Regulation and Terms of Trade 
As Figure 3.2 shows, above, periods of rising oil prices have not necessarily 
improved Ecuador’s terms of trade. In part, this is due to the fact that oil prices impact 
both exports and imports for Ecuador. A lack of local refining capacity means that 
Ecuador exports crude oil and imports refined petroleum products such as gasoline, as 
Figure 3.7 shows. This imbalance grew during the most recent oil boom, partially due to 
fuel subsidies, discussed below. 
Figure 3.7: Ecuador’s net petroleum exports by type, 1994-2013 (percent of GDP) 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of UN COMTRADE and IMF WEO data.  
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The Ecuadorian government uses some of its petroleum revenue to subsidize the 
consumer price of gasoline, diesel, and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), to cushion the 
impacts of price volatility on final consumers. In general, oil revenue and subsidy 
expenditure should rise and fall with the price of petroleum, acting as an automatic 
stabilizer of sorts. Table 3.2 shows the relationship between public oil revenue and public 
fuel subsidies between 2006 and 2013. The relationship varies, with subsidies 
representing between 4.8 and 30.2 percent of public oil revenues, because some public oil 
revenue is constant, as is explained below.  
Table 3.2: Public oil revenue and fuel subsidies, Ecuador 
 
Public Oil Revenue 
(share of GDP) 
Public Fuel Subsidies 
Share of GDP Share of Public Oil Revenue 
2003 16.6% 0.8% 4.8% 
2004 16.7% 2.1% 12.3% 
2005 16.8% 4.1% 24.2% 
2006 16.8% 4.4% 26.4% 
2007 18.4% 4.9% 26.6% 
2008 25.9% 5.9% 22.9% 
2009 17.9% 3.3% 18.4% 
2010 19.1% 4.4% 22.9% 
2011 22.1% 6.6% 29.8% 
2012 21.7% 6.6% 30.2% 
2013 22.2% 5.9% 26.8% 
Source: Author’s calculations using Espinoza Echeverría and Guayanlema (2017) and BCE (2014) data. 
Nonetheless, these subsidy programs shielded Ecuadorian consumers and 
producers from the fuel price impacts of the oil boom. Espinoza Echeverría and 
Guayanlema (2017) find that most of the benefit of the LPG subsidy benefitted the 
residential sector, while most of the gasoline and diesel subsidies unsurprisingly 
benefitted the transport sector.  
  
 131 
Table 3.3: Ecuadorian fuel subsidies by type, 2003-2013 
 LPG Gasoline Diesel 
 
Consumer  
Price 
Import  
Price 
Discount  
(%) 
Consumer  
Price 
Import  
Price 
Discount  
(%) 
Consumer  
Price 
Import  
Price 
Discount  
(%) 
2003 $0.09 $0.36 75% $1.12 $1.03 -9% $0.78 $0.91 14% 
2004 $0.09 $0.44 80% $1.15 $1.31 12% $0.79 $1.27 38% 
2005 $0.09 $0.53 83% $1.15 $1.78 35% $0.79 $1.90 58% 
2006 $0.09 $0.65 86% $1.15 $2.02 43% $0.79 $2.00 61% 
2007 $0.09 $0.74 88% $1.15 $2.19 47% $0.79 $2.18 64% 
2008 $0.09 $0.82 89% $1.15 $2.59 56% $0.79 $3.00 74% 
2009 $0.09 $0.51 82% $1.15 $1.91 40% $0.79 $1.87 58% 
2010 $0.09 $0.63 86% $1.15 $2.34 51% $0.79 $2.30 66% 
2011 $0.09 $0.90 90% $1.15 $3.14 63% $0.79 $3.11 75% 
2012 $0.09 $0.81 89% $1.15 $3.43 66% $0.79 $3.24 76% 
2013 $0.09 $0.78 88% $1.15 $3.14 63% $0.79 $3.14 75% 
Source: Author’s calculation using Espinoza Echeverría and Guayanlema (2017).  
Additional reforms during the oil boom were oriented toward increasing the 
government share of private oil company profits, helping to support the subsidies 
discussed above as well as the social spending discussed below. Ecuador’s 1978 
Hydrocarbons Law, dating to the years of military rule, established that private oil 
companies could explore marginal oil fields (those where production yielded less than 
one percent of the national total, and where production costs were expected to be higher 
than average) through contracts with the Ecuadorian state (or – after their creation – 
Ecuadorian state-owned oil companies), setting a fixed price per barrel of oil produced 
(Dirección Nacional, 1978). These fixed prices were to be set above market rates, in such 
a way as to incentivize exploration in fields not already in production, taking into account 
“greater investment levels to be realized in the area, guaranteed minimum production 
levels, and production costs” (Ibid., Art. 2, author’s translation). In 2006, as oil prices 
began to rise rapidly, President Alfredo Palacio signed an executive decree instituting a 
99 percent windfall tax on the difference between the market prices and the world prices 
anticipated in these exploration contracts (Palacio, 2006).  
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The 2010 Hydrocarbons Reform Law extended this arrangement to all oil 
producers in the country other than Ecuadorian state-owned firms, in order to establish 
that “the entirety of production within the contracted area of is property of the State” 
(Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador 2010b, Art. 8, author’s translation). However, it also 
determined that these producers should pay at least a 25 percent tax on their income from 
these sales, and at least a 44 percent tax on resulting profits (Ibid, Introduction). Taken 
together, the reforms of 2006 and 2010 gave the Ecuadorian state greater control over, 
predictability regarding, and revenue from its oil resources in the face of volatile 
international oil prices.  
Another approach to addressing the terms of trade problem is downstream 
refinery investment. The Refinería del Pacífico (RdP), a major refinery project near the 
Port of Manta, promises to be the largest infrastructure undertaking in the country’s 
history. This project was originally planned as a joint project between Ecuador and 
Venezuela’s oil SOE PDVSA. It gained new life after PDVSA sold 30 percent of its stake 
to China’s CNPC in 2013 (DeaLogic, n.d.) but has languished again since oil prices fell 
in 2014. The extent to which domestic refining can be increased enough to offset volatile 
costs of imported refined petroleum products remains to be seen and may have to wait 
until prices rise again. 
3.3.2.2 Environmental Protection 
 Ecuador’s most ambitious environmental protection reform has come through its 
2008 Constitution, which recognizes the rights of Mother Nature (Pachamama) herself 
(Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador 2008, Arts. 71-74). Article 71 explicitly states that “any 
person, community, town, or nationality” may bring legal action on behalf of Pacha 
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Mama against anyone suspected of causing environmental damage. In practice, this 
reform has the potential to be a powerful tool for environmental justice, in that plaintiffs 
do not need to prove that their private property was damaged by the alleged action. 
Furthermore, Article 72 states that Pacha Mama has a right to restoration: judges may 
order not only an end to specific acts of environmental damage but also remedial action.  
 The application of this reform has been tentative, but not without successes. For 
example, the first judgement using the rights of nature did not occur until March 2011. In 
that case, Wheeler v Director de la Procuraduría General del Estado de Loja, the judge 
ordered a municipality to pay for restoration of a river whose path it had modified for a 
new road (Daly, 2012). The next year, a group brought a case against the municipal 
government of Santa Cruz, Galápagos, regarding a road construction project that had not 
gone through the necessary environmental licensing or public information processes 
(Bedón Garzón, 2017). Finally, in a more recent case, communities along the Chiquita 
River brought a complaint against the Los Andes and Palesma palm oil plantations citing 
waste dumping into the river. After six years of trial, the 2017 judgement ordered the 
plantations to plant an eight-meter bamboo periphery buffer between their plantations and 
the river, to help mitigate runoff (Hazelwood et al 2017). This case presents a possible 
precedent for oil companies, in that it is the first time the rights of nature have been 
applied to productive investors rather than local government agencies.  
3.3.2.3 Social Inclusion 
During the oil boom, Ecuador enacted reforms aimed at broadening the social 
inclusion of the economic benefits of oil, while limiting its social cost. These reforms 
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centered on three thematic areas: labor protections, public revenue devolution to local 
governments, and prior consultation for indigenous communities.  
Labor conflict is common in Latin America’s extractive sectors, as chronicled by 
the “Observatorio Social de América Latina” (OSAL) initiative (CLACSO, 2000-2012).  
A common trigger of this conflict is the use of subcontracted workers to evade national 
labor standards.22 President Correa addressed this issue in 2008, with an executive decree 
limiting subcontracting to “complementary” work such as janitorial and security services 
(Correa, 2008). Furthermore, Ecuadorian employers must now engage in profit-sharing 
with all employees, including subcontractors. Employers must distribute 10 percent of 
their profits to all workers equally and must distribute an additional 5 percent of profits to 
workers based on their family dependents (Congreso Nacional, 2005).  
 Another touchstone for labor conflict in the Latin American extractive sector is 
the use of foreign workers by foreign investors. Ecuador has largely eliminated this 
trigger, through the Hydrocarbon Reform of 2010, which requires petroleum companies 
to hire Ecuadorian staff for 95 percent of unskilled positions and 90 percent of 
administrative and technical positions (Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador, 2010b). This 
standard can be quite powerful in preventing social conflict: Zach Chen, commercial 
attaché for the Chinese embassy in Quito, expressed in an interview that meeting these 
staffing goals has been key to the ability of Chinese oil companies to prevent labor 
disputes in their oil fields (Chen, 2014). 
                                               
22 For more on the role of subcontracting in extractive industry labor disputes in Latin America, see Cook 
and Bazler (2013); González Serna, Canstañeda Gómez, and Giraldo Ramírez (2017); Marshall (2000); 
Pont Vidal (2008); and Sanborn and Chonn Ching (2017).  
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 These labor reforms may have helped ensure that oil workers shared in the 
benefits of oil boom, but as mentioned above, the oil sector employs very few workers 
per million dollars of output. To broaden the group who benefit from oil profits beyond 
those employed by the sector, Ecuador has enacted a series of devolution reforms. These 
policies channel public oil revenue to sub-national governments, the Gobiernos 
Autónomos Decentralizados (GADs) at the province, canton, and parish level. In 2003, 
the Fondo para el Ecodesarrollo was established, which dedicates $1 per barrel of oil for 
public investment in the Amazon, under the care of the GADs and the Instituto para el 
Ecodesarrollo Regional Amazónico (ECORAE). From 2003 to 2013, Ecuador produced 
nearly 2 billion barrels of oil, distributing the resulting funds to municipalities (58 
percent), provinces (28 percent), parishes (5 percent), and the ECORAE (9 percent). The 
funds come with restrictions: at least 80 percent must be spent on conservation and 
transportation projects, and the rest is to be spent on public investments approved by the 
Secretary of Hydrocarbons.  More recently, the 2010 oil reform law re-directed 12 
percent of oil profits (which previously went to the central government) to the GADs in 
the regions where the drilling takes place, to be used for health and education projects as 
approved by the appropriate ministry (Asemblea Nacional del Ecuador 2010b, Art. 94).   
Finally, Ecuador has recognized the right of indigenous communities to have a 
meaningful voice in oil exploration plans in their traditional territory. In 1998, it ratified 
the International Labour Organisation Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, 
enshrining the rights of indigenous communities to determine the extent to which they 
assimilate into the society around them, and requiring their consultation for any projects 
that might impact their lands, water, air, or livelihoods (ILO 1989).  
 136 
In 2010, Ecuador enacted national legislation to formalize the commitments it 
made through ILO 169. The 2010 Citizen Participation Law requires the government to 
seek communities’ free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) before allowing new oil and 
mining projects. Projects are not completely prohibited if they do not win local 
community approval, but in the case of majority opposition, they must meet higher 
environmental and social standards, including offering employment to affected 
indigenous communities (Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador, 2010a). 
These reforms are perhaps the most ambitious in scope of all “high-road 
extractivism” efforts listed here. Rather than simply setting the terms of oil investment, 
they have the potential to determine if projects will happen at all. If adequately enforced, 
they could successfully address the intrinsic conflict of oil reserves below indigenous 
territory and ensure that exploration and drilling happen in a way that respects indigenous 
communities and shares benefits with them. However, these FPIC protections are also the 
most difficult to enforce, because they pit contradictory governmental incentives and 
even ministries against one another, setting up a conflict between the goals of expediting 
FDI and protecting human rights. Section four of the chapter looks more closely at this 
institutional conflict and its results in the application of FPIC protections.    
3.3.3 Shifting away from Reliance on the US 
Since his election in 2007, President Rafael Correa has facilitated a new type of 
international engagement for the country. Throughout its history, Ecuador’s economy 
was primarily dependent on the United States as a source of exports and imports, as well 
as a primary destination for migrants whose remittances made up a significant portion of 
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GDP. After assuming power, Correa employed several strategies to buffer Ecuador 
against the volatility of depending on one external partner.  
Part of Correa’s strategy has involved moving his country away from the US and 
toward China. The Ecuadorian leader explained the shift in a speech delivered in 2011 
about the two nations’ complementarity: "In 2006, 75 percent of our oil was going to the 
United States …this year, 50 percent has been committed to China, in exchange for 
billions of dollars" (“Presidente Destaca,” 2011, author’s translation). In another 
example, when Correa’s government refused to extend the controversial lease of an 
Ecuadorian Air Force base to the US military, it turned to China as a potential partner for 
re-developing the site. The government made attempts, which ultimately proved 
unsuccessful, to lease the base to a Chinese firm and to revamp a series of projects related 
to a transport corridor from Manta to the Brazilian Amazonas capital city of Manaus, 
with Chinese financing (Narins, 2012). In light of that project’s ultimate infeasibility, 
Chinese interests became more focused in the oil and mining sectors (Bonilla, 2010). In 
addition, Correa’s administration signed three major treaties with China, including:  
• Treaty on Economic and Technological Cooperation, including a RMB 20 million 
(about $3 million USD) in Chinese aid to Ecuador, 
• Executive Plan of Cooperation in Science and Technology;  
• Cooperation document on oil trade finance between PRC Export-Import Bank and 
PetroEcuador.	 
(For more on these deals, see ADB, IADB, and ADBI, 2012). 
In many ways, China has become an invaluable economic ally for Ecuador. 
Ecuador’s burgeoning relationship with China has guaranteed it access to financial 
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markets, an investor willing to develop oil fields in a way that benefits Ecuador as well as 
China, and a partner in generating value added through the Pacífico Refinery.  
3.3.3.1 China as a Source of Investment 
China’s involvement in Ecuador’s oil sector has been largely led by investment, 
which in turn has driven exports to China.   From 2013 to 2013, China was Ecuador’s 
most important source of oil investment, for both greenfield investment (GFDI) and 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals, as Table 3.4 shows.  
Table 3.4: Sources of oil FDI into Ecuador by type, 2003-2013 
Source  
Country 
Greenfield FDI  Mergers and Acquisitions 
Millions of USD Share of Total  Millions of USD Share of Total 
Brazil 316.0 26.4%    
Canada 337.0 28.1%  141.7 6.2% 
China 408.2 34.1%  1,905.0 84.0% 
Other 136.4 11.4%  222.0 9.8% 
Total 1,197.6 100.0%  2,268.7 100.0% 
Source: Author’s analysis of DeaLogic and FDIMarkets data. 
China’s importance in the Ecuadorian oil sector came through three large deals 
carried out by China’s largest two state-owned oil companies: the China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Sinopec. First, in 2003, CNPC acquired the oil 
interests of Block 11 on the northwestern border with Colombia. While Block 11 has 
never been shown to have significant oil reserves, it is conveniently located on Ecuador’s 
main oil pipeline, the Sistema Oleoducto Transecuatoriano (Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline 
System, or SOTE) so any oil discovered there would be easily transported (Chi, 2016).  
China’s biggest investment came in 2006 with the $1.42 billion purchase of the 
Ecuadorian oil interests of the Canadian firm Encana, including production in three 
important oil blocks (14, 17, and 62) For this deal, CNPC and Sinopec created two joint 
ventures. CNPC owns a majority stake (55 percent) in each of the resulting firms, Andes 
Petroleum and PetroOriental, with Sinopec owning the remaining 45 percent in each. 
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Andes Petroleum took over production in the northwestern block 62 while PetroOriental 
took operations in blocks 14 and 17, further south. Separately, PetroOriental bought a 36 
percent stake in Ecuador’s second major pipeline, the Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados 
(Heavy Crude Pipeline, or OCP) for $385 million.  
These oil investments are a major part of China’s overall relationship with 
Ecuador. As Table 3.5 shows, the oil and gas sector comprised 41.5 percent of all 
Chinese GFDI and 98.4 percent of Chinese M&As in Ecuador between 2003 and 2013. 
This heavy concentration stands in stark contrast to other FDI in Ecuador, in which the 
oil and gas sector represented only 11.8 percent and 9.2 percent, respectively. 
Table 3.5: Greenfield and M&A FDI deals in Ecuador, by source and sector, 2003-
2013  
Greenfield FDI Mergers & Acquisitions 
 
From China 
($0.9b) 
From R.o.W. 
($6.4b) 
From China 
($1.9b) 
From R.o.W. 
($2.4b) 
 USD Pct. USD Pct. USD Pct. USD Pct. 
Agr., food, bev. 0.0 0.0% 102.5 1.5% 0.0 0.0% 823.2 34.2% 
Oil & gas 408.2 41.5% 789.4 11.8% 1,905.0 98.4% 222.0 9.2% 
Mining & metals 0.0 0.0% 1,668.5 25.0% 28.0 1.4% 160.1 6.6% 
Other mfg. 4.3 0.4% 1,392.6 20.9% 0.0 0.0% 14.0 0.6% 
Communications 20.0 2.0% 732.9 11.0% 0.0 0.0% 833.0 34.6% 
Transp., storage 523.0 53.2% 233.7 3.5% 0.0 0.0% 210.0 8.7% 
Other services 28.3 2.9% 1,758.1 26.3% 2.8 0.1% 146.6 6.1% 
TOTAL 983.8 100.0% 6,677.7 100.0% 1,935.8 100.0% 2,408.8 100.0% 
Source: Author’s analysis of FDIMarkets and DeaLogic data. 
Notably, both Andes Petroleum and PetroOriental are SOEs and as such, may be 
expected to display different firm behavior than that of private MNCs. For example, 
DeWenter and Malesta (2001) shows that SOEs tend to operate longer-term decision 
horizons than private firms: that over longer-term time spans of 20 years, the commonly-
accepted SOE efficiency disadvantage disappears. This is particularly so in China, where 
policy strategies are famously determined along the lines of five-year plans. Putterman 
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and Dong (2000) show that firm behavior by Chinese SOEs has largely followed Chinese 
government policy prescriptions as they shifted from employment creation (during the 
Mao period) to efficiency (in the reform period). Thereafter, beginning with in 1999, 
China’s “going global” policy promoted outbound FDI in strategic sectors and through 
strategic partnerships. Buckley et al. (2007) and Ramasamy, Yeung, and Laforet (2012) 
examine the determinants of Chinese SOEs’ outbound FDI and conclude that, inter alia, 
institutional factors are crucial in explaining investment decisions. For example, Chinese 
SOEs established their presence overseas through an investment pattern that was 
simultaneously more geographically diversified (including countries seen as politically 
risky) and more sectorally concentrated (especially in raw materials) than would be 
predicted by traditional theories of MNC behavior.  Given these differing incentives for 
Chinese SOEs and western MNC investors in Ecuador, it should not be surprising that 
these new partners have acted in such a way as to protect their long-term relationship 
with Ecuador to a greater than the MNCs profiled above.  
China has differed from most other sources of oil investment in two important 
ways. First, Chinese petroleum companies have remained in the country through major 
oil reforms in 2007 and 2010, each of which increased the state’s revenue from oil 
production. After each round of reforms several other foreign oil companies left the 
country, including the Brazilian firm Petrobras, the French firm Perenco, and City 
Oriente, which was registered in Panama. Zach Chen, Chinese Embassy Attaché, 
attributes the perseverance of the Chinese oil companies to a long-term company 
strategy. The Chinese oil companies in Ecuador, CNPC and Sinopec, are both state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), and serve the Chinese government’s diplomatic as well as 
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financial interests. Diplomatic relationships take time to build and must be stronger than 
short-term profit motives (Chen, 2014).  
China has also distinguished itself as an investment partner in its willingness to 
support downstream industry linkages in Ecuador, rather than solely producing crude 
petroleum and refining it once it reaches China. As mentioned above, it is now a major 
partner in the Refinería del Pacífico project, though progress is stalled as of this writing. 
The RdP project also shows the limits of China’s goodwill in meeting  
The RdP project is an example of how Chinese investment and finance are 
interwoven in Ecuador. When CNPC joined as an RdP partner, it brought access to 
Chinese financing, as well as an expectation of the use of Chinese labor and equipment. 
This situation stands in contrast with Chinese oil production in Ecuador, which has used 
local labor following the Ecuadorian labor laws mentioned above. Thus, although 
China’s SOEs have shown themselves capable and willing to take steps to prevent labor 
disputes when required by law, they have not done so on their own accord.  
3.3.3.2 China as an Export Market 
Following the oil investments described above, China’s importance as a market 
for Ecuadorian oil also rose dramatically. The importance of China for Ecuadorian oil is 
understated in trade data because of the use of refineries in intermediary countries. Public 
records do not exist connecting oil fields in originating countries, through refineries in 
second countries, and on to consumers in third countries. Even so, as Figure 3.8 shows, 
China’s market share of Ecuadorian exports rose quickly Ecuador throughout the oil 
boom period, especially in the extractive sector. China’s share of petroleum exports 
themselves peaked at 10.9 percent of Ecuador’s exports in 2009. 
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Figure 3.8: China’s share of Ecuadorian exports, by major sector 
 
Source: Author’s analysis using COMTRADE data.   
Concerning imports, Figure 3.9 shows that by the end of the oil boom, the United 
States still led in shipments to Ecuador—25.2 percent in 2013—but China was the second 
most important source of imports, at 16.7 percent. Notably, China’s gains in the 
Ecuadorian market do not appear to have taken market share from the US but from 
smaller, regional partners like Colombia. China unseated Colombia as the second most 
important import source, while the US continued to grow in importance.  
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Figure 3.9: Ecuador’s imports (top three sources, in percent of total) 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of UN COMTRADE data. 
3.3.3.3 China as a Source of Bilateral Credit 
In 2008, after reviewing all of its international debt, Ecuador declared two bonds 
(totalling $3.2 billion) to be odious debt and defaulted on them. These bonds were singled 
out due to irregularities in their initial contracts: one was issued under a dictatorship and 
the other lacked a competitive bidding process in selecting investment-banking (CAIC, 
2008). Both situations make embezzlement, corruption, and capital flight more likely, 
although the funds themselves were not definitively shown to have been misappropriated.  
These two bonds amounted to less than half of all national public debt, and only 
about five percent of GDP (IMF, 2014). Nonetheless, the default was unusual in the 
government did not cite financial hardship but irregularities in the debt itself. Many 
international analysts and pundits vociferously opposed it, and Ecuador subsequently lost 
access to its traditional Western creditors (Porzecanski, 2010). This signalled an 
opportunity for Chinese leaders and investors to diversify their economy’s sources of 
China   
United States   
Colombia   
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primary commodities through the oil loans described below. Ecuador, for its part, became 
unable to seek funding elsewhere; China’s innovative arrangements involving pre-sales 
of crude oil provided much-needed immediate funds. 
Figure 3.10: Total Ecuadorian debt compared with debt to China (percent of GDP) 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of Banco Central del Ecuador (n.d.) and IMF World Economic Outlook (April 
2014) data. 
As Figure 3.10 shows, China became Ecuador’s most important creditor during 
these years (accounting for over one-third of the nation’s total public debt in 2013). From 
2009 to 2013, external public debt to China rose by five percent of GDP while total 
external public debt rose by just two percent of GDP: in other words, non-China debt fell 
during these years. Gallagher, et al. (2012) explain that China’s loans to Ecuador (about 
8.5 percent of Chinese loans to LAC from 2005-2011), constitute a disproportional 
amount based on Ecuador’s population (2.5 percent of LAC in 2011) and GDP (1.3 
percent of the region). Moreover, during this time China signed a series of oil deals with 
Ecuador in which it prepaid for oil shipments, giving both parties predictability in their 
trade and providing Ecuador with frontloaded income (Benítez, 2014).   
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Most loans from China during this time were directed at the extraction and 
hydroelectric sectors, as Table 3.6 shows. Ecuador did not receive significant Chinese 
finance until 2009, after the default. Thereafter, China backed both the Coca-Codo 
Sinclair Dam and the Sopladora Dam. These loans boosted the government’s goal of 
producing some 93.5 percent of its energy needs by the year 2021 via hydroelectric 
sources (see MEER, n.d., 1, 2 for more), but they also carried conditions to use Chinese 
equipment and contractors.23  The loans for the hydroelectric projects have the added 
benefit of providing power for the large-scale Chinese extraction projects in Ecuador.  
Table 3.6: Oil-boom era loans to Ecuador from Chinese banks and SOEs 
Year Lender Partner Quantity 
(USD, b) 
Purpose 
Oil-Backed:    
2010 China Dev’t Bank PetroEcuador 1.0 80% discretionary, 20% oil-backed  
2011 China Dev’t. Bank Government 2.0 70% discretionary, 30% oil-backed 
2011 PetroChina PetroEcuador 1.0 Pre-payment for oil purchase 
     
Other:     
2010 China Ex-Im Bank Government 1.7 Coca-Codo Sinclair hydroelectric dam 
2010 China Ex-Im Bank Government 0.6 Sopladora hydroelectric dam 
2012 China Dev’t Bank Government 2.0 Financed budget deficit 
2013 China Ex-Im Bank Government 0.3 Minas-San Francisco hydro. dam 
2013 China Ex-Im Bank Government 0.1 Highway construction 
TOTAL   8.7  
Source: IAD (2017). 
Loans for oil involve Chinese public banks, Ecuador, and Chinese oil companies. 
When the loans are made by the China Development Bank (CDB), they proceeded as 
follows: the CDB lent money to Ecuador, which in return shipped a prescribed amount of 
oil to Chinese oil companies. Those companies paid for the oil at current market rates; 
part of the payment goes to CDB account to repay the loan, and the remained was paid to 
Ecuador (Gallagher et Al, 2012; Sanderson and Forsyth, 2013).  
                                               
23  As Gallagher, Irwin, and Koleski (2012) have highlighted, most of China’s loans to Ecuador do not 
have policy conditions but do have conditions on using the funds to purchase Chinese goods or services. 
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These loans’ complicated structure makes them difficult to compare to traditional 
loans. However, given Ecuador’s constraints during those years, they posed an important 
advantage in terms of risk management for both China and Ecuador. Most international 
loans depend on the borrower’s continued access to the lender’s currency for repayment, 
which can trigger complications for countries with “soft” currencies or with no currency 
of their own at all, like Ecuador. In this case China and Ecuador avoid that risk, but face 
two others: the possibility of an unexpected drop in the world oil price (meaning that 
more barrels of oil would be required to repay the loan) or an unexpected drop in 
Ecuador’s oil output. The short-term nature of these arrangements (usually fewer than 8 
years, according to Bräutigam and Gallagher, 2014) reduced the risk of a drop in world 
oil prices (Ecuavisa, 2013). However, the oil boom itself ended after 2013, so it is likely 
that the 2010 and 2011 arrangements remained on Ecuador’s books much longer than 
originally anticipated. 
It is worth noting that seven years after Ecuador’s default, it re-entered 
international bond markets. By early 2017, international sovereign bonds had regained 
their position as Ecuador’s most important source of credit. By year-end 2017, Ecuador’s 
total external debt stood at 31.6 percent of GDP: 13.5 percent in sovereign bonds, 8.4 
percent in multilaterals loans, 7.5 percent in bilateral loans from China, and 2.2 percent in 
other bilateral debt (Ministry of Finance, 2018). Thus, China effectively saw Ecuador 
through a particularly difficult seven-year period without access to traditional credit 
market. For a small country such as Ecuador, with very few exports (most of which are 
subject to wide global price swings) and no currency of its own, such assistance was 
 147 
economically crucial to avoid a ballooning debt crisis, and laid the groundwork for a 
strategic relationship between the two countries.  
3.4. Case Study: CNPC and Sinopec in Ecuador 
The 2003-2013 oil boom provided a test case for Ecuador’s new model of “high-
road extractivism,” in two phases: in 2006 and again in 2014, in the form of the arrival 
and expansion of Chinese oil investment. This new relationship gave Ecuador the 
opportunity to begin an investment partnership under its new framework. The Chinese oil 
companies mentioned above, Andes Petroleum and PetroOriental, entered Ecuador in 
2006 by acquiring concessions in oil blocks already in operations. In 2014, Andes 
Petroleum acquired two new oil blocks, in a section of the Amazon where oil production 
has never occurred before.  
This section examines the social and environmental performance of Andes 
Petroleum and PetroOriental in their existing blocks, as well as the regulatory 
performance of the Ecuadorian state in overseeing the expansion of their operations into 
new territory. It seeks to determine the extent to which this new diplomatic and 
investment relationship allowed Ecuador to pursue its new approach to “high-road 
extractivism.” It addresses this question through a mixed-methods approach, utilizing 
both quantitative and qualitative measures. Section 3.1 quantitatively evaluates the 
performance of these Chinese oil companies in their existing concessions on the basis of 
social conflict (measured as the relative frequency and intensity of protests and other 
mobilizations targeting Andes Petroleum and PetroOriental operations compared to other 
oil companies in Ecuador) and environmental degradation (measured as relative 
deforestation in Andes Petroleum and PetroOriental oil blocks compared to other oil 
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blocks in Ecuador). Section 3.2 qualitatively evaluates Ecuador’s oversight of Andes 
Petroleum’s new concession, the first such expansion under the new regulatory regime 
for oil investors. This latter evaluation uses legal research and targeted, semi-structured 
interviews with key stakeholders and experts. Those sources, and their titles at the time of 
the new concession awards, are as follows: 
• Kléver Ruiz, President of the Sápara Nation of Ecuador 
• Gloria Ushigua, President of the Association of Sápara Women 
• Paola Carrera, Undersecretary for Environmental Quality, Ecuadorian Ministry of 
Environment 
• Anonymous representative of the Ecuadorian Ministry for the Coordination of 
Strategic Sectors  
• Kelly Swing, director of the Boston University Tiputini Biodiversity Station within 
the Yasuní National Park and renown expert on the Ecuadorian Amazon 
In addition to these five sources, the evaluation draws from a site visit to an oil 
well operated first by Texaco and now by PetroEcuador, and an accompanying 
presentation by Michel Boufadel, director of the Center for Natural Resources 
Development and Protection at the New Jersey Institute of Technology and expert on oil 
spill effects and remediation.  
3.4.1 CNPC and Sinopec in Ecuador, to Date 
As mentioned above, in 2006 CNPC and Sinopec jointly purchased the Ecuadorian 
assets of Canadian firm Encana, including three oil concessions in the country’s eastern 
provinces of Sucumbios, Pastaza and Orellana, as well as a lead stake (32.3 percent) of 
the Heavy Crude Pipeline (Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados, or OCP) project, which was 
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built in 2003 and operated by several MNCs, including Repsol, Perenco and Petrobras. 
CNPC and Sinopec formed Andes Petroleum to manage Block 62 in the northeastern 
province of Sucumbíos, and PetroOriental to manage Blocks 14 and 17 in Orellana and 
Pastaza, further to the south. Figure 3.11 shows the locations of these blocks, along with 
Andes Petroleum’s new concessions (discussed below).  
Figure 3.11: Map of Ecuador, with Andes Petroleum and PetroOriental holdings 
shaded 
 
Note: Solid blocks indicate Andes Petroleum and PetroOriental concessions. Mottling indicates parks, and 
hash marks indicate the off-limits “zona intangible.” Source: Adapted from Secretaría de Hidrocarburos. 
Andes Petroleum and PetroOriental are among the most important oil producers 
in Ecuador. At the peak of the oil boom, they collectively accounted for about one-fourth 
of Ecuador’s total production (ARCH, 2011-2013). Andes alone produced more than any 
other external producer except for Repsol and including PetroOriental raises the level 
even higher than Repsol’s.  
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3.4.1.1 Social Performance of Andes Petroleum and PetroOriental 
When CNPC and Sinopec arrived in Ecuador, they inherited Encana’s uneasy 
relationship with community leaders and environmentalists, mostly centered on the OCP 
pipeline. According to the Paola Carrera, Undersecretary for Environmental Quality at 
the Ministry of Environment, the government does not keep databases of firms’ 
environmental or labor performance, but it is possible to track the instances that were 
severe enough to spur public protest, though CLACSO’s “Observatorio Social de 
América Latina” (OSAL) initiative (Carrera, 2014; CLACSO, 2000-2012).  OSAL has 
documented at least four large-scale strikes during the OCP’s construction in 2001 and 
2002: two by environmental activists seeking to block the project entirely, one by 
workers seeking better pay, and one by community leaders seeking local jobs and a fund 
for projects to offset the economic effects of expected environmental damages.   
Since arriving in Ecuador, Andes and PetroOriental have maintained more 
positive relationships with the government and civil society than Encana had. In fact, 
despite the large scale of their operations, OSAL archives show that these two oil 
companies have maintained better community relations than any of their major 
competitors, including Ecuadorian SOEs. OSAL archives contain zero records of 
environmental protests that specifically targeted Andes or PetroOriental. In contrast, 
Repsol was targeted by a weeklong road blockade in 2006 over environmental concerns, 
and PetroEcuador was the target of large-scale environmental protests in 2006, 2007, 
2008, and 2010. 
The comparatively peaceful company-community relationship enjoyed by the 
Chinese oil firms may be partially due to the fact that Andes Petroleum (which produces 
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about three times as much oil as PetroOriental) is located in Sucumbíos, which has been 
home to large scale agricultural and oil development for decades, including Texaco’s 
original oil fields. Interviews with Undersecretary Carrera and remediation expert Michel 
Boufadel made it clear that the local aquifer is still so heavily polluted from the 
remaining Texaco pits that fishing and small-scale agriculture are no longer healthy 
options for local communities. In a site visit to Texaco's nearby Aquarico 4 well, 
Boufadel explained that the most toxic components of oil spills are compounds like 
benzene, which are invisible and quick to dissolve in water and spread throughout the 
aquifer and downstream waterways. Thus, even after remediation efforts have removed 
some of the visible effects of these decades-old oil spills, the water used by surrounding 
communities can still carry powerful toxins, making traditional livelihoods unsafe. New 
spills are unlikely to pose a significant marginal impact on communities that have been 
unable to hunt, fish, or farm for decades.   
However, Andes and PetroOriental have had their share of labor disputes. Early in 
their presence, they both faced community conflict over local job opportunities. In 
November 2006, 300 local residents entered, occupied, and stopped production for 
Andes, demanding 400 local jobs. In July 2007 community members, transit workers, and 
municipal staff from the nearby town of Nueva Loja blocked a major road to demand 
more local jobs and other local investment.  More serious conflicts involved 
PetroOriental, in the parish of Dayuma, Orellana. Dayuma crosses several oil blocks, 
including two major ones: Block 14, operated by PetroOriental, and Block 61, operated 
by Ecuadorian SOE PetroEcuador. Most of the protests focused on PetroEcuador 
(CLACSO documents 15 different protests, strikes, and blockades against PetroEcuador 
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in 2006 and 2007), but PetroOriental also received some attention. In the summer of 2006 
and again in 2007, local residents blockaded the road into the PetroOriental facilities 
twice, demanding more local jobs and the patronage of local transportation providers. 
After extensive negotiations, an agreement was reached on the provision of a Social Fund 
tasked with local job creation and credit programs.  
Furthermore, Chinese Embassy Attaché Zach Chen states that Andes and 
PetroOriental have established English as the primary working language in their 
Ecuadorian facilities, and only hire workers who speak it fluently. This requirement 
dramatically limits the pool of potential workers, raising their salaries, reducing turnover 
and improving morale. However, this policy also has a strong downside: it limits hires 
from the immediate vicinity, where schools are not able to teach students sufficient 
English. So, while this problem has been addressed at the national level, it may continue 
to cause friction with local communities in the future. 
Another area of labor relations continued to plague Andes and PetroOriental until 
recently: profit sharing with subcontract workers. As mentioned above, subcontracting is 
strictly limited in Ecuador and subcontracted employees must be included in profit 
sharing. Andes Petroleum and PetroOriental participated in the 15 percent profit sharing 
as required but neglected to include subcontracted employees in the distribution of those 
profits. At issue was not the companies’ willingness to pay – they had originally 
distributed the correct amount of their profits – but the fact that the original amount was 
shared among too few workers. As a result, the companies were required to pay an 
additional $16 million to the originally excluded workers (CLACSO, n.d.; “Ex 
Trabajadores” 2009).  Since the oil companies did not benefit financially from skirting 
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the law initially, and since they suffered extensive financial costs to address the problem 
later, it is unlikely that their oversight was intentional or that the problem will occur 
again.   
3.4.1.2 Environmental Performance 
 As mentioned above, the government of Ecuador does not keep a centralized 
database of environmental misconduct. However, it is possible to independently estimate 
one aspect of environmental management across Ecuador’s active oil blocks: 
deforestation. The location of most of these blocks within the Amazon rainforest means 
that any new expansion of operations is likely to be associated with deforestation in one 
of the most biodiverse areas on the planet.  
 In order to estimate deforestation, Figure 3.12 is based on geospatial data from 
Hansen et al. (2013), who offer satellite data on tree cover change between 2000 and 
2016, using a 30-meter grid.24 Figure 3.12 shows the total net tree cover change within 
the boundaries of each oil block that was actively producing during the oil boom years of 
2003 and 2013, weighted by the initial tree cover of each oil block (which ranges from 
zero to 100 percent). This initial tree cover is strongly related to the levels of biodiversity 
shown in Figure 3.5, with a correlation of 0.67 (p=0.008). Thus, deforestation in the 
richest sections of the Amazon basin appear more heavily weighted than the same levels 
of deforestation in less densely-forested areas. Unfortunately, it is impossible to limit the 
                                               
24 The level of granularity used in Hansen et al. (2013) is sufficient to capture all but the smallest 
encroachments into the forest, but is unable to differentiate between true deforestation and tree cover loss 
(defined as the loss of any tree cover, be it forest or plantation). For this reason, this section refers to these 
calculations as estimates of deforestation, and measures of net tree cover change. 
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measurements to the boom period, but the entirety of the 2003 to 2013 decade is 
encapsulated in this analysis.  
Figure 3.12: Net tree cover loss in oil blocks active during the oil boom, 2000-2016, 
weighted by initial tree cover 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of Hansen et al (2013) data.  Note: For oil blocks with joint nationalities or 
which changed nationalities during this time period, the nationality for the greatest time period is shown.  
 Figure 3.12 shows net tree cover change between 2000 and 2016. With only 17 
countries represented across 34 blocks during the oil boom, the sample size is too small 
to support statistical analysis. However, it is clear from these figures that the Chinese oil 
companies have avoided the worst outcomes. PetroOriental (blocks 14 and 17) and Andes 
Petroleum (block 62) concessions experienced one and four percent tree cover loss, 
respectively.  These levels are far better than the mean (7.2 percent tree cover loss) and 
substantially better than the median (5.1 percent tree cover loss) outcome for all oil 
blocks. 
Figure 3.12 shows oil blocks by the nationality or region of each block’s plurality 
concessionaire for the oil boom years. For example, as of this writing, Block 7 is 
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associated with Petroamazonas (an Ecuadorian oil SOE) but for most of the oil boom, its 
concessionaire was Perenco (an Anglo-French oil firm), and so it is shown as European. 
Similarly, Block 16 is managed by a joint venture between companies based in the US, 
Spain, and China, with Spain’s Repsol having the plurality stake (35 percent), so it is also 
shown as European. It is possible to further estimate deforestation associated with each 
country of concessionaire, by averaging across oil blocks and using concessionaire 
ownership stakes and block sizes as weights. For example, the deforestation associated 
with Chinese concessions is estimated in Table 3.7. Chinese oil companies had majority 
stakes in blocks 14, 17, and 62 (the blocks profiled in the current case study), as well as 
minority stakes in blocks 16 and 67.  These blocks vary widely in their size and initial 
tree cover as well as the net tree cover change they experienced from 2000 to 2016. Table 
3.7 combines these experiences to estimate the weighted average of overall deforestation 
under Chinese concessions: -1.6%.  
Table 3.7: Calculation of average weighted tree cover change under Chinese 
concessions in Ecuador, 2000-2016 
 Calculation of weights Calculation of avg. TC change Contrib. to TC 
change, Chinese 
concessions 
(pctg.. pts.) Block 
China’s 
stake (% 
of 16 yrs.) 
Block 
size 
(km2) 
China’s 
presence 
(km2-yrs.) 
Share of 
China’s 
presence (%) 
TC, 
2000 
(%) 
Net TC 
change 
(%) 
Weighted 
TC change 
(%) 
 A B C=A*B D=C/sum(C) E F G=E*F H=D*G 
14 61.5% 1,936.6 1,190.8 37.7% 97.5% -1.0% -1.0% -0.4% 
16 19.3% 1,256.8 242.9 7.7% 99.8% -0.1% -0.1% 0.0% 
17 61.5% 1,779.4 1,094.2 34.7% 98.9% -1.3% -1.2% -0.4% 
62 61.5% 1,007.9 619.7 19.6% 92.6% -4.2% -3.9% -0.8% 
67 10.8% 68.1 7.4 0.2% 99.7% -0.1% -0.1% 0.0% 
Sum   3,155.0 100.0%    -1.6% 
Source: Author’s analysis of Hansen et al (2013) data.  Notes: The weighted tree cover change shown in 
Column F is identical to the weighting used in Figure 3.12. TC: tree cover. 
 Figure 3.13 shows the results of repeating the calculations in Table 3.7 for each 
country represented in Ecuadorian oil production from 2000 to 2016. No obvious trend 
emerges regarding regions with better or worse outcomes regarding deforestation. 
However, it is clear that Chinese oil companies have out-performed most of their peers. 
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Chinese oil companies’ performance (-1.6 percent) is much better than a simple average 
of the 17 countries shown in Figure 3.13 (-5.3 percent) or their median (-3.9 percent).  
Figure 3.13: Weighted average tree cover change by concessionaire nationality in 
Ecuador, 2000-2016 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of Hansen et al (2013) data.   
3.4.1.3 Analysis 
The social and environmental performance of Andes Petroleum and PetroOriental 
during Ecuador’s oil boom appears to be on par or above average among all oil producers 
in Ecuador. However, as mentioned above, they may have had an advantage in this 
regard, by inheriting oil blocks where environmental damage had long since rendered 
traditional livelihoods impossible. A much more challenging test arose toward the end of 
the oil boom, when Andes Petroleum won an auction for two new oil blocks in an area 
where oil had never been developed. These were the first new oil blocks to be awarded 
after the environmental and social reforms of 2007 and 2010, and thus the first true test of 
Ecuador’s high-road extractivism model. The performance of Andes Petroleum and the 
Ecuadorian government regarding this new test is discussed below. 
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3.4.2 New Concessions in the Southeastern Ecuadorian Amazon 
In 2014, Andes Petroleum bid for and won two additional oil concessions, in 
Blocks 79 and 83 shown in Figure 3.14.25  These blocks border the southern end of 
PetroOriental’s current concessions, but they are farther away from Andes’ current 
concession in the northern region of Tarapoa, Sucumbíos. The economy and ecology of 
the new concessions are quite different from Tarapoa. Moreover, unlike the Tarapoa 
concession, the new blocks will be greenfield projects. Because of these differences, it 
seems very unlikely that Andes will be able to expand its operations with the same 
positive community and government relations it has enjoyed in the past.  
3.4.2.1 New Challenges in the Physical and Social Landscape of Blocks 79 and 83 
The new sites will be greenfield projects just outside of the Yasuní National Park. 
As Figure 3.13 shows, they are located in an extremely biodiverse area of the Ecuadorian 
Amazon, richer even than the more famous Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini (ITT) block 
on the eastern border. The prospect of new oil exploration in the Amazon has brought 
intense criticism from environmental and indigenous groups, including Amazon Watch, 
the Pachamama Alliance, Acción Ecológica, and others (Zuckerman 2014). Experts on 
the Ecuadorian Amazon, such as biologist Santiago Espinosa of the Pontífica Universidad 
Católica de Ecuador and conservationist Kelly Swing of Boston University and the 
Universidad San Francisco de Quito, believe that the government currently lacks the 
                                               
25 Andes Petroleum won these concessions through auction, though it was the only bidder for these two 
blocks. Two additional bids were registered and accepted for their respective blocks: Repsol Cuba, in 
Block 29; and a consortium comprised of Ecuadorian SOE PetroAmazonas, ENAP-Chile, and 
Belorosneft in Block 28. 
 158 
institutional capacity to successfully manage the ecosystems near the planned extraction 
sites (Espinosa, 2014; Swing, 2013).  
Figure 3.14: Sensitive territory and Andes Petroleum’s new oil blocks, Ecuador 
 Biodiversity Indigenous Territory 
 
Note: Very high biodiversity is defined as being within the highest 6.4 percent of all South American land. 
Source: Compiled from Bass et Al. (2010), LandMark (no date), and ARCH (2017).  
Furthermore, the social landscape in blocks 79 and 83 is quite different from the 
one Andes Petroleum has known in its current concession. First, unlike the northern 
Tarapoa block, the new southern concessions are entirely covered by indigenous territory, 
as Figure 3.14 shows. A majority is Sápara territory, with the remainder covered by 
Kichwa territory.26 Of the two indigenous nations, the Sápara are a much smaller group 
and have smaller territory: the new oil concessions will cover 52 percent of total 
recognized Sápara lands (Castillo et al, 2016). Both groups are classified by UNESCO as 
                                               
26 The Sápara people were also commonly known as “Zápara” before 2009. Documents from before 2009 
may refer to them using either spelling (see for example UNESCO, 2008). Newer official statements from 
the group exclusively use the spelling “Sápara” (see for example Association of Sápara Women, 2016; 
Ushigua and Ushigua, 2017).” For the sake of consistency, this essay uses the current name of the group: 
the Sápara Nation of Ecuador.  
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having endangered languages; the Sápara language is “critically endangered,” with only 
nine speakers (Moseley 2010). Although the Sápara nation is small (numbering less than 
300), its language is one of just two Ecuadorian cultural practices included by UNESCO 
in the Representative List of Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity. In including the 
language, UNESCO highlighted their “oral culture that is particularly rich as regards their 
understanding of the natural environment … demonstrated by the abundance of their 
vocabulary for the flora and fauna and by their medicinal practices and knowledge of the 
medicinal plants of the forest” (UNESCO 2008). Respecting the rights of this indigenous 
group, recognized internationally for its vulnerability as well as its cultural importance, 
will be paramount in any attempt at socially responsible extraction on the part of Andes 
Petroleum. 
In addition, residents in the southern concessions have very different living 
standards from the communities in Andes’ northern territory. The new concessions lie 
within the parish of Montalvo, Pastaza, among the poorest in the country.  As Figure 3.15 
shows, in 2013, at the time of the oil block auction, very few households in Montalvo had 
even the most basic services.  
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Figure 3.15: Basic service coverage, Ecuador and regions of Ecuador where Andes 
Petroleum (AP) and PetroOriental (PO) operate, 2013 
 
Notes: Shown are averages of the parishes in each oil concession, weighted by the number of homes or 
school-age children in each parish. Andes Petroleum’s current concession includes the parishes of Aguas 
Negras and Tarapoa, in Cuyabeno Canton, Sucumbíos. PetroOriental’s current concessions include the 
parishes of Alejandra Labaca, Dayuma, El Edén, Inés Arango and Taracoa, in Orellana Canton, Orellana; 
and Arajuno, Arajuno Canton, Pastaza. Andes Petroleum’s new concessions are in Montalvo, Pastaza 
Canton, Pastaza.  
Source: Author’s analysis of Sistema Nacional de Información (INEC) data. 
As of 2013, during the concession auction, fewer than 10 percent of residents in 
the blocks won by Andes Petroleum had electricity in their homes, fewer than five 
percent had indoor running water, and only one percent had wastewater treatment 
through a sewer hookup or septic tank. These figures place Montalvo in the bottom three 
percent of Ecuador’s parishes for running water and the bottom one percent for the other 
two services.  The educational situation was equally grim. Only about three-fourths of 
children attended primary school, and fewer than one in three attended secondary school, 
putting Montalvo in the bottom one percent and two percent of parishes nationwide, 
respectively.   
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3.4.2.2 (Mis)Management of New Challenges Posed by New Landscapes 
PetroOriental already has experience working in a delicate ecosystem: block 14 is 
located in and around the Yasuní National Park (shown in Figure 3.11).  However, 
PetroOriental inherited that concession from Encana. This will be the first time either 
Andes Petroleum or PetroOriental has established new concessions anywhere in Ecuador, 
much less in the Amazon.  
Unfortunately, problems with the prior informed consultation process have 
already begun to jeopardize Andes’ prospects for positive community relations.  
Ecuador’s constitution and international agreements set high standards for community 
consultation and participation, but they seem to have been circumvented in this case.   
Ecuador is one of just 20 signatories to ILO Convention 169, which calls for 
nations to consult with indigenous groups prior to developing subterranean mineral 
deposits below tribal hunting, fishing, or otherwise traditional territory (ILO, 1989). 
Article 57 of Ecuador’s new constitution also enshrines this requirement, with the added 
note that if the affected community does not agree to the proposal, the government must 
follow additional steps detailed in the 2010 Citizen Participation Law, which states that 
“if … a majority opposition emerges in the respective community, the decision to 
undertake the project or not will be made through a resolution, adequately debated …, 
which, in cases where it is decided that the project will be undertaken, must establish 
parameters that minimize the impact on communities and ecosystems; moreover, it must 
plan for mitigation, compensation, and damage repair; and where possible, it must 
include the members of the community in the labor force for the respective projects, in 
conditions that guarantee human dignity” (Article 83, author’s translation). In sum, the 
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prior consultation process must seek the community’s majority approval; if the majority 
of the community opposes the project, a resolution to proceed in a limited-impact way 
must be drafted, debated, and approved.  
Members of the Sápara nation claim that majority approval was never sought. 
Indeed, the Secretaría de Hidrocarburos (SHE), which conducted the consultation, does 
not claim to have sought it. Instead, SHE reports that the Sápara President at the time, 
Basilio Mucushigua, signed an agreement on November 21, 2012, allowing oil 
exploration in exchange for $5.95 million in local public investment (SHE, 2012). This 
neglect of majority opinion is not surprising, given its omission in Executive Decree 
1247, which directed this particular consultation process (Correa, 2012). The Decree 
allows for comments to be submitted either through community meetings or individually 
at local consultation offices, provided that the offices are extensively advertised through 
local press, government, or community leaders. SHE reports that 16,469 people 
participated in this consultation process, throughout the 16 blocks that the government 
hoped to develop. However, Mazabanda (2013) estimates that the indigenous nations 
whose territories overlap with the oil blocks include 69,114 adults, and that the total adult 
population of the oil blocks is 141,397.  Even if Mazabanda’s estimates are significantly 
overstated, SHE consulted with only a small minority of the affected population. It is 
worth noting that it is equally likely that SHE’s estimates are overstated. SHE include 
10,469 people who participated directly in the consultation process, as well as 6,000 who 
participated in “socio-environmental management model” workshops, which are outside 
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the scope of Executive Decree 1247; nor does SHE claim to have taken any precautions 
to avoid double-counting those who may be in both groups.27  
It may still be argued that those who did not participate were voluntarily 
abstaining from the consultation. However, current Sápara President Kléver Ruiz and 
President of the Association of Sápara Women Gloria Ushigua said in interviews that 
they never saw or heard any of the advertisements required by Executive Decree 1247 
(Ruiz 2014; Ushigua; 2014). Neither Ruiz nor Ushigua doubts that former Sápara 
President Mucushigua signed an agreement with the SHE. But both insisted that SHE 
never sought approval from the majority of the Sápara nation, in violation of the 2008 
Constitution and the 2010 Citizen Participation Law, or even held a widely-advertised 
public comment period, as required by Executive Decree 1247.  
Beyond the consultation process, evidence suggests that Pres. Mucushigua was no 
longer president at the time of the agreement, rendering it void. A Sápara resolution from 
August of 2012 – three months prior to the agreement – reports that in a national congress 
over three days, the Sápara nation sanctioned Pres. Mucushigua for allowing SHE 
representatives to enter Sápara territory, by relieving him of office and replacing him 
with Luis Armas (NASE, 2012). A joint report by Ecuador’s national and Amazon-
specific indigenous confederations states that Pres. Armas was recognized as the legal 
representative of the Sápara nation by the Ecuadorian government’s Council on the 
Development of Nationalities and Peoples in Ecuador (Consejo de Desarrollo de las 
                                               
27  Representatives of the Ecuadorian government asked not to be quoted on this matter. In an anonymous 
interview, a government source reiterated the government’s confidence in the process and asserted that 
there was full backing of indigenous communities for the current oil expansion, while acknowledging that 
no vote or poll was taken to determine majority support or opposition.  
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Nacionalidades y Pueblos del Ecuador – CODENPE) on September 21 (Ordoñez, 
Rivadeneira, and Mazabanda, 2016).  
The internal conflict over oil continued to intensify over the coming months. 
Ordoñez, Rivadeneira, and Mazabanda (2016) report that in January of 2013 (two months 
after the agreement with SHE), former president Mucushigua met separately with those 
who favored the agreement, who re-named him to the post, an act that was registered 
with CODENPE, prompting the remainder of the nation to meet and name Kléver Ruiz as 
president, which was not recognized by CODENPE. Both Ruiz and Ushigua indicate that 
the community is deeply divided between ethnic Sápara, opposed to the drilling, and 
other residents (including Mr. Mucushigua) who are in the minority but who welcome the 
oil exploration.  
It is unlikely that Andes will be able to win over the indigenous communities in 
their oil blocks easily. When asked what she would like to say to Andes Petroleum, 
Ushigua replied “The indigenous Sápara say to the hydrocarbon companies that we do 
not want oil exploitation; we want to be left alone …. We ask the big countries to please 
respect our rights and our life that comes from nature” (Ushigha, 2014, author’s 
translation). The national and Amazonian indigenous confederations have sided with 
Ruiz, Ushigua, and the other Sápara and Kichwa opposed to drilling, issuing a declaration 
directed to oil companies in 2013 (after the Mucushigua-SHE agreement but before the 
concession auction bidding period was closed) stating that:  
“Our nationalities and peoples have not given their consent to the realization of 
petroleum activities in our territories. The few agreements that the government 
claims to have signed with indigenous communities are the result of coopting 
leaders and of the division created in our organizations. None of these agreements 
was signed with the knowledge and approval of legitimately called assemblies” 
(CONAIE and CONFENIAE, 2013, author’s translation).  
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The statement ends with a stark warning: “we declare ourselves to be in 
permanent mobilization for the defense of our territories” (Ibid). 
3.4.2.3 Further Developments: Moving Forward After an Unsuccessful Consultation 
Andes Petroleum signed a contract for the exploration and development of blocks 
79 and 83 in January 2016, two years after winning the oil block auction. This contract 
establishes a sales price to the Ecuadorian government of $47 per barrel and gives the 
company four years to explore, with a possible two-year extension (Araujo, 2016). Since 
that time, the affected Sápara community has not given up its demands. Two weeks after 
the contract was signed, the Association of Sápara Women issued a statement denouncing 
the government for moving forward with contract despite indigenous opposition and 
demanding, inter alia “respect for our rights as an indigenous nation, conservation of our 
territory, our forests, and the Ecuadorian Amazon [and] the nullification of the contract 
with Andes Petroleum Ecuador” (Association of Sápara Women, 2016).  
The Sápara and Kichwa nations have developed a resistance strategy that 
incorporates two approaches: making international demands while building relationships 
with non-indigenous allies.  Through the first strategy, they have requested action from 
the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as well as 
Andes Petroleum itself. Simultaneously, they have reached out to potential allies among 
environmentalists, ecotourists, and medical tourists worldwide.  
The Sápara began their international campaign the same year the oil auction 
closed: 2014. Ruiz and Ushigua wrote to Vicky Tauli-Corpuz, then incoming Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples at the United Nations, explaining the 
situation from their perspective and requesting that she carry out a fact-finding mission in 
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Ecuador (Ruiz and Ushigua, 2014). While Ms. Tauli-Corpuz did eventually come to 
Ecuador for a conference on indigenous Amazonian peoples in Ecuador in 2016, the topic 
was limited to voluntarily isolated tribes, which does not include the Sápara (Tauli-
Corpuz, 2016; UASB, 2016).  
In May of 2017, Sápara representatives delivered a letter to the offices of the 
Chinese representatives to the United Nations in New York, explaining the Sápara 
people’s recognition by UNESCO and requesting “that the Chinese delegation to the 
United Nations protect ancient cultures such as ours, urging Chinese state-owned 
company Andes Petroleum to refrain from entering our territories, since our country has 
not respected or protected human rights” (Ushigua and Ushigua, 2017). As of this 
writing, no answer has been forthcoming. 
Another aspect of the indigenous response to Andes Petroleum’s expansion, on 
the part of both the Kichwa and Sápara peoples, has been that of strengthening 
relationships with potential allies outside of the Amazon. Both indigenous nations sent 
representatives to the People’s Climate March in New York in September 2014. At 
preparations for the March, Ushigua stated publicly: “We are ready to fight with all the 
strength of our ancestors against the companies and governments to protect the land from 
which we came, a land that must remain free from oil exploration" (Zuckerman, 2014). 
They returned for subsequent years’ marches, and their presence gained star power when 
famed actor and activist Leonardo DiCaprio joined hands with them literally as well as 
figuratively in 2017, posting photos of them together to his social medial accounts 
(Bruner, 2017).  
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The Sápara Nation, with the assistance of national environmental organizations 
such as the Pachamama Alliance and Terra Mater, has also launched an outreach effort 
called Naku (taken from the Sápara word for “forest”). Naku involves two arms: a 
“Sápara immersion” ecotourism program and educational experience, and a “healing 
center” where chronic illness sufferers can come for traditional Sápara treatments 
(Castillo et al., 2016).  
It is no exaggeration to say that civil society around the country and around the 
world is paying attention to what happens next. At this writing, Andes Petroleum and the 
Sápara people appear to be headed toward inevitable conflict, in a pattern reminiscent of 
Ecuadorian oil conflicts of decades past. Rather than establishing a new “high-road” 
approach to extractivism, the nation appears to have retraced its steps on the same road it 
has taken many times.  
3.5. Discussion 
This essay seeks to evaluate Ecuador’s turn toward “high-road extractivism,” and 
the extent to which a new relationship with Chinese oil companies gave the regulatory 
space necessary to carry out its new investment regulations and establish a less 
destructive form of existing as an oil-based economy. The results show that Andes 
Petroleum and PetroOriental have generally complied with this new legal framework, 
avoiding environmental or social misconduct that would engender conflict or 
deforestation. However, by the end of the oil boom, Ecuador’s new oil paradigm broke 
down – not because of the performance of Chinese oil companies, but despite it.  
The failure of Ecuador to successfully carry out its own commitments to human 
rights may be due in part to Executive Decree 1247’s assignation of FPIC duties to SHE, 
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rather than to a ministry or agency dedicated to indigenous affairs, such as CODENPE. 
SHE’s mission is explicitly oriented toward expediting production: “To study, measure, 
and evaluate hydrocarbon assets, promote them, seek out national and/or international 
investment, oversee and administer, in a sovereign manner, hydrocarbon areas and 
contracts, legally and ethically, so that they may contribute in a sustained fashion to good 
living for Ecuadorians” (SHE, n.d., author’s translation). By tasking SHE with a 
precedent-setting first attempt at operationalizing Ecuador’s new FPIC requirements, 
Correa gave the process to staff without the institutional incentives or independence 
necessary to ensure that indigenous concerns were taken into account.  
The importance of regulatory independence in Latin America for the success of 
private investment has been well established, especially in the sector of infrastructure.  
Pargal (2003) shows that the existence of government regulatory bodies was associated 
with greater private infrastructure investment in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, 
but that the location of regulatory bodies within sectoral ministries was also positively 
associated with greater investment. In other words, regulatory independence may slow 
private infrastructure investment in the region. However, Guasch, Laffont, and Straub 
(2003) show that concessions awarded in context with regulatory independence were less 
likely to be renegotiated later, indicating that infrastructure contracts established in such 
an environment are likely to encounter fewer problems during their lifespans. Guasch, 
Laffot and Straub (2007) revisit the subject with a deeper analysis and find that 
regulatory independence is especially important in contract success in Latin American 
contexts characterized by weak governance; it may provide a counterweight to political 
pressure to move forward with symbolic but poorly-considered “white elephant” projects. 
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As Foster (2005) points out, obstacles to regulatory independence in Latin America go 
beyond whether the regulators are housed within their own agencies or within sectoral 
ministries, and can also entail the extent to which they have financial and personnel 
autonomy or risk budgetary or operational interference by the executive branch or other 
government entity with a vested interest in expediting projects. While the challenge of 
establishing and empowering truly independent regulatory bodies is an ongoing concern 
throughout Latin America, the case examined here appears to be a “perfect storm” of 
political interference in a safeguard process. The prior consultation was carried out by the 
sectoral ministry, acting under an executive decree that did not meet the standards 
stipulated in the Citizen Participation Law. It is no surprise, then, that the resulting 
consultation process failed to live up to Ecuadorian’s much vaunted vision of a more 
sustainable and inclusive form of oil extraction.  
Beyond Ecuador, the topic of conflicting incentives within ministries tasked with 
regulating the extractive sector has been the source of political controversy throughout 
Andean nations over the course of this commodity boom. Particularly, toward the end of 
the boom, as falling prices reduced public hydrocarbon and mining revenue, Ballón et al. 
(2017) and Ray et al. (2017) find that governments were likely to curtail social and 
environmental protections or weaken their applications. While these counter-reforms 
were often enacted in the name of expediting new investments, they frequently have had 
the opposite results. Protracted social conflict, stemming from the rolling back of rights 
already in existence, can jeopardize the ability of those new investments to move forward 
on any timeline, as the example of weakened prior consultation explored in this chapter 
shows. The question for other governments considering weakening social and 
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environmental regulations surrounding extractive sectors, then, may not be whether they 
can afford to maintain their system of protections, but whether they can afford not to. 
3.6. Conclusion  
After 30 years of environmental degradation, social conflict, and economic 
instability stemming from its identity as an oil producer, Ecuador sought to change this 
paradigm, welcoming new investment partners to operate under a new regulatory 
framework in the amenable economic context of a global oil boom. This scenario created 
a natural experiment for the viability of this new model of “high-road extractivism.”  
Chinese SOEs appear to have acted as good faith partners in supporting Ecuador’s 
new approach, establishing relatively peaceful relations with neighboring communities 
and preventing major deforestation in the oil blocks under their management. However, 
the Ecuadorian state has missed its own standard for social inclusion in new oil 
investment decisions. The involvement of state hydrocarbons agency in overseeing 
human rights safeguards created an intrinsic, though implicit, conflict of interest, one that 
translated into explicit conflict among communities. It also created a very familiar 
scenario for Ecuador, in which the state was unwilling or unable to protect human rights 
in the face of a foreign oil company’s interest in exploring and developing oil reserves. 
Rather than putting oil development on a new, more sustainable footing, Ecuador’s 
institutional missteps seem to have reinforced the old model. It remains to be seen if the 
damage can be undone. Nonetheless, lessons abound for other nations considering re-
orienting their commodities sector by starting again with new relationships and new 
rules. As difficult as it may be for governments to regulate and oversee the performance 
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of foreign investors, it can prove even more difficult, in less obvious ways, to regulate 
and oversee themselves.  
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CONCLUSION 
This dissertation crosses many policy areas and sectors, but centers on one 
perennial challenge: shifting away from old, commodity-driven economic activity in 
LAC and toward more economically diversified, socially inclusive, and environmentally 
sustainable models. In doing so, it makes the case for interconnectedness among several 
areas of policy making. First, the results of this work show that structuralist and 
environmental approaches to economic management can benefit each other. Second, the 
challenge of diversification is intrinsically multidisciplinary and requires collaboration 
between economists, political scientists, and ecologists, among other experts.  
C.1 Interconnectedness of Structuralist and Ecological Approaches in LAC  
Structuralist and environmental economists have not always seen each other as 
allies or collaborators working toward similar ends. For example, Seguino (2014) claims 
that Alice Amsden, when asked about integrating concerns about livelihoods and the 
environmental during a visit to the University of Vermont’s Gund Institute for Ecological 
Economics and Sustainability, explained candidly that in her view livelihoods must 
always take priority and that environmental concerns must be secondary. For another 
example, the author attended a 2014 event, on the invitation of the Ecuadorian 
Environment Ministry, on “Achieving Equilibrium in the Amazon,” positing 
environmental and livelihoods issues as conflicting goals, rather than reinforcing 
approaches. The findings of this dissertation, however, suggest that structuralist and 
environmental approaches to economic policies in LAC are complementary in nature and 
that collaboration across these approaches can help each field approach its goals. 
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C.1.1 LAC Structuralist Economics as Complementary to Ecological Economics  
Essay 1 shows that primary commodity production in LAC is intrinsically more 
carbon- and water- intensive than manufacturing. The water use disparity is global in 
nature: no region or income level of countries has limited the water use or contamination 
from primary commodity production to the levels of manufacturing output. But even if 
“high-road” reforms are enacted to limit the water use and contamination, the carbon 
intensity remains. So, in order to limit the environmental impacts of production in LAC, 
either on the global (climate) or local (water) scale, it will be necessary to shift up the 
value chain.  
Essay 3 profiles Ecuador, a country famous for having the “greenest constitution 
in the world,” and also for the outsized importance of oil as an export, making it an apt 
case study of “high-road extractivism” in practice in LAC. The small, open, and 
dollarized nature of Ecuador’s economy makes it particularly exposed to trends in global 
commodity prices and foreign investor preferences. Its results show that the Ecuadorian 
government, caught between conflicting incentives of attracting foreign investment for 
oil exploration and development and upholding its highly ambitious social and 
environmental protections, failed to uphold those protections. Ironically, the inadequacy 
of the prior consultation process helped create such a conflictive situation that it may 
jeopardize the ability of Andes Petroleum to carry out oil exploration in its new 
concessions. In favoring oil expansion over social and environmental protections, 
Ecuador may have ended up with neither. Furthermore, given that the Sápara nation 
removed President Mucushigua from office for having allowed SHE personnel to enter 
Sápara territory, it is doubtful that a prior consultation – even if it had met the 
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requirements of the Citizen Participation Law – would have resulted in majority support 
for new oil exploration.  Thus, even if Ecuador had been able to establish sufficient 
regulatory independence to guarantee the fulfillment of its “high-road” commitments, 
those commitments would have stood in conflict with the expansion of oil production. If 
Ecuador jeopardizes oil expansion either by honoring or by not honoring its social and 
environmental protections, the only way forward for the country is to diversify away 
from oil as a driver of economic activity.   
C.1.2 LAC Ecological Economics as Complementary to Structuralist Economics  
Infrastructure is a core part of the structuralist approach to economic 
management, as a primary public good together with scientific research and education. 
Furthermore, it facilitates the establishment of value chains and can enhance clustering 
effects discussed in Amsden (2001). In South America, specifically, the IIRSA and later 
COSIPLAN initiatives were established to foster regional integration with the ultimate 
goal of creating new regional value chains with a greater regional participation in value 
added and employment, and less vulnerability to global commodity price swings 
(Estevadeordal and Blyde, 2016). Ideally, such regional infrastructure plans might be able 
to help with the structural transformation of the regional economy away from dependence 
on extraction of raw materials from the Amazon basin and the myriad environmental and 
social problems that have accompanied it (Samaniego et al, 2016). But without careful 
planning, South American infrastructure can simply facilitate more (or more efficient) 
extraction of those raw materials from the Amazon basin, reinforcing old trading patterns 
rather than feeding new ones.  In other words, one major challenge facing policy makers 
is to enable new foci of economic activity and transportation between those foci without 
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opening up new sections of the Amazon for additional natural resource exploitation. 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation shows that one effective way to plan infrastructure projects 
without opening up the Amazon rainforest and reinforcing old extractivist patterns is to 
incorporate the voices of indigenous communities who currently rely on the forest for 
their livelihoods. Expanding the agricultural and extractive frontiers into the Amazon 
rainforest puts their traditional livelihoods at risk, through competition for land and clean 
water. So, it is not surprising that projects requiring formal prior consultation with those 
communities are associated with significantly less tree cover loss than those projects 
without such protections.  
C.2 Interconnectedness Across Disciplines: Areas for Future Research 
This dissertation attempts to establish the interconnectedness of the agendas of 
structuralist and environmental economists in LAC. Further work into the ways in which 
economic planners and environmental regulators can support each other’s goals will be 
crucial in forming and pursuing a common vision of diversified, sustainable economic 
growth.  
For example, further research into institutional design and management may help 
resolve a potential paradox between the results of chapters 2 and 3.  Chapter 2 shows that 
in general, incorporating formal stakeholder engagement into infrastructure planning can 
help prevent deforestation. However, Chapter 3 shows that formal stakeholder 
engagement is not always carried out in a meaningful way. The difference between these 
two results is not simply attributable to the presence of DFIs in Chapter 2. As Table 2.14 
shows, there is no statistically significant difference in impact between prior consultation 
processes mandated only by national government and those mandated by both national 
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governments and DFIs. Nor is the difference solely a product of the setting of the failed 
prior consultation process in Chapter: Ecuador. Table 2.11 shows no significant 
difference among countries in the importance of prior consultation.  
It is likely that the difference in these results is related to institutional factors in 
the hydrocarbons and infrastructure ministries involved in consultation processes.  The 
Ecuadorian consultation process highlighted in Chapter 3 was in many ways doomed to 
failure. It was carried out by Hydrocarbons Ministry, which had never before carried out 
such a process, under an executive decree that did not require the process to meet the 
requirements of the Citizen Participation Law. To date, it is the only prior consultation 
process every carried out by Ecuador’s Hydrocarbons Ministry. In contrast, infrastructure 
ministries oversee many more projects and one would hope that their staff have more 
experience, expertise, and commitment to procedure. For example, the agency within 
Peru’s Transportation and Communications Ministry that oversees social and 
environmental safeguards (the Dirección General de Asuntos Socio Ambientales), was 
established in through concessional assistance from CAF. It was established to be a 
permanent oversight body capable of regulating all transportation and communications 
projects, not simply to facilitate one project as in the case of the Ecuadorian oil 
consultation (Dammert Bello, 2018).  
It is clear from the political interference in Ecuador’s prior consultation process 
that regulatory independence is an important factor in regulators’ ability to fulfil their 
mandates. Unfortunately, Gilardi, Jordana, and Levi-Faur (2006) find social and 
environmental protections are less likely to have politically autonomous regulators than 
other areas of government oversight such as economic competition. However, even 
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bureaucratic independence is insufficient for establishing and comparing the de facto 
autonomy of social and environmental regulators.  For example, Guasch and Spiller 
(1999), in their treatise on regulation in Latin America, enumerate five requirements for 
effective regulatory institutions: managerial freedom, political autonomy, accountability 
to the public as well as to elected officials, checks and balances to prevent arbitrary 
decisions, and incentives to prevent capture of individual regulators. Clearly, the findings 
of chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation show a need for more research in the area of 
institutional design and effective environmental regulation in LAC, especially with 
regard to the thorny policy challenges of economic diversification. Unfortunately, such 
research is well beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
If structuralist economics is to be relevant in the 21st Century, it will need to 
incorporate pressing environmental concerns that are now inseparable from issues of 
livelihoods and economic sustainability, especially in such socially and environmentally 
sensitive regions such as the Amazon basin. Achieving that relevance will require taking 
into account the interconnectedness of the “three pillars” of sustainability: economic 
stability, environmental conservation, and social inclusion.  Furthermore, the importance 
of regulatory independence for government infrastructure plans shows that the goal of 
working toward more diversified, inclusive, and sustainable economic models is an 
intrinsically interdisciplinary endeavor, requiring research beyond the bounds of 
economics. To face this challenge effectively, economists, ecologists, and social 
scientists of all stripes will be well served by more collaborative, interdisciplinary, and 
mixed-methods research. 
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APPENDIX A 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 1 
A.1 Combining Data from Lall with Data from Peters and WaterStat 
This essay uses trade data from the UN Comtrade database. For a few country/year 
combinations, UN Comtrade has no data, and so imputations were taken instead, 
substituting imports reported by the rest of the world in place of exports reported by the 
missing country. These include:  
• Anguilla: 2005, 2009-2013 
• Antigua and Barbuda: 2003, 2004, 2006, 2008 
• Bermuda: 2003-2011 
• Cuba: 2007-2013 
• Dominica: 2011, 2013 
• Haiti (all years) 
• Honduras: 2008, 2013 
• Macao: 2013 
• Montserrat: 2011 
• Netherlands Antilles: 2004, 2009-2013 
• Saint Kitts and Nevis: 2012, 2013 
• Saint Lucia: 2009-2013 
• Saint Vincent and the Grenadines: 2013 
• Trinidad and Tobago: 2011-2013 
• Turks and Caicos: 2010, 2013 
• Venezuela: 2007 
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Sanjaya Lall’s technology classification system assigns a category for almost all 3-
digit SITC codes. The remaining codes, such as 999 (miscellaneous, not otherwise 
classified), are listed separately as “other,” but these make up a miniscule share of 
exports and are largely excluded from this analysis.  
Glen Peters’ GHG intensity calculations estimate an emissions level per dollar for 
each GTAP category. Unfortunately, UN Comtrade data is not available in GTAP 
categories, but a translation between the two systems is relatively simple, as GTAP 
categories tend to be umbrella categories covering several SITC categories each.  
WaterStat water footprint estimates are available for 6-digit HS codes (for 
agricultural products) and for industrial products on average for each country.  No 
translation was necessary, as Comtrade offers HS disaggregation. Unfortunately, 
WaterStat has several gaps, which were imputed following the method below. 
• Where WaterStat has an intensity value listed for an umbrella category but not the 
sub-categories, the category average intensity is applied to the subcategories. 
• Similarly, where WaterStat has an intensity value for all subcategories but not the 
aggregated category, a simple average is used for category-level trade flows. 
• Where WaterStat is missing a value for the last in a series of sub-categories, usually a 
miscellaneous sub-category, a simple average of other sub-categories is used. 
• Processed foodstuffs not included in WaterStat are considered industrial. 
• WaterStat excludes seafood (category 03, 1504, 1603, 1604, and 1605) because it 
considers it to be a “low or non-water consumptive product.” (For more, see Hoekstra 
2003). Those categories are excluded here. 
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• Category 50 (silk) is not included in WaterStat but it is an important element of 
Chinese exports (China exported 417 million USD of silk in 2013). To avoid omitting 
it altogether, this study uses the estimate of 54,000 m3/metric ton established in 
Indian production, by Astudillo et al. (2014).  Astudillo et al. estimate that this water 
footprint could be reduced to 26,700 with production process reforms. The authors 
state that Chinese silk has a lower water footprint because the production methods are 
more efficient. Thus, this study uses the low estimate of 26,700 m3/MT for Chinese 
silk, the higher value for Indian silk, and omits it for LAC countries, which do not 
export significant levels of silk. 
• Several uncommon items are omitted altogether from this analysis, such as human 
hair, live primates, pet food, and miscellaneous animal products not for human 
consumption.  
• Other calculations, which vary by line item, are available upon request. 
WaterStat has data for more countries for agricultural products than for industrial 
products. A few assumptions for industrial water intensity levels were necessary:  
• Hong Kong and Macao are assumed to have the same intensities as mainland China 
(as many exports from those territories originate in the mainland).  
• WaterStat contains industrial water intensity levels for only two Caribbean nations: 
Barbados and the Dominican Republic. A simple average of these two intensities is 
applied to other Caribbean nations included in WaterStat for agricultural but not 
industrial purposes: the Bahamas, Dominica, Montserrat, and Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines.  
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A.2 Deflation 
For most specific raw commodities, including most agricultural, extractive, and 
chemical goods, this study uses the deflators found in the World Bank GEM 
Commodities database:  
• Aluminum 
 
• Ammonia 
 
• Bananas 
 
• Barley 
 
• Beef 
 
• Beverages 
 
• Chicken  
 
• Coal 
 
• Cocoa 
 
• Coconut oil 
 
• Coffee 
 
• Copper 
 
• Cotton 
 
• Crude petroleum 
oil 
 
• Fertilizers 
 
• Fishmeal 
 
• Gold 
 
• Groundnut oil 
 
• Iron 
 
• Lead 
 
• Liquid natural 
gas 
 
• Maize 
 
• Misc. energy 
products 
 
• Misc. metals, 
minerals 
 
• Misc. raw agric. 
prods. 
 
• Natural gas 
 
• Nickel 
 
• Oranges 
 
• Palm kernel oil 
 
• Palm oil 
 
• Phosphate 
 
• Phosphate 
 
• Platinum 
 
• Potassium 
 
• Rice 
 
• Rubber 
 
• Sheep 
 
• Shrimp  
 
• Silver 
 
• Sorghum 
 
• Soybean meal 
 
• Soybean oil 
 
• Soybeans  
 
• Sugar 
 
• Superphosphate 
 
• Tea 
 
• Timber 
 
• Tin 
 
• Tobacco 
 
• Urea 
 
• Wheat 
 
• Woodpulp 
 
• Zinc 
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Simple averages of existing related commodities were used for miscellaneous 
seafood, oilseeds, precious metals, and hydrocarbons. 
For food commodities not found in the GEM Commodities database, this exercise 
uses the broader categories of deflators found in the FAO Food Price Index (FPI) 
database: meat, dairy, cereals, vegetable oils, sugars, and miscellaneous food products. 
For example, pork is not included in the GEM database, so it is deflated using the FPI 
deflator for meat.  For manufactured and miscellaneous goods, this exercise uses the 
country of origin’s export price deflator, calculated by UN ECLAC (CEPALStat). 
 
  
 183 
A.3 Statistical Analysis of GHG Intensity Levels of Exports 
By definition, an export basket contains a range of products, each with their own 
environmental intensity.  This section examines the distribution of those products across 
GHG intensity levels and compares the distribution of LAC exports to China with LAC 
exports to the rest of the world.  
Figure A.3.1 shows the cumulative distribution of exports from LAC to China and 
to the rest of the world, measured against the GHG intensity of each commodity and 
weighted by the real (2004) dollars of exports of each commodity.  The red line 
(representing exports to China) is mostly to the right of the gold line (representing other 
LAC exports). This position indicates that overall, LAC exports to China have a higher 
GHG intensity than other LAC exports.   
Figure A.3.1: Cumulative distribution of exports across GHG intensity levels, by 
destination 
 
Figure A.3.2 shows that exports to China appear more GHG-intensive in the 
Caribbean and in Mexico and Central America, but less intense in South America.  
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Mexico alone accounts for roughly 40 percent of all LAC exports, which explains the 
region-wide difference in Figure A.3.1. 
Figure A.3.2: Cumulative distribution functions of export basket GHG intensity, by 
sub-region 
 Caribbean Mexico, Cent. Am. South America 
 
Figure A.3.3 shows the cumulative distribution functions of exports across GHG 
intensity levels for each LAC country. Exports to China appear significantly more GHG 
intense than other exports in most Caribbean countries, Mexico, Ecuador, Honduras, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela. In contrast, exports to China appear significantly less GHG 
intense in most other South American countries.  
Figure A.3.3: Cumulative distribution functions of export basket GHG intensity, by 
country 
 Anguilla Argentina Aruba 
 
 Bahamas Barbados Belize 
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Figure A.3.3, continued: Cumulative distribution functions of export basket GHG 
intensity, by country 
 Bermuda Bolivia Brazil 
 
 Chile Colombia Costa Rica 
 
 Cuba Dominica Dominican Rep. 
 
 Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala 
 
 Guyana Haiti Honduras 
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Figure A.3.3, continued: Cumulative distribution functions of export basket GHG 
intensity, by country 
 Jamaica Mexico Montserrat 
 
 Nicaragua Panama Paraguay 
 
 Peru St. Kitts & Nevis St. Lucia 
 
St. Vincent & Grenadines Trinidad & Tobago Turks & Caicos 
 
 Uruguay Venezuela 
 
 
 
Tables A.3.1 and A.3.2 show two different statistical tests for the impact of China 
on the water intensity of LAC exports. First, a two-sample t-test is conduction to establish 
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whether the means of the distributions shown in Figures A.3.1 through A.3.3 above are 
statistically significant. Second, regression analysis is conducted to distinguish the impact 
of China and the impact of time (in other words, the progression of the commodity boom 
in general) on the changing average GHG intensity of these exports over the decade 
studied here.  
The regression analysis is repeated separately for each sub-region and country 
rather than incorporating them all into one analysis with interaction variables. This choice 
prevents the unnecessary introduction of additional heteroskedasticity. It takes the form 
G/H/IJKL' = ) + +,&ℎN:5' + 1,4"56'	
Where: 
• OPQPRSTU represents the mean GHG intensity of a given export basket. 
• i corresponds to each of 20 export baskets: to China and the rest of the world over a 
10-year period from 2004 to 2013, weighted by their value in millions of real (2004) 
US dollars, so that years with higher exports are weighted more heavily. 
• Year is the calendar year less 2008 (the midpoint of the sample) 
• China is a binary variable (1= exports to China, 0 = exports to elsewhere). 
Eleven countries and territories had insufficient exports to China during the study 
period to calculate country-level coefficients: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, 
Dominica, Montserrat, the Netherlands Antilles, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines, and the Turks and Caicos Islands. However, their exports 
are included in overall LAC and Caribbean exports in Table A.3.2. 
Venezuela is an outlier, because not all of Venezuela’s exports to China are 
registered as such in the UN Comtrade database. Venezuela’s oil exports (which account 
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for the overwhelming majority of the country’s total exports) go to refineries in countries 
that are often not the final destination. Many of Venezuela’s trading partners use their 
own refineries, but China’s imports of Venezuelan oil go through intermediary countries.  
So, UN Comtrade reports only non-oil exports from Venezuelan to China, which is 
hardly an accurate representation of the whole. With this in mind, it is worth repeating 
the regressions for South America and for LAC overall without Venezuela. The 
relationship holds, because Venezuela accounts for only 6.8 percent of the region’s total 
exports during the decade studied.   
Finally, Tables A.3.1 and A.3.2 list the ratio of average emission intensities of 
exports to China compared to other exports. For example, the region-wide value of 1.16 
indicates that overall, LAC exports to China cause 16 percent more net GHG emissions 
per dollar than other LAC exports.  
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Table A.3.1: Mean GHG intensities and regressions results for LAC region and sub-regions  
Average GHG Intensity of Exports  Two-sample t-test  Regression Results 
 
.   To China   . .   To R.o.W.    . China/ R.o.W.1 
 T-statistic N  
.         China         
. 
.              Year              
. 
.     Intercept    
. R2  
Mean SE Mean SE   Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
LAC Overall                 
W/ Venezuela 1.96 0.00 1.69 0.00 1.16  58.2*** 5,273,434  0.28*** 0.05 0.00 0.00 1.69*** 0.01 0.6893 
W/O Venezuela 1.93 0.00 1.65 0.00 1.17  60.5*** 4,912,485  0.28*** 0.04 0.00 0.00 1.65*** 0.01 0.7691 
                 
Sub-Regions                 
Caribbean 2.26 0.03 1.30 0.00 1.74  29.8*** 69,006  0.94*** 0.18 -0.01 0.01 1.31*** 0.03 0.6344 
Mex., Cent. Amer. 1.03 0.00 0.96 0.00 1.08  15.4*** 2,354,278  0.08 0.05 0.00* 0.00 0.96*** 0.01 0.3597 
South America 2.08 0.01 2.36 0.00 0.88  -51.8*** 2,850,150  -0.29*** 0.05 0.01 0.01 2.36*** 0.02 0.6388 
S. Amer. W/O Venez. 2.05 0.01 2.38 0.00 0.86  -61.2*** 2,489,201  -0.35*** 0.04 0.02*** 0.00 2.37*** 0.01 0.8605 
1 This column shows the ratio of average intensity of LAC-China exports to the average intensity of other LAC exports. A value greater than 1.0 indicates that 
exports to China are more GHG intensive than other exports, and a value less than 1.0 represents the opposite.  
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Table A.3.2: Mean GHG intensities and regressions results for LAC countries  
Average GHG Intensity of Exports  Two-sample t-test  Regression Results 
 .   To China   . .   To R.o.W.    . China/ 
R.o.W.1 
 T-statistic N  .         China         . .              Year              . .     Intercept    . R2  
Mean SE Mean SE   Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Argentina 2.08 0.02 2.99 0.01 0.69  -55.5*** 403,735  -0.93*** 0.11 -0.07*** 0.01 3.04*** 0.03 0.8720 
Bahamas 2.78 0.26 1.46 0.01 1.90  5.0*** 4,911  1.13* 0.42 0.03** 0.01 1.43*** 0.03 0.5226 
Barbados 1.29 0.10 1.52 0.02 0.84  -2.4* 3,064  -0.19 0.52 -0.01 0.02 1.53*** 0.06 0.0253 
Belize 1.57 0.23 0.69 0.01 2.29  3.8*** 1,784  0.84* 0.30 0 0.01 0.69*** 0.03 0.4285 
Bermuda 1.05 0.03 0.85 0.01 1.24  5.7** 4,103  0.19 1.25 0 0.02 0.86*** 0.05 0.0069 
Bolivia 3.03 0.16 4.07 0.01 0.74  -6.6*** 35,122  -0.91*** 0.19 0.02* 0.01 4.04*** 0.03 0.6183 
Brazil 2.50 0.01 2.83 0.00 0.89  -39.5*** 1,022,431  -0.41*** 0.08 0.07*** 0.01 2.8*** 0.03 0.7969 
Chile 1.14 0.00 1.26 0.00 0.90  -45.5*** 342,229  -0.13*** 0.01 0.01*** 0.00 1.26*** 0.00 0.9496 
Colombia 1.23 0.01 1.38 0.00 0.90  -18.4*** 225,467  -0.1 0.11 -0.03** 0.01 1.4*** 0.02 0.4904 
Costa Rica 0.57 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.71  -81.3*** 75,141  -0.23*** 0.04 0 0.00 0.8*** 0.01 0.6746 
Cuba 1.81 0.01 1.23 0.01 1.47  64.6*** 21,034  0.59** 0.14 -0.02 0.02 1.24*** 0.05 0.5114 
Dominican Rep. 2.31 0.05 1.14 0.00 2.02  24.5*** 49,671  1.18*** 0.20 -0.02 0.01 1.15*** 0.03 0.6831 
Ecuador 1.17 0.03 1.04 0.00 1.13  5.0*** 90,499  0.13* 0.06 0 0.00 1.04*** 0.01 0.2480 
El Salvador 1.11 0.14 0.73 0.01 1.52  2.7** 34,806  1.12 0.54 -0.01 0.01 0.74*** 0.02 0.2820 
Guatemala 0.92 0.06 1.19 0.00 0.78  -4.6*** 47,570  -0.22 0.20 0 0.01 1.18*** 0.02 0.0789 
Guyana 0.47 0.02 1.88 0.40 0.25  -32.8*** 4,782  -1.34*** 0.19 0.05*** 0.01 1.84*** 0.03 0.8229 
Haiti 1.34 0.10 0.68 0.00 1.98  6.8*** 6,649  0.64*** 0.08 0 0.00 0.69*** 0.01 0.8061 
Honduras 3.91 0.23 1.92 0.02 2.03  8.5*** 23,946  1.96 1.43 0 0.06 1.93*** 0.19 0.0989 
Jamaica 2.20 0.04 1.91 0.01 1.15  7.9*** 10,663  0.33* 0.15 0.02 0.01 1.91*** 0.03 0.2790 
Mexico 1.15 0.00 0.91 0.00 1.26  47.0*** 2,100,911  0.25*** 0.03 -0.01*** 0.00 0.92*** 0.00 0.8740 
Nicaragua 2.00 0.17 3.60 0.04 0.56  -9.1*** 13,462  -1.54 1.84 -0.17** 0.05 3.96*** 0.16 0.4557 
Panama 1.80 0.06 1.64 0.01 1.10  2.5* 56,658  0.17 0.22 0.07*** 0.01 1.59*** 0.02 0.7818 
Paraguay 2.38 0.11 3.20 0.07 0.74  -6.1*** 31,544  -0.81 0.84 -0.01 0.04 3.22*** 0.13 0.0521 
Peru 1.47 0.02 1.55 0.01 0.95  -5.0*** 159,906  -0.13 0.10 0.08*** 0.01 1.49*** 0.04 0.7489 
Trinidad, Tobago 1.25 0.03 1.75 0.00 0.71  -15.4*** 91,941  -0.43 0.45 -0.04** 0.01 1.79*** 0.03 0.4425 
Uruguay 7.50 0.14 6.96 0.06 1.08  3.6*** 39,867  0.69 0.45 -0.08 0.04 7.03*** 0.12 0.2394 
Venezuela 4.90 0.06 2.21 0.00 2.21  45.1*** 360,949  2.61* 1.05 -0.07* 0.03 2.24*** 0.09 0.4010 
1 This column shows the ratio of average intensity of LAC-China exports to the average intensity of other LAC exports. A value greater than 1.0 indicates that 
exports to China are more GHG intensive than other exports, and a value less than 1.0 represents the opposite.  
Note on representation: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Dominica, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, and Turks and Caicos are omitted due to small sample sizes, but their exports are included in overall and Caribbean exports in Table A.3.2, above. 
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A.4 Statistical Analysis of Water Intensity Levels of Exports 
Figure A.4.1 shows the cumulative distribution of exports from LAC to China and 
to the rest of the world, measured against the water intensity of each good and weighted 
by the real (2004) dollars of exports of each good. The results show that LAC exports to 
China fall roughly into two categories: about 60 percent have extremely low water 
intensity, and an additional share (over 20 percent) have intensity levels between 6 and 8 
cubic meters per dollar. In contrast, over 80 percent of exports to the rest of the world 
have very low intensity.   
Figure A.4.1: Cumulative distribution of exports across water intensity levels, by 
destination 
  
Figure A.4.2, disaggregated by sub-region, shows that the results for LAC overall are due 
primarily the experiences of South America.  
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Figure A.4.2: Cumulative distribution functions of export basket water intensity, by 
sub-region 
 Caribbean Mexico, Cent. Am. South America 
 
Among countries (below) it is clear that exports to China are more water intense 
in Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, and Uruguay, and less intense in several smaller 
countries. 
Figure A.4.3: Cumulative distribution functions of export basket water intensity, by 
country 
 Argentina Bahamas Barbados 
 
 Belize Bolivia Brazil 
 
 Chile Colombia Costa Rica 
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Figure A.4.3, continued: Cumulative distribution functions of export basket water 
intensity, by country 
 Dominica Dominican Rep. Ecuador 
 
 El Salvador Grenada Guatemala 
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Figure A.4.3, continued: Cumulative distribution functions of export basket water 
intensity, by country 
St. Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia St. Vincent, Grenadines 
 
Trinidad and Tobago Uruguay Venezuela 
 
 
 
Tables A.4.1 and A.4.2 show two different statistical tests for the impact of China 
on the water intensity of LAC exports. First, a two-sample t-test is conduction to establish 
whether the means of the distributions shown in Figures A.4.1 through A.4.3 above are 
statistically significant. Second, regression analysis is conducted to distinguish the impact 
of China and the impact of time (in other words, the progression of the commodity boom 
in general) on the changing average water intensity of these exports over the decade 
studied here.  
The regression analysis is repeated separately for each sub-region and country 
rather than incorporating them all into one analysis with interaction variables. This choice 
prevents the unnecessary introduction of additional heteroskedasticity. It takes the form 
!"#$%&'() = + + -./ℎ123) + 4.5637)	
Where: 
• 9:;<=>?@ represents the mean water intensity of a given export basket. 
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• i corresponds to each of 20 export baskets: to China and the rest of the world over a 
10-year period from 2004 to 2013, weighted by their value in millions of real (2004) 
US dollars, so that years with higher exports are weighted more heavily. 
• Year is the calendar year less 2008 (the midpoint of the sample) 
• China is a binary variable (1= exports to China, 0 = exports to elsewhere). 
Five countries and territories had insufficient exports to China during the study 
period to calculate country-level coefficients:  Dominica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. However, their exports are included in 
overall LAC and Caribbean exports in Table A.4.2.  In addition, Anguilla, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Bermuda, Cuba, Grenada, Haiti, and the Netherlands Antilles are omitted from 
the analysis entirely because water intensity estimates for their national production are 
unavailable. 
As with Appendix A.3, the tables here show the LAC region and South America 
both with and without Venezuela in order to address this country’s outlier status. Finally, 
Tables A.4.1 and A.4.2 list the ratio of average emission intensities of exports to China 
compared to other exports. For example, the region-wide value of 2.80 indicates that 
overall, LAC exports to China can be expected to use or contaminate 180 percent more 
net GHG emissions per dollar than other LAC exports.  
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Table A.4.1: Mean water intensities and regressions results for LAC region and sub-regions  
Average Water Intensity of Exports  Two-sample t-test  Regression Results 
 .   To China   . .   To R.o.W.    . China/ 
R.o.W. 
 T-statistic N  .         China         . .              Year              . .     Intercept    . R2  Mean SE Mean SE   Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
LAC Overall                 
W/ Venezuela 2.70 0.01  0.97 2.80  225.1*** 4,792,095  1.64*** 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.94*** 0.02 0.9622 
W/O Venezuela 2.72 0.01  1.03 2.60  218.7*** 4,513,788  1.60*** 0.08 0.00 0.01 1.00*** 0.02 0.0620 
                 
Sub-Regions                 
Caribbean 0.05 0.02  0.23 0.20  -7.7*** 117,296  -0.09 0.05 -0.01* 0.00 0.23*** 0.01 0.3975 
Mex., Cent. Amer. 0.25 0.01  0.24 1.03  0.9 2,234,613  0.01 0.14 -0.01 0.01 0.25*** 0.02 0.0861 
South America 2.96 0.01  1.74 1.71  143.7*** 2,440,186  1.16*** 0.09 0.01 0.01 1.65*** 0.03 0.9036 
S. Amer. W/O Venez. 2.98 0.01  1.98 1.50  115.8*** 2,161,879  0.96*** 0.10 0.01 0.01 1.87*** 0.03 0.8562 
Note on sample sizes and weights: For the two-sample t-test, the unit of analysis is millions of real (2004) dollars of exports during the decade studied here. The 
sample sizes are the corresponding number of millions of dollars of exports during that time. Since the two-sample test statistic eliminates any possibility that the 
differing means could be the result of chance, it is possible to conduct regression analysis on just the mean intensity level of the whole basket of exports from 
each reporter to China or to the rest of the world. For these regression functions, the sample size is 20 (two exports markets and 10 years).  The regression 
analysis uses analytic weights of the dollar value of each year’s exports (in millions), which allows years with more exports (in real terms) to be counted more 
heavily. 
Note on country representation: Antigua and Barbuda, Bermuda, Cuba, Haiti, and the Netherlands Antilles are omitted from the analysis because water intensity 
estimates for their national production are unavailable. 
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Table A.4.2: Mean water intensities and regressions results, by countries  
Avg. Intensity of Exports  Two-sample t-test  Regression Results 
 .   To China   . .   To R.o.W.    . China/ 
R.o.W. 
 T-statistic N  .         China         . .              Year              . .     Intercept    . R2  Mean SE Mean SE   Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Argentina 6.36 0.02 3.50 0.01 1.8  143.0*** 379,925  2.88*** 0.28 -0.06* 0.03 3.39*** 0.09 0.8671 
Bahamas 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.0  -0.9 3,442  0.01 0.01 0.00*** 0.00 0.05*** 0.00 0.7979 
Barbados 0.11 0.00 0.50 0.06 0.2  -6.5*** 2,079  -0.27 0.58 -0.02 0.02 0.41*** 0.06 0.0804 
Belize 0.68 0.00 2.71 0.11 0.3  -18.2*** 1,594  -1.89 1.78 0.05 0.06 2.27*** 0.17 0.0872 
Bolivia 1.85 0.29 1.98 0.03 0.9  -0.6 36,542  0.01 0.39 -0.16*** 0.02 2.18*** 0.06 0.7942 
Brazil 3.81 0.01 2.07 0.00 1.8  142.4*** 1,003,350  1.66*** 0.10 0.04** 0.01 2.01*** 0.03 0.9522 
Chile 0.05 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.3  -77.1*** 292,376  -0.12*** 0.01 0.01*** 0.00 0.16*** 0.00 0.9676 
Colombia 0.23 0.02 0.69 0.01 0.3  -29.0*** 196,367  -0.32** 0.10 -0.06*** 0.01 0.72*** 0.02 0.8670 
Costa Rica 0.21 0.02 0.70 0.01 0.3  -25.0*** 56,119  -0.44** 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.66*** 0.02 0.4910 
Dominican Republic 0.06 0.05 0.39 0.01 0.1  -7.2*** 43,108  -0.15 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.35*** 0.02 0.2231 
Ecuador 0.63 0.10 1.42 0.02 0.4  -7.7*** 69,790  -0.62** 0.19 0.02* 0.01 1.13*** 0.02 0.5003 
El Salvador 0.47 0.29 0.72 0.01 0.7  -1.7 30,874  -0.29 0.31 -0.01 0.00 0.68*** 0.01 0.1832 
Guatemala 5.07 0.24 2.12 0.02 2.4  10.7*** 42,715  2.39* 1.02 -0.02 0.03 2.01*** 0.09 0.2603 
Guyana 0.07 0.00 2.38 0.06 0.0  -37.6*** 4,126  -1.94* 0.73 -0.04 0.03 2.01*** 0.10 0.3283 
Honduras 0.30 0.09 2.26 0.03 0.1  -23.1*** 20,969  -1.57 1.60 -0.10 0.07 2.22*** 0.21 0.1710 
Jamaica 0.03 0.00 0.63 0.03 0.0  -19.6*** 9,216  -0.67*** 0.14 -0.07*** 0.01 0.56*** 0.03 0.7652 
Mexico 0.18 0.01 0.15 0.00 1.2  4.2*** 2,024,608  0.04 0.15 -0.01 0.01 0.16*** 0.02 0.1338 
Nicaragua 2.55 0.46 3.03 0.05 0.8  -1.8 11,440  -0.39 2.58 -0.21** 0.07 3.03*** 0.23 0.3621 
Panama 0.84 0.18 0.14 0.01 5.9  3.8*** 52,152  0.41 0.71 -0.02 0.03 0.15* 0.06 0.0360 
Paraguay 9.08 0.34 8.71 0.09 1.0  0.7 28,485  -0.69 1.94 -0.61*** 0.09 9.43*** 0.29 0.7241 
Peru 0.05 0.00 0.50 0.01 0.1  -63.2*** 123,484  -0.43*** 0.03 0.02*** 0.00 0.44*** 0.01 0.9401 
Trinidad & Tobago 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.7  -15.0*** 59,946  -0.01 0.01 0.00*** 0.00 0.07*** 0.00 0.8007 
Uruguay 5.75 0.10 4.07 0.02 1.4  16.3*** 35,713  1.24** 0.42 0.12** 0.04 3.55*** 0.12 0.5387 
Venezuela 0.83 0.13 0.03 0.00 25.6  6.1*** 278,829  0.83** 0.25 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.3996 
See the note on sample sizes and weights on Table A.3.2, above. 
Note on country representation: Dominica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines are omitted from this step due to small 
sample sizes, but their exports are included in the “Caribbean” category in Table A.3.1, above.  
Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Bermuda, Cuba, Grenada, Haiti, and the Netherlands Antilles are omitted from the analysis entirely because water intensity 
estimates for their national production are unavailable 
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APPENDIX B 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 2 
B.1 Completed, International DFI-Financed Infrastructure Projects Included in This 
Analysis, and the Corresponding Site-Specific Radii used in Models 4-13 
 
The following tables give a timeline of project approvals by country, bank, and 
type of project. These tables show the choice of each project’s site-specific radius, used 
in Models 4 through 13. Where applicable, those choices entail tree cover change as a 
function of the radius chosen for measurement, and the resulting site-specific radius, 
defined as the x-intercept of the second derivative of these functions. In other cases, an 
explanation is provided for an alternate choice in site-specific radius. 
 
Table B.1.1: Projects in Bolivia 
Approval 
Year Type DFI(s) Project Name 
Tree Cover Change as a Function of 
Radius 
Radius 
(km) 
2002 Road 
CAF/ 
IADB Santa Cruz – Puerto Suárez y=0.0006x
3-0.0131x2+0.0891x-0.4544 7 
IBRD 
La Paz – Oruro 1 N/A (zero tree cover within 10km) 10 
Rio Seco – Huarina 1 N/A (zero tree cover within 4km) 4 
Tiquina – Copacabana 1 N/A (zero tree cover within 3km) 3 
Yacuiba – Boyuibe 1 y=0.0003x3-0.006x2+0.0484x-0.2821 7 
Yamparáez – Sucre 1 N/A (zero tree cover within 6km) 6 
2004 Port IFC Puerto Aguirre N/A (zero tree cover change nearby) 1 Road IADB La Paz  – Caranavi y=-0.00004x3+0.0007x2-0.0031x-0.0082 6 
2006 Road 
CAF 
Huachacalla – Pisiga N/A (zero tree cover within 10km) 10 
Integración Sur, Phase 2 N/A (zero tree cover within 10km) 10 
Riberalta – Guayamerín y=-0.00006x3+0.0002x2+0.017x-0.3844 1 
Uyuni – Potosi N/A (zero tree cover within 10km) 10 
IADB Quiquibe – Yucumo 
2 y=0.0002x3-0.0046x2+0.0273x-0.1707 8 
Yucumo – Rurrenbaque 2 y=0.0006x3-0.0126x2+0.1076x-0.6697 7 
2011 Road CAF La “Y” de Integración N/A (zero tree cover within 10km) 10 Uyuni – Cruce Condo K N/A (zero tree cover within 10km) 10 
2012 Road CAF 
Chacapuco – Ravelo N/A (zero tree cover within 10km) 10 
Quillacollo – Suticollo N/A (zero tree cover change within 10km) 10 
Uyuni – Tupiza N/A (zero tree cover within 10km) 10 
Notes:  
1 These roads were jointly financed through the “Road Rehabilitation and Maintenance” program. 
2 These roads were jointly financed through the “Santa Bárbara-Rurrenabaque Northern Corridor Highway 
Improvement” program.  
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Table B.1.2: Projects in Colombia 
App. 
Year 
Type DFI(s) Project Name Tree Cover Change as a Function of 
Radius  
Radius 
(km) 
2005 Dam, w/ res. IADB Porce III N/A (unrelated TC loss at 7km) 6 
2006 Road IADB 
Andes – Jardin 3 y=-0.00006x3+0.0005x2+0.004x-0.0658 3 
Angelópolis – Caldas 3 y=0.0002x3-0.0054x2+0.052x-0.2259 9 
Bolombolo – Venecia 3 N/A (zero tree cover change within 1km) 1 
Entrerrios – San Pedro 3 y=-0.0001x3+0.0013x2+0.0023x-0.0971 4 
La Fabiana – Valparaiso 3 y=0.0001x3-0.0029x2+0.0204x-0.0583 10 
Marinilla – Guatape 3 y=-0.0001x3+0.0006x2+0.0157x-0.1205 2 
Montenegro – La 
Fabiana-El Líbano-
Tamesis 3 
N/A (unrelated TC gain at 6km) 5 
Puerto Triunfo – 
Autopista 3 N/A (unrelated TC loss at 7km) 6 
Titiribi – Albania 3 N/A (unrelated TC loss at 4km) 3 
2007 Port IFC 
Terminal Maritimo 
Muelles el Bosque S.A. 
N/A (zero tree cover change within 
2km) 2 
Road CAF Buga – Buenaventura y=-0.0001x3+0.0031x2-0.0201x+0.0097 10 
2009 
Dam, 
w/ res. CAF Sogamoso N/A (unrelated TC loss at 5km) 4 
Fossil 
fuel 
power 
CAF/IFC Termoflores N/A (zero tree cover within 2km) 2 
CAF/IFC/IIC Termo Rubiales N/A (zero tree cover within 2km) 2 
2010 Port 
CAF/IFC Puerto Santa Marta N/A (zero tree cover within 2km) 2 
IFC/IIC Puerto Buenaventura N/A (zero tree cover change within 1km) 1 
2011 
Dam, 
RoR IIC Patico – La Cabrera 
N/A (zero tree cover change within 
2km) 2 
Port CAF/IFC Puerto Bahía y=-0.0025x3+0.023x2+0.0716x-0.6722 3 
2014 Dam, RoR IIC Los Molinos 
N/A (zero tree cover change within 
2km) 2 
Notes:  
3 These roads were jointly financed through the “Roads for Integration and Social Equality” program.  
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Table B.1.3: Projects in Ecuador 
App. 
Year Type Bank(s) Project Name 
Tree Cover Change as a Function 
of Radius  
Radius 
(km) 
2000 Dam, RoR BNDES San Francisco y=0.00005x
3-0.0009x2+0.0055x-
0.0105 6 
2004 Dam, RoR IBRD 
Abanico 4 N/A (zero tree cover change within 2km) 2 
Sabanilla 4 N/A (zero tree cover change within 2km) 2 
2007 Dam, w/ res. IADB Baba y=-0.0016x
3+0.0308x2-
0.1851x+0.1812 6 
2010 Dam, RoR CHEXIM Coca-Codo Sinclair 
y=0.0001x3-0.0024x2+0.0129x-
0.0242 8 
Sopladora N/A (zero tree cover within 6km) 6 
2011 
Fossil fuel 
power CDB Termoesmeraldas 
N/A (zero tree cover change within 
2km) 2 
Unconv. 
renewables CDB Villonaco Norte (wind) 
N/A (zero tree cover change within 
1km) 1 
2012 
Dam, RoR 
BNDES Manduriacu y=0.0037x
3-0.0721x2+0.4322x-
0.7892 6 
CAF San José de Minas N/A (zero tree cover change within 1km) 1 
CAF/IFC San Bartolo N/A (zero tree cover change within 1km) 1 
Road CAF Ruta Viva y = 0.0002x
3 - 0.0019x2 + 0.0025x - 
0.0176 3 
2013 Dam, RoR CDB Minas San Francisco N/A (zero tree cover change within 1km) 3 
2014 Unconv. renewables CAF Gran Solar 
y=0.005x3-0.1128x2+0.8056x-
1.8256 8 
Notes:  
4 These dams were jointly financed through the “SIBIMBE” program, with the Netherlands Clean 
Development Facility. 
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Table B.1.4: Projects in Peru 
Year Type Bank(s) Project Name Tree Cover Change as a Function of 
Radius  
Radius 
(km) 
2003 Road IADB/IFC Red Vial 5 Toll Road Ancón 
– Pativilca 
N/A (zero tree cover change within 10km) 10 
2004 Dam, w/res. IBRD Cerro Mulato 5 N/A (zero tree cover change within 3km) 3 
El Sauce 5 N/A (unrelated tree cover loss at 2km) 1 
Moche I & II 5 N/A (zero tree cover within 10km) 10 
Tanguche I & II 5 N/A (zero tree cover within 10km) 10 
Tunnel Graton 5 N/A (zero tree cover within 10km) 10 
2005 Road CAF Corredor Vial Interoceánico 
Sur, Rte. 2 6 
y=0.0001x3-0.0022x2+0.0123x-0.0318 7 
Corredor Vial Interoceánico 
Sur, Rte. 3 6 
y=0.0006x3-0.0124x2+0.0955x-0.437 7 
Corredor Vial Interoceánico 
Sur, Rte. 4 6 
y=0.00003x3-0.0009x2+0.0091x-0.0684 10 
2006 Road IADB Canta – Huayllay N/A (zero tree cover within 10km) 10 
Sullana – El Alamor y=0.0004x3-0.0054x2+0.0348x+0.0978 5 
2009 Biofuel IADB Maple, Inc. sugar ethanol 
project 
N/A (zero tree cover within 7km) 7 
Road CAF Red Vial4: Pativilca – Casma 
– Chimbote – Trujillo 
N/A (zero tree cover within 10km) 10 
2010 Dam, w/ res. IFC Hydro Cheves N/A (zero tree cover within 8km) 8 
Road CAF Camaná – Dv. Quilca –
Matarani – Ilo – Tacna 7 
N/A (zero tree cover within 10km) 10 
Casma – Yaután – Huaraz 7 N/A (zero tree cover within 2km) 2 
Churín – Oyón 7 N/A (zero tree cover within 10km) 10 
Lunahuaná – DV. Yauyos- 
Chupaca 7 
N/A (zero tree cover within 1km) 1 
Reposo – Saramiriza 7 y=0.00003x3-0.0012x2+0.015x-0.1027 13 
Tingo María – Aguaytía 7 y=-0.00004x3+0.0004x2+0.001x-0.1077 3 
Aguaytía – Pucallpa 7 y=-0.0003x3+0.0087x2-0.0796x-0.356 10 
Tocache – DV. Tocache 7 y=-0.0002x3+0.0045x2-0.0212x-0.2788 8 
Trujillo-Sirán-Huamachuco 7 y=-0.0003x3+0.0053x2-0.0396x+0.0699 6 
CAF/ IBRD Chongoyape – Cochabamba 
– Cajamarca 8 
y=-0.0004x3+0.008x2-0.0494x+0.0583 7 
Ollantaytambo – 
Quillabamba 8 
y=-0.00001x3+0.0001x2-0.0004x-0.0006 3 
Lima – Canta 8 N/A (zero tree cover within 10km) 10 
2011 Dam, RoR CAF Las Pizarras N/A (zero tree cover within 11km) 1 
2012 Dam, RoR CAF Canchayllo N/A (zero tree cover within 10km) 10 
2013 Port IFC Callao Muelle Norte N/A (zero tree cover within 10km) 10 
2014 Unconv. 
renewables 
CAF/ IADB Marcona/Tres Hermanas 
(wind) 
N/A (zero tree cover within 10km) 10 
Notes: 5 These dams were jointly financed through the “Poechos” program. 
6 These dams were jointly financed. 
7 These roads were jointly financed through the “Infraestructura Vial de Perú” program. 
8 These roads were jointly financed through the IBRD’s “Peru Safe and Sustainable Transport” program 
and CAF’s “Infraestructura Vial de Perú” program. 
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B.2 Methodology: Environmental Performance Index 
EPI scores used here are derived from the Environmental Performance Index project 
managed by Yale University and the Columbia University Earth Institute, with a few 
adjustments as noted below: 
1. As EPI methodology changes over time, in order to calculated scores that are 
comparable across years, scores are normalized across countries for each year. Two 
versions of these scores are available: one series from 2000 to 2010 (Yale and 
CIESIN, 2012), and another from 2007 to 2015 (Hsu, 2016). For the years 2007 
through 2010, averages are taken for each country across the two indices, and those 
results are then normalized.  
2. For multilateral development banks, weighted averages are calculated using 
countries’ representation on bank boards for each year.  
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